Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effectiveness of border enforcement and internal enforcement policies under capital immobility and free capital mobility. Different from the previous studies where host firm is assumed to be risk-neutral, we introduce a framework in which host firm is allowed to exhibit different attitudes to risk and examine how the enforcement policies influence illegal migration. We show that the attitude toward risk of the host firm is important in determining the nature of equilibrium and many results with an assumption of risk neutrality continue to hold if the host firm exhibits a risk-averse attitude. We also show that under international capital mobility, the impacts of two enforcement policies on factor prices are different according to the factor intensity ranking between countries.JEL Classification: F21, F22
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