From Sleepwear to Sportswear

A Digital History of Anglophone Demography and Global Population Control, 1915–1984

Prejudice against Jews was part of the political, cultural, economic and social landscape in the Union of South Africa long before Nazism made inroads into the country during the 1930s, at which stage Jews constituted approximately 4.5% of the country’s white or European population. Racial discrimination in a country with diversified racial elements and intense political complexities was synonymous with life in the Union long before Apartheid, with its strictly enforced legal, political and economic segregation, became the country’s official policy with the accession to power of the National Party under Prime Minister Dr Daniel François Malan in May 1948. Although the Jews, while maintaining their own sub-cultural identity, were classified within the country’s racial hierarchy as part of the privileged white minority, the emergence of recurrent anti-Jewish stereotypes and themes became manifest in a country permeated by the ideology of race and white superiority. This was exacerbated by the growth of a powerful Afrikaner nationalist movement, underpinned by conservative Calvinist theology. Fear of Communism in the aftermath of the 1917 Russian Revolution and the First World War; disquiet over the arrival of what was seen as disproportionately large numbers of Jewish immigrants during the 1920s; and the effects of the severe world-wide economic depression after the Wall Street stock market crash in October 1929, set the scene for an unprecedented period of antisemitic activity. This was reflected, in part, in legislation aimed at curbing Jewish immigration and the emergence of several antisemitic movements. This dissertation, which covers the period between the First and Second World Wars, explores the perception that South African antisemitism was a foreign import. Based on an examination of archival sources and contemporary publications, the study concludes that prejudice against the Jews was evident in the weltanschauung of right-wing and extremist Afrikaner nationalists long before the influence of Nazism became apparent and was not dependent on the influence of Nazi propagandists in the country. Aggressive Afrikaner nationalism along with economic antisemitism characterised the years between the end of the Great Depression and the outbreak of the Second World War. Antisemitism became a significant issue in elections and towards the end of the 1930s opposition to Jewish immigration was included as an official plank in the political platform of the opposition Purified National Party. Jews were also banned from party membership in the Transvaal, where most Jews resided. Attempts by the South African Jewish Board of Deputies and its affiliates together with several non-Jewish organisations to counter the increasing influence of antisemitism, principally among the Right and Radical Right in the ranks of the Afrikaner nationalists, also marked the inter bellum period on which this study focuses.

Reclaiming the Revolutionary

Milton Friedman and the Road to Monetarism: A Review Essay

The Melodramatic Nation: Integration and Polarization in the Argentine Cinema of the 1930s

In December 1916, as Sergei Diaghilev's Ballets Russes company was crossing the United States to make its West Coast premiere in Los Angeles, the Metropolitan Musical Bureau attempted to generate additional publicity and sustain excitement by publishing the first (and only) issue of the Diaghilef Ballet Russe Courier. Squarely in the center of the front page, under the headline “Ballet Too Expensive for Filming,” was a letter from American film director and producer Thomas H. Ince, purportedly responding to impresario and publicist Robert Grau's recommendation that Ince invite the ballet troupe to make a film: Dear Mr. Grau, I have read your communication in regard to the Russian Ballet. I fail to see the practicability of the idea of making a picture of the Russian Ballet, wonderful and unprecedented as the success of this notable organization has been. You understand, of course, that it would necessitate bringing the entire organization to Los Angeles, and any aggregation of dancers that can play to $100,000 dollars in two weeks would most assuredly demand all the money that I have, my right eye and left hand in addition to any hopes that I may have for a future life, in return for their service. Very truly yours, Thomas H. Ince.1Thomas Ince was not the only one skeptical of a Ballets Russes film project. The company's impresario, eager to position his company within the realm of high art, actively shunned mass culture and popular entertainment, including the still-young filmic medium: no Ballets Russes production was ever filmed.2 Despite this, there were numerous encounters between the Ballets Russes and the burgeoning Hollywood film industry during and immediately after the company's American tours in 1916 and 1917. Tales of these encounters paint a picture of the reciprocal fascination and mutual attraction of Diaghilev's troupe and the American film industry, and the spheres of stage and screen more broadly. A few of these connections have been examined: film scholar Gaylyn Studlar, for example, has discussed the influence of the Ballets Russes on the mise-en-scène of The Thief of Baghdad (dir. Raoul Walsh, 1924), particularly the extent to which the film's star, Douglas Fairbanks, was inspired by Vaslav Nijinsky's choreography and stylized movements.3 Scholars have also explored cases in which Ballets Russes dancers went on to choreograph dance numbers for American films, such as Adolph Bolm's work with director Dudley Murphy on Danse Macabre (1922) and Theodore Kosloff's collaborations with director Cecil DeMille on nearly thirty Hollywood productions following his time with the Ballets Russes.4 Relatedly, Lynn Garafola has cited such “crossovers and parallels” between film and the Ballets Russes, though she has focused primarily on the relationship between European avant-garde and experimental film strategies and the company's aesthetics.5 However, the Ballets Russes's sustained influence on silent film culture in the United States—its production, narratives, aesthetics, and exhibition—as well the extent to which Hollywood crafted and offered American audiences its own vision of the Ballets Russes and its dancers long after the company departed, remains largely unexamined. This omission is hardly surprising: not only have many of the silent films (and silent film scores) that may most clearly demonstrate these connections been lost, but crucial information about the production and exhibition contexts in which these relationships were most visible are scattered and incomplete as well. Finally, the West Coast leg of the Ballets Russes's second US tour, which brought the company into the orbit of the burgeoning American film industry, is rarely discussed.In this article, I examine this mutual attraction between the Ballets Russes and cinema, beginning with the company's arrival in Los Angeles for a week of performances in late December 1916, during which Hollywood elite attended performances that received rave reviews and company members, in turn, were treated to behind-the-scenes visits to the town's film studios. With this expanded vision of the troupe's activities and reception in mind, I examine two types of cinematic “appearances” that Diaghilev's dancers made in the years immediately following the company's US tours: first, the performances by company members and invocations of company repertoire and aesthetics in the live stage acts so often integrated into film presentations in the silent era and, second, the incorporation of Ballets Russes dancers, repertoire, and aesthetics, as well as the Ballets Russes as a broader signifier, into a number of feature-length films. In the former performances, I argue, the visual and narrative themes, music, and choreographies associated with the company were reprised on cinema stages, most often under the direction of the company's male dancers. The latter performances offered a more fanciful and imaginative vision of the company onscreen, frequently deploying either female Ballets Russes dancers or fictional modern Russian ballerina characters as visual—and highly visible—icons of the Ballets Russes and American mythologies of Russian culture and politics more broadly. Both types of cinematic (re)appearance, I argue, introduced new audiences to the company's choreographic, musical, and visual aesthetics, allowing these aesthetics to circulate and the company's influence to grow long after its departure. These performances also benefited the film industry, enabling filmmakers, studios, and exhibitors alike to associate themselves with the company's cultural capital, its status as high art, and the aura of mystique and intrigue that surrounded it.Scholars such as Hanna Järvinen have recently challenged standard narratives about why the Ballets Russes failed “to conquer America.”6 Yet the Ballets Russes spawned a fleet of reprises, tributes, and references on cinema stages and screens throughout the country. These cinematic performances generated their own advertisements, programs, and reviews that gestured toward the Ballets Russes and simultaneously invited an ever-expanding segment of the American public to engage with and find their own meanings in both these cinematic “texts” and the Ballets Russes performances and mythologies that they referenced.7 Perhaps this is not a conquest. But this complex, layered, and multivalent intermedial web, I believe, is evidence of the company's significant influence on art and entertainment in the United States, as well as its lasting resonance within American culture.Bypassed during the Ballets Russes's first US tour, Los Angeles audiences and critics were on pins and needles waiting for their first glimpse of the company in the fall of 1916. “Dancers Are Coming!” declared a Los Angeles Times headline, announcing that the company was set to arrive on Christmas day for a weeklong engagement at Clune's Auditorium.8 Over the next several weeks, audiences in Los Angeles were bombarded with glowing previews hyping premier danseur Vaslav Nijinsky; Schéhérazade and other signature ballets; the seventy-piece orchestra traveling with the troupe; and the “wild opulence” of the company's scenery and costumes.9 By the time the Ballets Russes arrived via train—six baggage cars of equipment, three coaches and a dining car for the performers, plus a private car for Nijinsky and an extra baggage car decked for the company's Christmas Eve party, the Los Angeles Examiner reported—the press was near fever pitch. Los Angeles residents were equally excited. The company's premiere, which featured Nijinsky's new ballet Till Eulenspiegel and the dances from Prince Igor, was completely sold out and began late due to the large crowd, which included film industry elite and familiar faces from the screen. As newspapers gleefully reported, the delay was compounded when the dancers, on hearing that Charlie Chaplin was in attendance, demanded that he be brought backstage. One critic explained, “[They] had all heard of him and seen him . . . so that Nijinsky, Revalles, Lopokova, all of them, kowtowed to him, and I shouldn't be surprised if someone kissed him; . . . foreigners do that when greatly enthused.”10That Chaplin and others working in early film would have been eager to see the Ballets Russes is hardly surprising. Those in the film industry had looked to the dance world for inspiration and personnel since its advent, yielding early moving picture experiments such as Thomas Edison's Annabelle Serpentine Dance (1895) and silent feature films like director Lois Weber's The Dumb Girl of Portici, starring Russian ballerina Anna Pavlova (Universal, 1915). For early filmmakers, dance was understood as a means of displaying—and a model for exploring—film's capacity to represent movement, as well as a strategy for creating rhythm, pace, and mood onscreen. Many directors, such as D. W. Griffith, also believed that dance training cultivated an attention to physical presence and a slower, more musical movement style that worked far better on screen than that quicker, larger gestures that many theater actors brought to film studios.11 As a result, a number of dance schools and companies in and around Los Angeles—perhaps most notably Ruth St. Denis and Ted Shawn's Denishawn, but also former Ballets Russes dancers Theodore Kosloff and Alexandra Maria Baldina's ballet school and British dancer Ernest Belcher's Celeste School—quickly became affiliated with the film industry, training film actors and actresses to move on camera and providing a steady supply of dancers for film productions.12 That the principles of movement and gesture established by François Delsarte are as visible in the aesthetics of silent film as they are in the aesthetics of modern dance, as scholar Carrie Preston has demonstrated, is hardly a coincidence.13Reviews of the Ballets Russes's Los Angeles performances were strikingly enthusiastic, praising the company's vigor, speed, and variety. As Los Angeles critic Edwin Schallert wrote, “Daring to the last degree in its big conceptions, startling throughout in its massing of color, and breathtaking in the swiftness of its supreme moments, the first performance of the Diaghileff Ballet Russe . . . made all other dancing we have seen here seem like child's play.”14 Schallert continued at length, almost rhapsodic: “They have an all-consuming energy that leaves you dazed, captivated, and inspired at once. The dancers come and go like magic, they concentrate more motion into the minute than could seem possible, and they finally leave you again seemingly almost before you had realized their presence. . . . [T]here is something inconceivably swift in the magnetic power of this troupe.”15 As exciting to critics as the choreography were the musical performances that accompanied it. “The pulsation of the Borodine [sic] music to the Prince Igor, played in masterly style by an orchestra,” the Los Angeles Times reported, was “worth more than half the price of admission in itself.”16 A critic for the Los Angeles Examiner concluded a description of Cléopâtre by noting, “The Balakireff music is superb; rushing hither and thither with the sweep of the violins predominant—the clash of the cymbals and rumble of tympani combining with the winds to form an overwhelming tornado of Russian fire and expression.”17 The close relationships between music and choreography were praised as well; after watching the company's rendition of Carnaval, Schallert asserted, “Schumann must have dreamt something like this when he wrote this piano series.”18But it was the company's dancers—especially the company's male dancers—who stole the show. Descriptions of the grace and delicacy of female dancers including Lydia Lopokova quickly gave way to lavish praise for Nijinsky's “technical wizardry” and “many-sided genius,” his “rhythmic perfection” and “delicate yet virile suppleness.”19 As Edwin Schallert waxed in an account that, despite its euphoria, was fairly typical of the Los Angeles reaction, “Strange realms does the genius of Waslav Nijinsky invade. Amid the floating clouds of his imagination's horizon arise unreal colors and mysterious shapes of things wherewith to create the background for realities that venture into untried provinces in the world of art. He opens by turn the portals of charm, of fire, of magnificence, he treads the corridors of symbolism and drama and the plastic arts, and he and his assistants lead their audiences through the ever-varying suggestions of these things.”20 Similar accolades were awarded to the “wonderfully expressive” Bolm, whose “facial expression and muscular grace plac[e] him on a plane but little removed from the master, Nijinsky, himself.”21 A few critics acknowledged the company's difficulty moving scenery quickly on opening night, but the concerns about ticket prices, the sexual overtones of Faun, and racial representations in Schéhérazade that had dominated New York and Boston reviews were either absent, dismissed outright, or even mocked by the Los Angeles press.22 Los Angeles audiences, in short, loved the Ballets Russes.The Ballets Russes dancers and personnel were equally enamored with Hollywood, based on anecdotes that emerged in both trade press and first-hand accounts. Company members visited at least two film studios, where they watched the production process with curiosity and wonder. In the February 1917 issue of The Moving Picture Weekly, a short article described the company's tour of a Universal City studio, where they looked on as director W. W. Beaudine shot one of his many comedy shorts. The article reports, The particular set on which they were working had a living room and a hall room next door. In the hall was a telephone on a table. The [ballet master] remembered he had an appointment and was late, and he requested permission to use the phone. Beaudine's sense of humor immediately came to the surface, and he said, “Why, certainly.” The ballet master sat for quite a long time at the phone and then appealed to the director. He tried again. Finally Beaudine told him it must be that the line was out of order. But the Russian never knew that the telephone cord extended no further than the edge of the carpet and that it was merely a “prop” instrument.23About halfway through Charlie Chaplin's autobiography, there is a similar—albeit far more poignant—account of Nijinsky and other Ballets Russes personnel watching the production of a short film in which Chaplin was acting (see Figure 2). According to Chaplin, Nijinsky “sat behind the camera, watching me at work on a scene which I thought was funny, but he never smiled. . . . Before leaving he came and shook my hands, and in his hollow voice said how much he enjoyed my work and asked if he could come again. ‘Of course,’ I said. For two more days he sat . . . watching me. . . . [A]t the end of each day he would compliment me. ‘Your comedy is balletique, you are a dancer,’ he said.”24The details of both stories are likely exaggerated, and the Moving Picture Weekly tale seems particularly apocryphal: it is difficult to believe that anyone associated with the Ballets Russes was not intimately familiar with the concept of sets and props. Indeed, the story seems designed to tacitly imply that company members embodied a sort of innocence—an exotic primitivity—when it came to modern technology like telephones and film. It also conjures for readers an oft-cited distinction between stage and screen in the ‘teens and early 1920s: film's ability to achieve a sense of realism to which stage productions could only aspire—or, in the case of the Ballets Russes, to which many stage productions did not aspire at all. Yet while highlighting the radical differences between comedy shorts and Schéhérazade, these anecdotes also highlight the intimate connections between dance and silent film. Perhaps most importantly, they point to the shared artistry and imagination of these two projects: the continuity between the experiments in choreography, design, and music that the Ballets Russes was conducting onstage as the troupe reimagined twentieth-century ballet and the experiments in movement, mise-en-scène, and visual language that filmmakers and actors were conducting in studios and on location as they imagined into existence narrative cinema. In these visits by Diaghilev's dancers to film studios, in Chaplin's attendance at the Ballets Russes premiere, in the open-minded and enthusiastic reception of the company in Hollywood and beyond, a reciprocal patronage, engagement, and admiration comes into focus.Though Ballets Russes performances were never recorded, the and of the company made their way into American film culture before the company's United States tours even the cinematic in which Ballets Russes aesthetics and of the company's were most immediately were film By the late ‘teens and throughout the large in as well as throughout the offered a feature film as of a larger audiences were treated to a musical by a of live stage and comedy with short films including films, and by the feature and often an or other musical on the of a as much by as by many were around particular a an or or a particular were of acts believed to with the feature film at hand and even with theater or the of can be film trade and newspapers often only the of by the of the However, a number of male Ballets Russes dancers are more than in the of large in several that they in and dance numbers at these Adolph and also in the two US for example, were both in the worked at the and in New York and at the in Los Angeles, the in the in New York and with in but left the company before the 1916, was the at the in and a dance school in the and both of with in before dance numbers in at the and in New York and the in this is to a It is difficult to the they looked and but it is that many or at least Ballets Russes of the company's at the as did at the a of was included on a in and the dances from Prince are as of offered there in both and Ballets Russes to the United States in in the film an of a at the that it would the of the ballet in associated with or inspired by the Ballets Russes was also frequently integrated into at many film during and in the of the troupe's American According to and of at large in newspapers and film trade of Schéhérazade and Till Eulenspiegel were as on such of to the of a also became a popular musical of these were at accompanied by and choreography that Ballets Russes a at New that Schéhérazade as the for example, the stage was with two and in and and a as a of the I a with a scene with a and all to out the music associated with the Ballets Russes both in and as film was actively in the of film trade These of associated with the company such as and exhibitors on where to and piano of their and praised theater and music for their with A in a December issue of Moving Picture for example, with a letter from an in of of the dances in Prince you me how to the there is no music but popular music in my little The that exhibitors the in New York for As was often the case with in film trade this was likely a by a than the of an the simultaneously and a demand for the company's music, a popular with audiences from the company's and exhibitors the to of it into their programs, if only to with their were the filmic in which the music, choreography, and male dancers of the Ballets Russes continued to be to long after the company left the United States is not surprising. offered an for dance and music with exciting musical and stage acts week in and week likely at the to music associated with the Ballets Russes and to the male were with the company in the American The numbers both Ballets Russes eager to of the company's performances and to see the dancers had often been in the company's film art music and comedy from stage to screen from an experimental film short to a popular dance accompanied by a had been in the orchestra an the of the Ballets Russes that most American all-consuming color, and of and But even as these male dancers on their with the Ballets Russes, also the to with new movement aesthetics and performance the of the both to new and and to more and than the company's own performances had As Adolph wrote in his autobiography, is no better for dancer and public than the motion picture the stages of in New Los Angeles, and beyond, male dancers like and were to their aesthetics, of dance, and themselves as performers, while simultaneously and American with and admiration for Diaghilev's own the music and choreography of the Ballets Russes were reprised in film programs, of the company's aesthetics, and were visible and in a number of feature-length silent films in the late and early the company's male dancers and were most visible in both the press the Ballets Russes tours and on the stages of it was the company's female dancers were most visible onscreen. female Ballets Russes dancers were by studios to in films following the second American tour, often in that a to they had a number of films about fictional Russian often played by American were made during these These or in Ballets the and performances of the company's female dancers. Indeed, while film the company's male dancers a to themselves as and at a from Diaghilev's these feature films female Ballets Russes and time and their and performances became of the company and Russian more it is one of the films a fictional Russian ballerina that most conjures the Ballets Russes onscreen. The which and is was by in as the second Ballets Russes tour was to a by the film in the of Russian dancer and A the film as she to with a ballet company and an The company's director that she is the of a Russian and all is when and with making way for to a the film's narrative and visual there are several references to the Ballets Russes and the that had around the company by 1917. Perhaps most the film troupe's from to for its premiere Diaghilev's of the Ballets Russes in the for its first The director in the film also to was with a and around about sexual and a relationship with Vaslav Nijinsky However, the Ballets Russes is early in the film after several of dance an Ballet Russe Ballet In the that and Ballet by Theodore Kosloff's an extended by a large of dancers. It is not the Ballets Russes's choreography, of course, but the and are not the film and theater music would likely have attempted to highlight the by the with from Those had seen the company would have the and members could quite have it for the and publicity for the film on Kosloff's as evidence of the and of the film's dance if not the film as a A dancer had arrived in New York City to and in and would go on to as dance master of the Metropolitan Company in the Kosloff's with the Russian Ballet were and his by was described as a and Russian engagement for the the trade press was of the most ever made in the motion picture and the for Moving Picture came close to that the film was as as the Ballets other ever such of the art of the Indeed, went so far as to that the stage with Kosloff had into a As performance was and by the presence in the of . . . is of how these of the dance go about in and how they into of dancing These dancing in

Spain escaped the Great War. It was a neutral country. Internal opinion and elites were too much divided between the two blocks to take any decision. This real neutrality, in a very good geostrategic situation, provided many opportunities as well as losses. The immediate post-war years were a major distributive struggle between classes, sectors and regions. Once it was settled, interwar years—both the 1920s and the early 1930s—were quite different to most Western European countries precisely because of a better heritage from the Great War. The 1920s were booming and the Great Depression was less dramatic than in many other big economies. On the contrary, Spain could not enjoy the economic recovery of the late 1930s as it entered into a devastating Civil War.

In Asylum Ways of Seeing, Heather Murray promises a 'book about people with mental illnesses and distress and those in their orbits who cared for and observed them' (p. 1). In so doing, Murray charts an exuberantly wide terrain for what she has dubbed 'patient cultures', using an impressive range of sources: patient case files (from public and private hospitals), patient and family letters, medical literature to memoirs, novels and Hollywood films, and a broad range of anti-psychiatry literature. Focusing on North America, Murray weaves together her disparate sources to create four broad chronological eras that begin with the early 1920s and end with the present. She writes of the post–World War I era that 'a sense of inevitability was more likely to define ideas about mental illness within the confines of institutional psychiatry particularly during the interwar era, and this posture toward one's lot in life had its parallel in a larger sensibility and mode of engagement with life: a sense that one was powerless to change the way things are, that what can't be cured must be endured' (p.4). She characterises the mid-century patient as transformed by the therapeutic optimism of 'biological cures', in which the patient sheds resignation for an 'ideal of activity and transformation'. She writes, 'As scientific modernity came to be seen as something that the individual could engage with and possibly manipulate, autonomy and self-possession deepened as ideals in the institutional setting' (pp. 5–6). By the late 1960s and 1970s, with an increasing crescendo of critiques of state hospitals and psychiatry as repressive, and against the background of the growing civil rights movement, she describes a new emerging patient culture, one that reflected a growing distrust of institutions and their potential for repression and a newfound neoliberal ideology that valorised individual independence and disdained dependence, especially on the welfare state.

Jeans and their Fashionable Meanings: Revisiting Beverly Gordon's Cultural Conceptual Framework

TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Book Reviews 1075 Aviation in the U.S. Army, 1919—1939. By Maurer Maurer. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1987. Pp. xxxiii + 626; illustra­ tions, maps, notes, glossary, appendixes, bibliography, index. $29.00. The development of military and commercial aviation in the interwar years is a subject of major significance that, ironically, has not received the attention that is its due. Eclipsed by the more alluring pioneering days before and during World War I and by the ominous adulthood of “air power” in the years after 1939, the interwar period has rarely been seen as more than the overromanticized “golden age of flight,” a time of brightly colored biplanes, daredevil barnstormers, and nascent airlines and air forces. Instead, as Maurer Maurer points out in this important book, that period marked a critical stage in the evolution of aviation technology, the aircraft industry, and both military and civilian aeronautical activities. Maurer’s book is structured according to the three “phases” of U.S. military aviation development in the interwar years: the period of the Army Air Service (1919-26), the Army Air Corps (1926-33), and the little-known and underappreciated “General Headquarters Air Force” (1933—39). Within this general structure he examines a broad range of issues, including force structure, developments in engineer­ ing and technology, training, logistics, establishment of air routes and operational services, relations with other services and with the civilian world, pioneer exploratory Hights, war games and military planning, and preparation for future wars. Overall, his book confronts four subjects: adjusting to the post-Armistice world and building on America’s (not altogether laudable) wartime aeronautical experience; establishing an air corps within the army and equipping it with well-trained personnel and suitable aircraft; coping with the Great Depression and, at the same time, confronting the expanding tech­ nical challenges of the late 1920s and early 1930s; and, finally, laying the ground- and air work for a combat-worthy (and genuine) “air force.” Maurer has written an impressive and, indeed, exhaustive book that is meticulously documented by reference to a plethora of primary sources. Along the way he relates many a relevant anecdote or insight, always without succumbing to the temptation to enshrine the past. (For example, his discussion of the Billy Mitchell controversy— pp. 113—29—is forthright and succinct, a genuine “warts and all” presentation.) The book offers us an in-depth accounting of Ameri­ can military aviation development that, quite simply, has been lacking up to this time. Though written in an often dry manner, it furnishes a wealth of information of interest to historians of technology, 1076 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE particularly on the incorporation of new aviation technology into the army, development of radio navigation aids, and the training and establishment of a technologically oriented “new” military service. His discussion of the airmail crisis of 1934 is the best short account that has yet appeared, and is admirably annotated by reference to key documents. The book is not without some small flaws. Maurer has many excellent sections on various war games and exercises but very little to say about how these subsequently influenced strategic and tactical thought and operational planning. Doctrine is likewise mentioned only in passing. The interest of airmen in lessons from foreign wars (notably the war in Spain and the Sino-Japanese war) is not men­ tioned, even though a substantial body of documentation exists that indicates such information was of acute interest to military planners. His discussion of air racing fails to indicate the very real importance that racer aircraft had for future design developments; they were (to use a modern term) the “technology demonstrators” or the “X-series” of their day. Finally, I quibble with his implied criticism of F. Trubee Davison, President Hoover’s assistant secretary of war (for air) be­ cause he was disliked by both partisan airmen and dedicated ground officers. Davison was somewhat like James Forrestal after 1945: the fact that he came under criticism from various camps should be taken as evidence that he was doing his job in a remarkably fair and evenhanded way. But all of these are very small criticisms indeed. Maurer...

The Great Depression is one of the most important economic incidents in the twentieth century. A significant and long-lasting impact of this event is the rise of the government intervention to the economy. Under the catastrophic downturn of the economic condition worldwide, people required their government to play an active role for economic recovery, and this mentalite prolonged even after the Second World War. Social science textbooks taught at Korean high schools mostly referred to the Great Depression for explaining the reason of government intervention in economy. However, the mainstream view commonly found in the textbooks provides a misleading theological interpretation. It argues that inherent flaws of the market economy causes over-production/under-consumption, and that this mismatch ends up with economic crisis. The chaotic situation was resolved by substitution of the governments for the market, and the New Deal was introduced as the monumental example (‘laissez-faire economy→over-production→the Great Depression→government intervention→economic recovery’). Based on economic historians’ researches for past three decades, I argue that this mainstream view commits the fallacy of ex-post justification. Unlike what the mainstream view claims, the Great Depression was neither the result of the ‘market failure’, nor the recovery from the Great Depression but was due to successful government policies. For substantiating this claim, I suggest three points. First, blaming the weakness or instability of the market economy as the cause of the Great Depression is groundless. Unlike what the textbooks describe, the rise of the U.S. stock price during the 1920s cannot be said as a bubble, and there was no sign of under-consumption during the 1920s. On the contrary, a new consensus emerging from the 1980s among economic historians illustrates that the Great Depression was originated from ‘the government failure’ rather than from the ‘market failure’. Policymakers of European countries tried to return to the gold standard regime before the First World War, but discrepancies between this policy and the reality made the world economy vulnerable. Second, the mainstream view identifies the New Deal as Keynesian interventionism and glorifies it for saving the U.S. economy from the crisis. However, this argument is not true. The New Deal was not Keynesian at all. What the U.S. government actually tried was not macroeconomic stabilization but price and quantity control. In addition, New Deal did not brought about economic recovery that people generally believe. Even after the New Deal, industrial production or employment level remained quite low until the late 1930s. Lastly, studies on individual New Deal policies show that they did not work as they were intended. For example, the National Industrial Recovery Act increased unemployment, and the Agricultural Adjustment Act expelled tenants from their land. Third, the mainstream view characterizes the economic order before the Great Depression as laissez-faire, and it tends to attribute all the vice during the Industrial Revolution era to the uncontrolled market economy. However, historical studies show that various economic and social problems of the Industrial Revolution period such as inequality problems, child labor, or environmental problems cannot be simply ascribed to the problems of the market economy. In conclusion, the remedy for all these problems in high school textbooks is not to use the Great Depression as an example showing the weakness of the market economy. The Great Depression should be introduced simply as a historical momentum that had initiated the growth of government intervention. This reform of high school textbooks is imperative for enhancing the right understanding of economy and history.

Hungary’s Rusyn Policy in the Early 1940s: The Subcarpathian Scholarly Society, the Journal <i>Zoria/Hajnal</i>, and the Rusyn Language

Previous articleNext article FreeOn Graduation from Default, Inflation, and Banking Crises: Elusive or Illusion?Rong Qian, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Kenneth RogoffRong QianUniversity of Maryland Search for more articles by this author , Carmen M. ReinhartUniversity of Maryland and NBER Search for more articles by this author , and Kenneth RogoffHarvard University and NBER Search for more articles by this author University of MarylandUniversity of Maryland and NBERHarvard University and NBERPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreI. IntroductionThis paper addresses the concept of "graduation" from external default, banking, and inflation crises.1 Employing a vast data set cataloging more than 2 centuries of financial crises for over 60 countries developed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), we explore the risk of recidivism across advanced economies versus middle- and low-income countries. We show that 2 decades without a relapse (falling into crisis) is an important marker. After 1800, roughly two-thirds of recurrences of external default on sovereign debt and three-quarters of recurrence of inflation crisis occur within 20 years.2 However, crisis recidivism distributions have very fat tails, so that it takes at least 50 and perhaps 100 years to meaningfully speak of "graduation." Indeed, in the case of banking crises in particular, it is hard to argue that any country in the world has truly graduated.Given that graduation (with its companion question, will this ever happen again?) is arguably one of the most important issues in macroeconomics and development, there has been remarkably little theoretical or empirical investigation of the subject. For example, the large theory literature on sovereign lending and default, while producing many important insights into the fundamental distinction between willingness to pay and ability to pay, largely treats a country's basic developmental and political characteristics as parametric. There is very little on explaining the political, social, economic, and financial dynamics that ultimately lead a country to be less prone to certain types of crises.We acknowledge that the concept of graduation is a hard nut to crack. Many advanced countries had enjoyed a long hiatus from systemic banking crises after World War II and yet had huge problems during the recent global financial crisis. After 90 years of serial default running from 1557 to 1647, Spain did not default again until 1809. Even the advanced countries had high inflation as recently as the 1970s and early 1980s, while many emerging markets had hyperinflation less than 2 decades ago. Is the advent of modern independent central banks sufficient to guarantee that fiscal dominance never again reasserts itself? Have the rich countries that have supposedly "graduated" from serial default on external debt shifted the locus of risk to de jure or de facto (via inflation or financial repression) default on domestic debt? Does the theory of sovereign default or of financial development tell us that we should expect richer and more advanced countries to be immune? Or is graduation a mirage, with the "graduates" really being at best "star pupils," and can graduates be distinguished from patients in remission?Our goals in this paper are fairly narrowly circumscribed. Most of our analysis is based on data on the dates and duration of the crises themselves. We speculate on underlying causal factors but do not approach them empirically here.3 Although the various types of crises often occur in clusters, our quantitative analysis mainly treats individual crises separately.We begin the paper in Section II by defining the crises that we will catalog. In Section III of the paper, we present a summary time line of crisis, followed by a brief overview of the early history of serial default on external debt. An interesting case is France, which defaulted on its external debt no fewer than nine times from the middle of the sixteenth century through the end of the Napoleonic War but has not defaulted on external debt since. France is a canonical case of what we define as an "external default graduate." (This did not stop France from having numerous severe banking crises in the past 2 centuries.)In the main body of the paper, we provide a broad aggregative historical overview of the data across different types of crises, distinguishing between advanced countries and emerging markets, also taking into account the advent of International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs after World War II as another marker of a debt crisis.In Section IX of the paper, we speculate on links between graduation and development and the possibility for recidivism among richer countries. The fact that the canonical theory of sovereign default does not strongly predict smaller problems in richer countries (it does not strongly predict graduation) might be considered a flaw in theory. But it might also be taken as warning sign that graduation can be more difficult and take even more time than our data of "just" a few centuries can reveal. On banking crises, the theory needs to better explain why countries never seem to graduate.The main empirical results from our long-dated historical time series on financial crises may be described as follows. First, the process of "graduation," that is, emergence from frequent crisis suffering status, is a long process. False starts are common and recurrent. This is especially true in the case of banking crises, for both high-income countries and middle- and low-income countries.Second, the vulnerability to crisis in high-income countries versus middle- and low-income countries differs mostly in external default crises, to a lesser extent in inflation crises, and surprisingly little in banking crises.4Third, the sequence of graduation for most countries is first to graduate from external default crisis, then from inflation crisis, and eventually from banking. The last stage of graduation is extremely difficult, even for high-income countries. Among high-income countries, even though most of them have graduated from external default crisis and inflation crisis, more than 20% recently experienced a banking crisis, and far more when weighted by size. Schularick and Taylor (2009) speculate that advanced countries continue to experience credit busts despite arguably advancing regulation and institutions, because as risks moderate, financial systems grow and restore them.Finally, the role of IMF programs in crises in the modern period is important. The availability of IMF bridge loans certainly has increased countries' resilience to "sudden stops" but, even setting aside moral hazard problems, is by no means a cure-all. Countries entering IMF programs are still forced to undergo painful macroeconomic adjustments in an attempt to regain sound fiscal footing and regain access to private capital markets. The challenges of successfully implementing IMF programs are underscored by the fact that there are many significant cases in which countries default within 3 years of an IMF bailout. IMF programs may help facilitate orderly debt workouts but do not guarantee them. We also note that in its early history, many of today's rich countries regularly drew on IMF resources, although there has been a 3-decade hiatus.II. Definition of CrisesExternal debt crisis. We distinguish between external and internal debt on the basis of the legal jurisdiction where the debt contracts are enforced. This is a convenient construct given the history and evolution of sovereign debt. Obviously it may be useful to parse the data in other ways for some exercises, and in principle our data set allows that.Although there are exceptions and there has been some evolution in recent years, typically in our long-dated historical data set, external debt is denominated in foreign currency and held by foreign creditors. There are certainly important examples, such as Mexico's short-term Tesobono bonds in the mid-1990s, where the debt is domestic yet is denominated in foreign currency and held primarily by foreign creditors. Although we regard the U.S. abrogation of the gold clause in the early 1930s—when gold was revalued from $21 to $35 per ounce—to be a default on domestic debt, many non-U.S. residents were also holding the debt at the time. In general, following standard practice, we define an external debt crisis as any failure to meet contractual repayment obligations on foreign debts, including both rescheduling or repayments and outright default. (As both of these examples make clear, however, one ultimately needs to think carefully about whether graduation from external default may sometimes just mean a shift to episodic de facto and de jure internal default.)In practice, most defaults on external debt end up being partial, with creditors typically (but not always) repaying 30¢–70¢ or more on the dollar, admittedly not adjusting for risk. The rationale for lumping together defaults regardless of the ultimate "haircuts" creditors are forced to absorb is that, in practice, the fixed costs of external debt default (which include difficulties in obtaining trade credits and loss of reputation) tend to be large relative to the variable costs. In principle, one could parse episodes more finely here according to, say, output or tax revenue loss depending on data availability, although we do not undertake that exercise here. See, however, Tomz (2007) and Tomz and Wright (2007).Inflation crises. Following Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), we define inflation crises as episodes in which annual inflation exceeds 20%. This threshold is lower than the 40% we and others have used in related studies on postwar data but is a compromise reflecting that prior to World War I, average inflation rates were much lower, and 20% inflation generally represented a significant level of dysfunction. Indeed, since we are particularly interested here in inflation as a vehicle for partial default, one clearly would also want to consider lower levels of sustained unanticipated inflation such as many advanced countries experienced in the 1970s. Depending on the maturity structure of debt, sustained 10% inflation can certainly be tantamount to de facto default. A proper calibration, however, would require detailed data on the maturity structure of debt (as in Missale and Blanchard 1994) and, ideally, also on the evolution of inflation expectations. We do not attempt this here, though again, this is an important caveat to interpreting the concept of graduation from external debt crises.Banking crises. Our definition of banking crises follows standard practice (e.g., Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999; Caprio and Klingebiel 2003). Following our own earlier work, "We mark a banking crisis by two types of events: (1) bank runs that lead to the closure, merging or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial institutions and (2) if there are no runs, the closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important financial institution (or group of institutions) that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other financial institutions" (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, 11). We recognize that our listing of systemic (on a national scale) banking crises may be incomplete, especially prior to 1970, especially for crises outside the large money centers that attract the attention of the world financial press.5Having set out basic definitions, we are now ready to view some basic characteristics of the data. To provide context and motivation for the concept of graduation, we begin with a summary time line of financial crises since 1550, followed by a brief overview of the early history of sovereign defaults.III. A Time Line of Financial Crises and the Early History of Sovereign DefaultsTable 1 provides a summary historical perspective that helps show how the three different varieties of financial crisis have spread over time and across country groups. Between 1550 and 1800, sovereign defaults on external debt were relatively common in Europe, but they were relatively rare elsewhere if only because (a) there were few other independent nations in a position to default and (b) given the crude state of global capital markets, relatively few countries were wealthy enough to attract international capital flows. Thus defaults were relatively insignificant in the regions that constitute today's emerging markets. Systemic banking crises, however, were relatively rare everywhere. The legal and technological underpinnings of modern private banking simply had not reached a stage of maturity and depth sufficient to cause systemic crises in most instances. (Of course, there are exceptions. Following Cipolla [1982] and MacDonald [2006], Reinhart and Rogoff [2009] discuss how England's 1340 default to Florentine bankers triggered a financial crisis in Italy.) Similarly, inflation crises were relatively rare, although again there are many exceptions (see Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, chap. 12). Prior to the widespread adoption of paper currency, bouts of very high inflation were relatively difficult to engineer.Table 1. Time Line of Crises, 1550–2010 External DebtCrisesBanking CrisesInflation Crises1550–1815 (Napoleonic wars end)Frequent in advanced economies (including the "world powers" of the time); serial in some casesRareRare1826Frequent in "peripheral" advanced economies and most emerging marketsSerial in advanced; rare in emergingRare18501900Serial in advanced; more frequent in emerging1913 (WW1 begins)Frequent in advanced and emerging1945 (WWII ends)Rare in advanced and emergingPost-1945Rare19641973Serial in some emerging marketsMore frequent in advanced; serial in emergingFrequent in advanced and emergingEarly 1980sEarly 1990sFrequent in emerging2000Rare20092010??View Table ImageThe end of the Napoleonic War in the early 1800s marks a significant transition. The largest advanced countries were increasingly able to avoid external default, albeit partly by their ability to issue an increasing share of their debt domestically. Default, however, became common in "peripheral" advanced countries such as Spain and Portugal, while newly independent emerging markets such as Greece and Latin America entered a long period of serial default. Over the same period, as advanced countries developed more sophisticated banking systems, banking crises became far more common. Emerging markets were certainly affected by advanced country banking crises but did not have so many of their own, if only because their financial systems were dominated by foreign banks.By the turn of the twentieth century, emerging market financial institutions had developed to the point where domestic banking crises became more common. By the time of the Great Depression of the 1930s, banking crises were a worldwide phenomenon. Owing in no small part to the financial repression that followed in reaction to the Great Depression, banking crises were relatively rare during the period from the end of World War II until the early 1970s. As financial repression thawed, banking crises became more frequent in the advanced economies and serial in many emerging markets, bringing us to the recent financial crisis episode.Finally, Table 1 gives a time line of inflation crises, which of course were quite common in all countries in the 1970s and remained a problem in emerging markets until the past decade.We thus focus our early history on sovereign external defaults. As Reinhart et al. (2003) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) emphasize, many of today's advanced economies had recurrent problems with default on sovereign debt during the period when they might arguably have been characterized as emerging markets. Table 2 illustrates the case of Europe for the 3-century period 1550–1850, with the years listed marking the beginning of a sovereign default episode.Table 2. External Defaults: Europe, 1550–1850CountryYears of DefaultNumberof DefaultsAustria-Hungary1796, 1802, 1805, 1811, 18165England*1594*1*France1558, 1624, 1648, 1661, 1701, 1715, 1770, 1788, 18129Germany: Prussia1683, 1807, 18133 Hesse18141 Schleswig-Holstein18501 Westphalia18121Netherlands18141Portugal1560, 1828, 1837, 1841, 18455Russia18391Spain1557, 1575, 1596, 1607, 1627, 1647, 1809, 1820, 1831, 184310Sweden18121Source: Reinhart et al. (2003), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and sources cited therein.Note: The table excludes Greece (which gained independence in 1829). Note that for some countries, even if there was a default on external debt, there may have been a default on domestic debt, as was the case for Denmark (1813).* Denotes our uncertainty at this time about whether England's default involved external (as opposed to purely domestic) debt.View Table ImageAs one can see clearly from the table, serial default was quite common among the major European powers during the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries, with France defaulting on its external debt nine times and Spain defaulting 10 times (with three more to follow in the second half of the nineteenth century). One important observation, immediately apparent from the table, is that there is typically a substantial interval between defaults, typically decades, but sometimes centuries. (Note that we require at least 2 years between default episodes to regard them as independent events.) After defaulting in 1683, Prussia's next default episode did not follow for more than a century in 1807. Portugal, after defaulting in 1560, did not default again until 1828, when the country lapsed into a period of serial default that did not end until 1890. At this writing, Portugal has not defaulted again since. (Importantly, during a significant portion of Portugal's quiescent period, it had effectively lost its independence.)Figure 1 gives a measure of the duration of periods of recidivism during the pre-Napoleonic era for the independent (relatively) high-income countries of our sample. The the of time between default episodes (including cases in which there was no As one can see from the half of all default recurrences after a more than with a significant even after a 1. External default duration of high-income countries, of time is as the of years between two external We first the of external default then the duration of time if it was and the episodes of default crisis with and two episodes with no countries Portugal, and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited and country external sovereign debt defaults have much in the modern most recent default in in and in (Reinhart and Rogoff interesting are the cases of and France, despite a level of defaults in its pre-Napoleonic has not defaulted on external debt since. has not defaulted on external debt since its default at the end of the Napoleonic War in would be interesting to explore whether defaults are less to than defaults, though of course over many it is the to that many countries to up large (as in the of we will consider the of our recidivism results to the of and Rogoff (2009) also show that the of long in Table 2 are quite of some of today's emerging markets, many of which have defaulted at least during the past The of emerging markets that have experienced external debt crises if one episodes in which countries default to IMF bridge In all these the countries still as were forced to fiscal as we do not include these in our although arguably from the point of view of macroeconomic and the of debt they are important. We to this issue when we IMF The and of Crises: The now to focus on the more period, to the at the same time the analysis to include banking and inflation crises, as in Table as important in this The past 2 centuries also a much of independent nations to as various regions of the world the of In Table we present of crisis measure takes the of years a country experienced of crisis (including all years and not just the by the of years since independence (or since of External and low-income Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited and is as the of years in crisis by the of years since were for country since or the country's independence countries for external default crisis and countries for inflation and banking Latin Table 3 that the between high-income countries and the of the world in to external default crisis. The average external default crisis of the high-income group is less than half of that of middle- and low-income countries and of that of Latin countries. The would be even if we only and defaults. crisis are also in the of the world than in high-income countries although the is the average of banking crises in high-income countries and in the of the world are The results in Table 3 of course, with the time line in Table that inflation and banking crisis are lower in part because the average duration of these crises to be much to external default crises. (Note also that we are years in crisis, as opposed to the of independent Table which gives the average duration of crises, the between the mean and duration of external default crises versus inflation and banking crises. The duration of banking crises is 3 years or less across all where the world for default crises is For inflation crises, the is only 1 across all this that a country can ways to on in a state of sovereign default far more than it can continue any of as during a banking or inflation the long duration of external default crises and their it is not that large of the world have been in default over much of the last years, as by Reinhart and Rogoff of the major default episodes include the Napoleonic in the early nineteenth century and then Latin countries and Portugal in the first of the The default during the era that the Great Depression and World War when at the more than 40% of the weighted by was in default on external 2 gives the share of countries in inflation crisis over the same Note the huge in inflation crises after World and II and again in the and early The very recent history of inflation most of the world a major shift from the to be whether inflation is a that has been As Rogoff (2003) has including especially the advent of independent central banks with a have been an important in this in but so was the that political on central banks to in unanticipated to be whether the period will another many in as opposed to a shift and 2. Share of countries in inflation crisis, countries that were independent in the given Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited and if one truly that fiscal dominance will never again in most countries, historical of outright default may the true the of default inflation has been effectively The recent of public debt this 3 gives the share of the world banking crises since Note the remarkably small of banking crises during the years of financial repression that during World War II and in many countries into the 1970s. By historical this was a quiescent is also from the that this era has been long but to be to an Share of countries in banking crisis, countries that were independent in the given Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited and next three the of high-income countries with of middle- and low-income countries (including Latin what we have in Table 3 but more on external debt crises, for example, illustrates two First, as middle- and low-income countries are in default on external debt a of the time than high-income countries. high-income countries had a in external defaults in the with (as of this since the advent of rates in the 1970s. we at on since the last default crisis. We from our middle- and low-income countries very low-income countries that do not have external default by of the fact that they are not able to at all on private Share of countries in external default crisis, high-income versus middle- and low-income countries. countries high-income and middle- and low-income that were independent in the given Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited and countries seem to have graduated from default crisis, or at least into But most middle- and low-income countries have not yet the of inflation crises in middle- and low-income countries versus high-income countries. countries have had inflation crises more recently than external default crises, but the has to since the early For middle- and low-income countries, a in the has been followed by a during the is of the of very high inflation we note that it does not episodes of sustained high inflation 20% that, if unanticipated and depending on the maturity structure of government debt, may a substantial de facto default on domestic Share of countries in inflation crisis, high-income versus middle- and low-income countries. countries high-income and middle- and low-income that were independent in the given Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited and on banking crises a very different data for countries begin more the line for middle- and low-income countries only in the course, many of today's countries did not their independence until One can see that in to external default and inflation crises, banking crises are (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, chap. Although banking crises have up in

In February 1930, Eugene Pittard, the director of the ethnological museum in Geneva, sought to expand his museum’s collections in an unusual manner. Instead of sponsoring an expedition to Africa or acquiring objects from former missionaries, instead of buying from established dealers in ethnographic specimens or the newer galleries that specialized in l’art negre, Pittard wrote to an African man in Africa, a Bamum man named Mose Yeyap (Pittard 1930) (Fig. 1).1 Yeyap was the head of the relatively new artisanat in Foumban, a school and artists’ cooperative founded in 1927, and he was known as a key figure for collectors seeking to acquire works of art from the Bamum kingdom. Pittard’s letter explained that he “would like to assemble ... as true a picture as possible of the population of which you are a part, that is to say of the material life of this population. I am sending you by the same post [a list of] the kinds of things that would be the most interesting to have” (Pittard 1930). Pittard explained pointedly, “I insist on one point: Our intent is to have the oldest objects; those which have not been subjected to European influence.” He then listed for Yeyap the kinds of objects he had in mind: “sculpted wood masks, statues, sculpted horns, etc. ... sculpted drums with carved animals or other designs. Miss Debarge [a physician known both to Pittard and Yeyap] showed me drawings on paper that you made of sculptures. Is it possible to have these sculptures themselves?” (Pittard 1930). Pittard’s letter, of course, epitomizes how European arrogance and fantasy informed the collection of African art in the first decades of the twentieth century. Pittard condescendingly and absurdly schooled Yeyap about Yeyap’s own culture and, by privileging his desire for “the oldest objects,” those supposedly untouched by “European influence,” Pittard revealed his adherence to the chimerical “ideal” of African cultures as isolated in time and space. In a fascinating twist, however, we also have Yeyap’s response to Pittard. Yeyap answered back:

Hope in Hard Times: Norvelt and the Struggle for Community during the Great Depression, The Mutual Housing Experiment: New Deal Communities for the Urban Middle Class