From the Change of the Pattern to the Change in the Pattern. The Trilateral Game in the Italian Intergovernmental Relations

Abstract

Studies on federalism, regionalism and devolution often tackle the processes of institutional change in a country's polity merely as transitions from an institutional pattern to another, thus mainly focusing on the role of legal frameworks and Constitutional setting in the transition from an equilibrium to another. Such an approach overlooks the role of incremental dynamics: what happens after a new constitutional equilibrium has been reached? Does it stand still, crystallized by formal institutions, or does it evolve in time? This article illustrates the relevance of incremental institutional changes that occur after a major Constitutional reform and shows how an alteration in the distribution of resources among actors may heavily affect the territorial arrangement and the intergovernmental relations (IGRs) of a country. It focuses on the Italian case and the change in its IGRs between 2001 and 2016. Through a secondary analysis, a scrutiny of the trilateral game among the State, the Regions and the Local Authorities – played by reshaping and implementing the initial arrangement through gradual, piecemeal and layered modifications – will be conducted. Evidence is displayed through Dente (1997) resources (legal, political, financial and cognitive) framework. The main finding is that the change in the pattern turns out to be less visible, sometimes ambiguous and sticky, and more uncertain than a change of the pattern, but equally deep and effective. In the conclusion, some interpretative hypotheses for further research on the relevance of change in the pattern and its generalization for multi‐level system countries are proposed.