Group firms’ access to internal capital markets: The contingent roles of group resources and affiliates’ financial weakness

Abstract

This study investigates how group’s value maximization considerations determine affiliates’ access to internal capital. Previous studies have indicated that both the amount of group resources and affiliates’ financial weakness are relevant to internal capital allocation decisions. Our study investigates how these two factors jointly affect affiliates’ access to internal capital. By analyzing the effects of capital shortage on various financing channels in the context of insurance groups, we reveal that financially-weak firms’ capital shortage positively affects the receipt of internal capital when groups own abundant resources. Conversely, when the amount of group resources is limited, those affiliates enjoying better financial conditions receive more internal capital to manage their capital shortage, and financially-weak ones do not; thus, such financially-weak firms exhibit increased tendency to use costly external capital to manage their capitalization. Our findings indicate that groups with less abundant resources tend to engage in “winner-picking” allocation decisions to maximize value.