Abstract

The volatility of a new energy output leads to bidding bias when participating in the power market competition. A pumped storage power station is an ideal method of stabilizing new energy volatility. Therefore, wind power suppliers and pumped storage power stations first form wind storage joint ventures to participate in power market competition. At the same time, middlemen are introduced, constructing an upper-level game model (considering power producers and wind storage joint ventures) that forms equilibrium results of bidding competition in the wholesale and power distribution markets. Based on the equilibrium result of the upper-level model, a lower model is constructed to distribute the profits from wind storage joint ventures. The profits of each wind storage joint venture, wind power supplier, and pumped storage power station are obtained by the Nash negotiation and the Shapely value method. Finally, a case study is conducted. The results show that the wind storage joint ventures can improve the economics of the system. Further, the middlemen can smooth the rapid fluctuation of power price in the distribution and wholesale market, maintaining a smooth and efficient operation of the electricity market. These findings provide information for the design of an electricity market competition mechanism and the promotion of new energy power generation.

Highlights

  • With the deterioration of the environment and the frequent occurrence of energy problems, new energy research is being actively conducted in various fields to achieve sustainable energy development, and distributed power sources are combined with the power grid to improve the energy structure [1,2]

  • Where, ri represents the value of cooperative member i; Rwp and Rpu represent the benefits of the cooperative game between the wind power supplier and the pumped storage power station; Xwpu represents the overall income of wind storage joint ventures; Xwp represents the income of wind power suppliers’ independent participation in the distribution market; Xpu represents the income of pumped storage power stations independently participating in the distribution market

  • To stabilize the bidding bias caused by the volatility of wind power suppliers, this paper proposes that wind power suppliers and pumped storage power stations form an alliance to participate in the power market competition

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Summary

Introduction

With the deterioration of the environment and the frequent occurrence of energy problems, new energy research is being actively conducted in various fields to achieve sustainable energy development, and distributed power sources are combined with the power grid to improve the energy structure [1,2]. [16,17] proposed the Shapely value to distribute the income, but the application scenarios were different, Wu, Zhou et al [16] based on the Shapley value to share the income between wind power suppliers and pumped storage power stations. Compared with the existing research, the innovations of this paper are as follows: (1) Through the aggregation of distributed wind power and pumped storage power stations, it is regarded as a deterministic power supply, participating in the power distribution market’s bidding competition, and stabilizing the volatility of wind power generation. (3) The Nash negotiation method and Shapely value are used to quantify the profit between the wind storage joint venture, the wind power suppliers, and the pumped storage power stations, which solves the problem of cooperative game profit distribution.

Market Trading Framework
Decision Model of Power Producers
Objective Function
Restrictions
Decision Model of Wind Storage Joint Venture
Decision Model of the Middleman
Lower-Level Wind Storage Joint Venture Profit Distribution Model
Interactive Planning Method
Model Specific Solution Process
Basic Data
Empirical Analysis
The Impact of Different Alliance Scenarios on Equilibrium Results
Profit
The Impact of Wholesale Market Demand on Equilibrium Results
Conclusions
Full Text
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