From Waning to Resurgence: Tracing Chinese Popular Nationalism by Age, Period, and Cohort, 2008–2021

In 'A Beijing Man in New York' (Beijingren zai Niuyue), China's popular 1993 tele-series, the protagonist Wang Qiming, a man on his way to making a fortune after a train of failures and betrayals, hires a New York prostitute. She is white, blonde and buxom. Wang decides to take some of his frustrations out on her. While thrusting himself onto the prostrate prostitute, Wang showers her with dollar bills. As the money swirls around the bed, Wang demands that she repeatedly cry out: 'I love you'. Reportedly, this was an extremely popular scene with mainland audiences, in particular with the Chinese intelligentsia.l It is also the type of

Anti-Japanese popular nationalism is rising high in China today. Little evidence to date proves that it is officially orchestrated. Nonetheless, Chinese popular nationalism still has deep roots in the state's history propaganda which has implanted pernicious myths in the national collective memory. Fueling mistrust and exacerbating a mutual threat perception, popular nationalism could be a catalyst for future Sino–Japanese conflict over the Taiwan problem, island disputes, and maritime resource competition. The increasingly liberalized but often biased Chinese media, the role of nationalist sub-elites, and the government's accommodation have all contributed to the strength of anti-Japanese nationalism, which cannot be mitigated by bilateral economic interdependence. To rid bilateral relations of the negative historical legacy, the two countries need the vision and determination to remove nationalistic myths and promote a shared history through mutual critique and self-reflection in transnational historians' dialogues.

Chinese popular nationalism has been spotlighted as a source of the “China Threat” in interpreting the country’s foreign policies by China scholars, especially, so-called constructivist pessimists. However, the applicability of this interpretation is quite limited when Sino-South Korea relations are examined. Though it is true that the anti-Korean sentiment of the Chinese has seriously grown in recent years, it has not affected the government’s foreign policies to Korea. On the contrary, it has been played down or counter-balanced by the government, its media, and academics of China, as the period around the 2008 Beijing Olympics, when negative feelings surged, clearly illustrates. Chinese nationalism is not a threat to South Korea and cannot be generalized as a variable explaining Chinese foreign policies.

ABSTRACTThis study extends the leisure constraint model by examining the role that popular nationalism has in Chinese outbound travel. Using a case study approach based on the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku Island Incident between China and Japan, the study demonstrates how Chinese popular nationalism has the potential to shape the geopolitical environment of all outbound Chinese tourism. The study proposes a new model that can be used to illustrate how popular nationalism may affect bilateral tourism in other settings. Findings of this study offer important insights for both scholars and practitioners contributing to the understanding of the impact of Chinese popular nationalism on bilateral tourism flows.

Previous research on Chinese nationalism has largely treated it as a monolithic concept, neglecting its multifaceted and evolving nature. This study addresses this gap by deconstructing Chinese nationalism into three dimensions — inward vs. outward, state vs. ethnicity, and proactive vs. reactive — and analyzing their manifestations in cases of “insulting China” (ruhua 辱华), a key expression of nationalism in China’s digital space. Using quantitative content analysis of 459 ruhua cases collected from Chinese social media sites between 2013 and 2023, the study shows that popular nationalism is shifting from ethnicity to state, from outward to inward, and from reactive to proactive. These trends indicate that popular nationalism in China has moved beyond expressions of anti-foreign sentiment to become a mechanism for internal discipline. A growing emphasis on state nationalism has facilitated the construction of otherness within the in-group, giving rise to the weaponization of popular nationalism through ruhua to police and surveil perceived deviations from nationalist orthodoxy. These insights offer strategic guidance for navigating China’s increasingly discursive sociopolitical landscape.

This chapter investigates how Chinese popular nationalism has influenced the country’s decision of using force or maintaining the status quo in the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands dispute between China/Taiwan and Japan in the East China Sea. The chapter illustrates how China has mainly exercised restraint and maintained the status quo in this dispute, despite strong popular nationalism. Although China has been rising rapidly, its complete victory in conflict has been a distant possibility at best, and with the lack of competitive nationalist political opposition, popular nationalism has had a restraining effect. The chapter also provides a close investigation of a crisis triggered by Japan’s nationalization of the disputed islands in 2012. The chapter contrasts China’s restrained behavior with a more assertive approach taken by Taiwan.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the ongoing project in a long, steady progression of China’s foreign relations, and a new paradigm for global governance among countries around the world. Previous studies confirm that China’s internet is full of nationalism, but relatively few studies examine the case of the BRI. Therefore, this chapter analyses the online nationalism discourse on BRI. This study uses in-depth case-study analyses of the Budapest-Belgrade Railway Saga and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor on Weibo to illustrate popular nationalism. This study finds out that geopolitical rivalry, self-interest in globalism, pride, and satisfaction with the government are the four major themes and important elements of popular nationalism discourse. The Chinese popular nationalism uses the BRI as a tool to express their hostile attitude towards foreign countries and demonstrate their willingness to become the leader of the world. However, their willingness of becoming the leader of the world shows a feature of the self-interest in globalism that is influenced by Chinese Confucian culture. Overall, the study argues that Chinese popular nationalism is a social construct that is embodied in people’s personal experience and understanding.KeywordsBelt and Road InitiativeCyber-nationalismGlobalistDiscourse analysisChina

This paper investigates how state-led and popular nationalism in China construct borders as tools of exclusion, reinforcing national identity amidst global populist movements. Using the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a case study, the analysis examines Global Times articles and corresponding user-generated content to reveal how geopolitical, ideological, and emotional borders are created and maintained through nationalist discourse. State-led nationalism emphasizes cooperation and diplomacy, framing borders to position China as a global leader promoting shared prosperity. In contrast, popular nationalism—expressed through user-generated comments—manifests in a confrontational, exclusionary discourse that delineates China from external adversaries, particularly Western powers. Through a mixed-methods approach—combining word frequency, sentiment, and emotional categorization using the NRC Emotion Lexicon—this study uncovers key differences between the two forms of nationalism. State narratives construct inclusive borders that foster international engagement, aligning with China’s diplomatic ambitions. Meanwhile, popular nationalism reflects heightened emotional intensity, especially through expressions of fear, anger, and opposition, creating rigid borders that emphasize ideological conflict and national pride. The research contributes to the literature on populism and border studies by demonstrating how Chinese nationalism functions as both a state strategy and a grassroots expression, delineating “the people” from “the other.” It highlights the critical role of media—both state-controlled outlets and user-generated platforms—in constructing and reinforcing these boundaries. As populism continues to shape political discourse globally, the study offers valuable insights into how nationalism in non-Western contexts mirrors broader populist strategies of identity formation through the construction of symbolic and emotional borders.

This paper revisits the debate about foreign policy implications of Chinese nationalism in the context of China's increasingly confrontational and assertive behavior in recent years. It argues that while the Chinese government made effective efforts to control popular nationalism and Chinese foreign policy was therefore not dictated by emotional nationalistic rhetoric before 2008, it has become more willing to follow the popular nationalist calls to take a confrontational position against the Western powers and to adopt tougher measures in maritime territorial disputes with its neighbors. This strident turn is partially because the government is increasingly responsive to public opinion, but more importantly because of the convergence of Chinese state nationalism and popular nationalism calling for a more muscular Chinese foreign policy. Enjoying an inflated sense of empowerment supported by its new quotient of wealth and military capacities, and terrified of an uncertain future due to increasing social, economic and political tensions at home, the communist state has become more willing to play to the popular nationalist gallery in pursuing the so-called core national interests. These developments have complicated China's diplomacy, creating a heated political environment to harden China's foreign policy.

This chapter examines the motivation for popular nationalism in China. It explains that Chinese and Western observers of Chinese nationalism have long disagreed over who the agents of Chinese nationalism are. Chinese pundits ascribe agency to the masses, while Westerners point to the elites. The chapter highlights the tendency of Chinese commentators to describe Chinese nationalism as a mass or popular movement.

Introduction: Dragon-Slayers and Panda-Huggers 1. Saving Face 2. Chinese Identity and West 3. A of Humiliation 4. The Kissinger Complex 5. Victors or Victims? 6. China's Apology Diplomacy 7. Popular Nationalism and the Fate of the Nation 8. Chinese Nationalism and U.S.--China Relations in the Twenty-First Century Notes Bibliography Acknowledgements Index

This study examines the major sources of Chinese new nationalism among the Chinese populace two decades after the 1989 Tiananmen movement. Based on the 2008 East Asian Social Survey (EASS) using China data collected nationwide, this research finds that China’s major sources of popular nationalism in 2008 are largely consistent with “New Left” intellectuals’ propositions. In contemporary China, Chinese national identity is premised on identification with Asia rather than Western countries and Japan as the “other” that supports China’s self-image as a “victim”. This new identity boundary has enabled the positive roles and traits of Confucian culture to build and shape Chinese new nationalism.

The research aims to explore the changes of national identity among Chinese international students in the odd social context of the global pandemic. By conducting semi-structured interviews with 10 Chinese undergraduate and postgraduate students in a prestigious university located in London, UK, the study provides evidence of Western neo-racism against Chinese students and the rise of Chinese nationalism. More significantly, it is found that Western neo-racism and Chinese nationalism have a push and pull effect on the national identity enhancement of Chinese international students. The participants revealed that bottom-up popular nationalism is more than a shadow of top-down state nationalism in China, and is more influential on students’ national identity formation. The research also discusses the implications of these findings, limitations and future research directions.

Mainstream views in China tend to believe that lower popular support for the DPP shown in the 2008 presidential election indicates parallel declining support for the Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM). However, this study shows that during the DPP administration of 2000–2008, popular support for the DPP and the TIM has become divergent: at the aggregate level, popular support for the DPP has generally declined since 2000, but that for the TIM has actually increased and then remained stable; at the individual level, Taiwanese people's dissatisfaction with the DPP administration significantly reduced their support for the DPP in 2008, but had no independent effect on their nationalist sentiment. Further analysis of the TIM's support base shows that the supposedly pro-status-quo pan-blue camp actually provided an increasing number of Taiwanese nationalists, which stabilized popular Taiwanese nationalism and weakened the DPP's monopoly of it.

This chapter summarizes the central arguments and findings of the book: popular nationalism does not inevitably lead to interstate war, and it can facilitate the maintenance of the status quo. After briefly reviewing the arguments and findings from each chapter, this chapter discusses some remaining questions. It also draws several implications for the international relations scholarship and highlights avenues for future research. In addition, based on the findings, this chapter offers a number of critical policy implications to prevent wars that stem from popular nationalism. Finally, it also provides extended implications about Chinese popular nationalism and the likelihood of war in the Asia-Pacific region.