General T. C. Hindman and the Trans-Mississippi District

Abstract

When the student of Arkansas history encounters the name of Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman, Jr., it is generally connected in some manner with the failure of the Prairie Grove Campaign in December 1 862. Certainly this defeat was significant, but it is unfortunate that relatively little attention has been devoted to his success in organizing and administering the Trans-Mississippi District in June and July of the same year. During a scant two months, Hindman dramatically demonstrated what a determined individual could accomplish. However, on the negative side, his dictatorial methods did little to endear him to the people of Arkansas or to impress the Confederate authorities in Richmond, Virginia. This important period of Hindman's career has usually been passed rapidly over with a favorable remark about his organizational ability and an adverse comment concerning his arbitrary methods. This leaves the reader with an incomplete picture, because it fails adequately to explain the general's acts or to discuss the conditions in the state that undoubtedly influenced him. Therefore, before judgment can be passed on Hindman's conduct, an analysis must be made of the difficulties that would have faced any Confederate commander in Arkansas by the spring of 1 862. Hindman's assignment to the Trans-Mississippi District grew out of the Confederacy's rapidly deteriorating military fortunes throughout the Mississippi Valley in the early months of 1862. By February, Rebel forces in western Kentucky and Tennessee were in retreat due to the loss of Forts Henry and Donelson. West of the Mississippi River, Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn, commander of the Trans-Mississippi District, attempted to lead Confederate forces in a sweeping invasion of Missouri and was checked almost before he began. While advancing through northwest Arkansas, the general's troops were met by a determined Union army under the command of Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis. The result was a bloody two-day engagement on March 7 and 8 at Pea Ridge that ended with Curtis 's army administering a stinging defeat to the Confederate invasion force.1 Shortly after the battle, Van Dorn's army was ordered east of the Mississippi River to shore up sagging Confederate defenses being severely tested by Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant. Thus, the battle of Pea Ridge left northwest Arkansas and southern Missouri under Federal control and the remainder of Arkansas open to invasion. In accordance with orders received on March 27, 1862, Van Dorn began to move his command to Memphis, Tennessee, and by May 1, the transfer was complete, leaving no organized Confederate troops in Arkansas.2 On April 11, Van Dorn appointed Brig. Gen. John S. Roane to organize the defenses of Arkansas. His orders gave him authority to put into the field all troops under the conscript law and all cavalry forces that may come through.3 Roane's assessment of his position was not encouraging. In a letter to Van Dora dated May 4, he expressed little hope of saving the state and felt that he was not capable of commanding the area. Even in the matter of the enforcement of the conscript law, he refused to act positively, stating that if I shall judge it wise, I may raise more troops, but I will not do so unless I am compelled to.4 Roane's immediate problems, which were intensified by his pessimistic attitude, paralyzed any effort to coordinate the defensive preparations in Arkansas. His predecessor had not only removed all the organized troops from Arkansas but also taken all the available military supplies and machinery. The only troops immediately available to Roane were under the command of Brig. Gen. Albert Pike in the Indian Territory. Although ordered by Van Dora to send all non-Indian troops to Arkansas, Pike had refused to comply. Roane's position was further weakened by the actions of Gov. Henry M. Rector. Enraged by the withdrawal of Van Dora's forces, the governor, on May 5, issued a proclamation that Arkansas had been deserted by the Confederacy and hinted that it might become necessary to form a separate western nation. …