Abstract
The stability of Nash equilibria against the perturbation of the right-hand side functions of state equations for noncooperative differential games is investigated. By employing the set-valued analysis theory, we show that the differential games whose equilibria are all stable form a dense residual set, and every differential game can be approximated arbitrarily by a sequence of stable differential games, that is, in the sense of Baire’s category most of the differential games are stable.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
