Generalized Engage or Retreat Differential Game With Escort Regions

Abstract

This paper is motivated by the desire to develop optimal defensive control strategies that discourage an attacker from engaging in attack while simultaneously encouraging retreat. We develop a general, two-player, differential game in which one player represents an attacker and the opposing player represents the defender. The attacker possesses superior dynamics such that it is capable of terminating the game either in engagement or retreat as it so chooses. The defender is incapable of directly preventing engagement. Instead, the defender uses the manipulation of the attacker's utility function as a form of indirect control in an attempt to make retreat a more attractive option over engagement. The solution to the overall engage or retreat differential game is found by solving two related optimization problems: the differential game of engagement and the optimal constrained retreat. The equilibrium open-loop control strategies and resulting game values of the attack or retreat game are expressed in terms of the solutions to these subproblems. Within the optimal constrained retreat problem, a value function constraint is imposed in order to prevent the attacker from moving into regions where engagement becomes optimal. This leads to regions of constrained retreat which we refer to as escort regions.