Games vs (Democratic) Deficits: The Challenges of Digital Gamification for Supranational Regulators

Abstract

An acute problem at the national level, the deficit of openness and transparency among supranational regulators is even more critical and actual. Following on the expansion of their regulatory powers, decision makers operating beyond national borders are criticized for their inherent democratic deficit, opaque operations and lack of legitimacy. The proposed paper investigates the use of digital “gamification” strategies - i.e. the introduction of game-design elements into regulatory policies - by supranational regulators - including both international institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the United Nations (UN), and supranational institutions, such as the European Union (EU) and the European Central Bank (ECB). Section 1 describes the use of gamification in governance and investigates the reasons motivating supranational regulators to experiment with gamification. Section 2 of the paper develops a conceptual understanding of the uses of gamification in supranational governance. Section 3 ventures beyond the empirical analysis to address the impact of gamification strategies on the exercise of public power in supranational contexts.