Governance shifts: regulating private security for the Paris 2024 Olympics

The extension of private security patrols into public spaces has increased considerably in recent years and both the government and the police service have indicated a willingness to seek ways to accommodate and regulate private security companies. This article presents the results of a study into the operation of one private security company in a working‐class area in the North of England. It examines some of the difficulties that will be faced by the police, the formal agents of law and order in attempting to regulate private security firms and highlights the motivation of ordinary citizens faced by increasing fear of crime. At the same time it allows us to challenge some earlier assumptions about the nature of vigilantism and suggests a modification of Johnson's 1996 definition.

Key issues raised by the use and operation of private military and security companies, particularly in conflict areas, are their accountability and how to control them. National regulation, however, is still rare. States have a role to play first as contractors. Considered selection, contracting and oversight procedures and standards may help promote respect for human rights and international humanitarian law by companies and their staff. Secondly, territorial and exporting states may consider adopting regulations to increase control and promote accountability. In view of this still largely unregulated phenomenon, this contribution considers elements of contracting and regulatory options.

This paper seeks to explore the legislation and regulatory frameworks that guides the functionality and operation of private securities placed in drinking establishments in South Africa. Prior research has indicated lack of clarity regarding private security personnel regulation in drinking establishments, otherwise known as bouncers. For instance, the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) is the current regulatory structure which is mandated to monitor and regulate all the private security industries in South Africa. Private security players in South Africa are obligated to comply with the PSIR Act and related laws in general. For this reason, the duty of PSIRA to oversee and monitor private securities and to ensure that they comply with the law is paramount. However, a major concern is whether nightclub security is regulated in adherence to this Act or not. Research evidence has shown that security legislation and guidelines are either not in place or not enforced at nightclubs. The purpose of this article is to examine critical legislations that South African nightclub securities must comply with to ensure legitimacy. Furthermore, it assesses the regulatory body, PSIRA, in relation to South African nightclub securities. It further explores the training requirements needed to qualify as a nightclub security. Arguably, a limited number of studies address the skills and legal requirements nightclub securities need to meet to fully qualify to work as a nightclub security in South Africa. Thus this paper will add to the body of knowledge in the field of nightclub security regulation. Strengthening the regulatory framework and increasing the authority's enforcement capacity to regulate the industry more effectively have become inevitable obligations, especially in light of the continued growth in the private security industry. The article finds that nightclub security is not adequately regulated, leading to non-compliance of the regulatory framework from the private security industry. This paper is an extensive review of literature focusing on South African legislative frameworks that regulate private security operations in drinking establishments.

Over the past 40 years, the private security sector in Belgium, along with its related policies, has undergone significant transformations, with the industry establishing itself as a crucial partner in domestic security governance. Although the political context in which private security has evolved holds considerable importance in criminological scholarship, the specific processes of framing this phenomenon have attracted much less attention. This article examines the various approaches adopted by political actors in framing private security within policy formulations and efforts to introduce new regulations. Empirical data are drawn from parliamentary records spanning the years 1980 to 2020. By focussing on the parliamentary arena, we analysed how the issue – that is, the need for regulating private security – has been discussed, motivated and framed by those in power. Our results demonstrate that six conflicting and supporting frames revolved around three overarching themes: the function and position of private security, and what the government sought to protect in society. The findings of this study provide new insights into the forms, degrees and manifestations of framing private security, along with its relation to security events over time. Consequently, it offers a deeper understanding of the political field and societal conditions under which the trajectory of private security has unfolded in Belgium.

Legal laws which regulate private security sector in the Republic of Serbia have arrived after twenty years of legal vacuum in this area, and they have been the object of expectations of many private security experts and practitioners in Serbia. They regulate the licensing process of private security officers. Aim of this research was to identify key characteristics of the licensing process which implies training course in licensed training centers, exam in front of the commission of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and, finally, licensing. The aim was also to identify values points, experiences and opinions of private security officers and candidates in the process of their course, exam and licensing. That was the reason to use the method of a semi-structured interview in our qualitative research. We interviewed eleven respondents - private security officers who are working or have worked for eight different private security agencies in the Republic of Serbia. They all have a license which is regulated with new Private security law. Research helps us to identify key problems in the licensing process. Candidates who are working in some private security agencies are not free from the job days during the course. They work night shifts and then go to the training center or go to work after classes. Also, there is the question of meeting fund of the course hours and whether all candidates go to the course at all. The criteria were lowered at the exam, and there is a problem of funding licensing process. Some of the candidates are paying their course by self, some are financed by the employer. In that case, the employer refunds it in the future or candidate have a contractual obligation to work with that employer in the future. Licensing process has its good sides as well. Candidates gain knowledge in security sciences, law and their rights. They are developing skills of self-defense and overcoming the resistance and developing their physical strength. The development of security culture is encouraged as well as a desire for improvement of security sector officers and candidates.

Scholars tend to agree that imposing comprehensive regulations is one of the most effective strategies states can use to control and direct private security companies. This study shows how attempts to strictly regulate private security firms have failed in Mexico. The Federal government of Mexico, as well as each state government, has created some form of regulation to control the activities of the private security industry. In certain states, these regulations are more stringent than those in many countries. Nonetheless, corruption, weak enforcement, and high entry barriers have created low incentives for private security firms to abide by government regulations, leading to a widespread evasion and an expansive market of unregulated and undisciplined private security companies, thus bringing into question the efficacy of imposing strict private security regulations in states with weak institutions.

Beyond the Public Gaze — The Exclusion of Private Investigators from the British Debate over Regulating Private Security

This article reviews legislation that was introduced in Spain in 1992 to regulate private security agencies. I will first try to show that the private security sector played a key role in the development of this legislation, which it needed to shore up its public image. Second, I present some of the impacts that the legislation has had on the private security industry and further discuss how relationships between the state and the larger private security agencies evolved after the passing of the legislation. Finally, I reflect upon the process of exchanging information between the public and the private sector in the light of the framework developed by Richard Ericson and Kevin Haggerty in their book Policing the Risk Society. In conclusion, I underline the meaning of the Spanish reforms in respect to the more recent developments in the theory of policing, such as the networked nodal governance model.

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One of the challenges faced by most countries today is adopting an appropriate legal framework to regulate the most important issues of private security activities. Certainly, one of these issues is the services provided by private security companies, which include the activity of securing the transport of money and other valuables. France, as a member state of the European Union, has a specific legal framework. The subject of this paper is the analysis of the legal framework regulating private security activities concerning the transport of money and other valuables. In this regard, the historical development of the legal framework will be particularly analyzed. Additionally, the provisions of the current Code of Internal Security (Code de la sécurité intérieure) will be analyzed, which, among others, regulate the following issues: performing tasks of transportation of money and other valuables; conditions that transport vehicles must meet; types of transport vehicles; transport vehicle crew (wearing a uniform, protective vest and weapons) and technical protection systems.

Whom do we blame for causing crime? Increasingly, Americans blame the management of shopping malls, restaurants, parking facilities, and other quasi-public spaces on private property where many predatory crimes occur. This trend has fed both litigation and legislation regulating private security measures in those locations. The two main trends require the disclosure of information on prior crimes and the provision of specific crime prevention strategies. Despite the measurement problems in reporting place-specific crime rates, this practice seems likely to grow. So do the legal restrictions on the physical design of automatic teller machines, the number of clerks on duty in stores, and the number of security guards on duty. Whether these requirements will actually reduce, or even increase, crime remains to be seen. An agency like the Food and Drug Administration is needed to supervise the testing of crime prevention measures to ensure that they are safe and effective.

This paper examines the problem of regulating private security in Britain by locating the issue in a wider European context. It suggests that future debate will have to focus on three issues: the relationship between regulation and quality of service; the relationship between regulation and market expansion; and the impact of a changing ‘policing division of labour’ on the regulation of relations between public and private, and national and supranational policing agencies.

There is wide variation among states in the type of behavior that disqualifies individuals from becoming a security guard. There is also variation among states with respect to the minimum requirements for becoming a security guard. Roughly one-third of the states require that applicants be either citizens or legal residents of the United States. One half of the states have a minimum age requirement. The most common minimum age for both armed and unarmed security guards is eighteen years; however some states have different age requirements depending upon whether or not the guard is armed. For example, the minimum age in Delaware is twenty for unarmed guards and twenty-one for armed guards. As a general indicator, 66 percent of states regulated private security guard services in some manner in 1981. Presently, 82 percent of states regulate private security at the employee level. This is a positive sign, but it should be reiterated that there is a vast difference between regulation levels among the states. What passes for regulation in some states is little more than asking applicants to promise that they are qualified to be a security guard.

Regulating Private Security Providers in the Maritime Sphere: Legal Challenges and Dilemmas