Abstract
In the preceding chapter I have addressed myself primarily to those who will reject, on moral grounds, my Chapter 1 solution of the problem of suffering. But these philosophers ought to ask themselves whether they are Kantian absolutists with respect to suffering -whether they hold, e.g., that it would be morally unacceptable to inflict, say, five minutes of intense pain on an innocent person in order to prevent the annihilation of the human species. If they do not, then they have no good reason to reject my Chapter 1 solution. For it is open to us to hold that E is a much more valuable end than the preservation of humanity - valuable enough, indeed, to outweigh the negative value of human and animal suffering to a much greater extent than would the preservation of humanity outweigh the negative value of five minutes of intense pain. At any rate, I address myself in this chapter to those who agree that my Chapter 1 solution is successful.
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