From Recognition to Resonance: Insights for Lutheran Theology From Hartmut Rosa's Critique of Honneth

This paper aims to analyse Axel Honneth's theory of recognition by focusing on two distinct methodological approaches present in it, namely, critique and reconstruction. The critical moment in Honneth's theory of recognition is articulated around two concepts: world-disclosing critique, which is based on the attempt to suggest new and provocative points of view on social reality through the usage of rhetorical devices; and misrecognition, as the empirical starting-point for the theoretical model. These two notions, which can be traced back to Adorno and the so called "first generation" of the Frankfurt School, are interpreted as the mainlines of the diagnostic moment in Honneth's critical theory, as they provide an effective analytical insight into the reality of social suffering. Furthermore, they represent the basic fundament upon which the second level, reconstruction, is articulated. By bringing to light the core aspects of social interaction, they provide the initial clues for the development of the normative framework of recognition, the formal idea of a "good life". The final part of the paper argues that such an interpretation of Honneth's theory of recognition helps to overcome some of its most problematic aspects and thus to deepen its critical potential.

This article explores how Axel Honneth's critical theory, when adapted to a materialist depth realism, can be utilised as a critique of Fredrick Hayek's ‘neoliberalism’, an antipolitics influenced by Karl Popper's neo‐positivism. In response to the neoliberal challenge, it is proposed that Axel Honneth's theories of recognition, when grounded in anthropological (‘critical’) materialism, provides a robust defence of an irreducible social agency. When interpreted through this lens, recognition is one aspect of the system of human needs based on subject–subject interactions, the other being a subject–object interaction of humans with non‐human objects. By contrast, Honneth's more recent theory of social freedom relies on a Hegelian process of historical reconstruction and so remains vulnerable to the same epistemic errors that inform neoliberal attempts to universalise homo economicus, that is, of reducing reality to various ways in which it is conceptualised. In this regard, anthropological materialism must presuppose depth realism. The importance of this can be seen when the implications for Honneth's move towards a more orthodox Hegelianism in his more recent works are considered.

Le bien juridique et la reconnaissance : une étude de la théorie honnéthienne de la reconnaissance Les auteurs explorent ce que la discussion actuelle sur le « bien juridique » (legal good) et le « principe de préjudice » (harm principle) peut offrir à la théorie honnéthienne de la reconnaissance. À travers Hegel et Durkheim, ils relèvent combien la peine juridique, concept ressenti du droit positif, concrétise puissamment les notions de justice et d’injustice auxquelles font écho les premiers travaux de Honneth sur les expériences négatives de mépris juridique. Regrettant que le modèle honnéthien ait ensuite bifurqué pour envisager d’autres objets d’étude, ils expliquent comment le caractère intégral, c’est-à-dire à la fois axiologique et existentiel, de la notion de bien juridique pourrait en faire l’heureux complément de cette méthode que Honneth appelle la reconstruction normative.

IntroductionIn Japan, the concept of tabunka-kyōsei (multicultural coexistence) has emerged in response to the growing number of foreign residents, yet its ideological background and policy implications remain insufficiently examined in international discourse. Unlike multiculturalism in Europe, Canada, and Australia, it has evolved under Japan's unique social conditions and remains conceptually distinct.MethodsThis study adopts a normative theoretical approach, analyzing tabunka-kyōsei through Axel Honneth's theory of recognition. Selected local initiatives are used illustratively to explore broader conceptual implications without empirical validation of specific cases.ResultsThe analysis traces the development of foreign resident policies in Japan, identifies the distinctive ideological and institutional features of tabunka-kyōsei, and compares them with Western multiculturalism. Differences include limited rights-based frameworks and an emphasis on exchange and mutual understanding over institutional recognition.DiscussionApplying Honneth's three-layered framework of love, law, and solidarity, the study argues that institutional recognition and social solidarity are central to evaluating Japan's multicultural practices beyond cultural tolerance. The findings contribute to normative debates on tabunka-kyōsei and offer insights for designing inclusive policies in contemporary Japan.

The purpose of this paper is to expose, and provide a possible solution to, an internal inconsistency in Axel Honneth's critical theory of recognition.Honneth requires a way of making his claim that misrecognition causes subjective suffering, with the potential to cognitively disclose injustice, consistent with his account of ideological recognition as a form of misrecognition that engenders compliance with an oppressive social order. Only by reconciling these claims—that is, by showing how ideological recognition can engender an acceptance of domination whilst at the same time causing subjective suffering—can Honneth's theory of recognition retain the kind of critical capacities he desires. As a means of achieving this reconciliation, I propose the notion of “invisible suffering.” In the case of ideological recognition, I suggest that the suffering caused by misrecognition has its disclosive power blocked by the faux‐affirmation that the ideology discursively accords, and this renders the experience of suffering, qua painful indicator of social injustice, invisible to the subject. Drawing on insights from medical sociology, I show how the need to supplement Honneth's theory of recognition with the idea of invisible suffering is revelatory of the kind of critical theoretical stance demanded by his ontological commitments.

This article presents and discusses Axel Honneth's theory of recognition as a specific constellation, i.e. as a theoretical endeavour spanning over and interrelating positions in the fields of anthropology, social theory, and politics. As essential components in this constellation I discern an anthropology of recognition, a social philosophy of different forms of recognition, a morality of recognition, a theory of democratic ethical life as a social ideal, and a notion of political democracy as an ambitious reflexive form of social cooperation. A tentative attempt is also made to elucidate the motivational history that underlies and animates Honneth's theoretical endeavour and accounts for its specific 'spirit'.

In this chapter, the author offers a reading of Axel Honneth's theory of recognition as a romantic political theory in which states do not seem to have any moral standing of their own. The author briefly discusses the opposite view which takes states to be moral persons and he argues for a conception of recognition that takes the specificity and irreducibility of international society seriously without falling into the trap of turning states into fetishes. Finally, the author concludes with a reflection on the place of states and peoples in the critical theory of recognition.Keywords: Axel Honneth's theory of recognition; romantic political theory; state fetishism

ABSTRACTAlthough trends in young adult literature (YAL) indicate that authors are constructing more positive renditions of gay characters, curricular and pedagogical choices seem to remain quite unsympathetic and “conservative,” reproducing harmful stereotypes. This paper contends that the kiss in YAL can symbolize the physical, social, and moral manifestation of same-sex desire, and thus functions as a personal, social, and moral marker of one's relation to oneself and to others. To aid our discussion, we employ Axel Honneth's theory of recognition. Integrating Honneth's theory of recognition with lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, queer and questioning (LGBTQ) young adult novels offers researchers the potential to conduct literary analysis that offers readers, teachers, and students new or alternative “readings” of LGBTQ individuals as well as the social constraints that obstruct social recognition for everyone within a given space. This paper provides a brief literature review of LGBTQ YAL in education and then explicates Honneth's theory of recognition, followed by an application of Honneth's theory to David Leviathan's novel, Two Boys Kissing.

Analizamos los alcances que tiene la teoría del reconocimiento de Axel Honneth como teoría crítica de la sociedad capitalista contemporánea. Para ese fin, mostramos cómo la teoría del reconocimiento se articula con la crítica inmanente de la sociedad y cómo Honneth intenta subsanar los vacíos existentes en el programa de la primera Escuela de Frankfurt. Seguidamente, se muestra que el momento de “trascendencia intramundana”, distinguido por Honneth, está constituido por un sujeto político que no está determinado ni por su condición de clase, ni por su ubicación dentro los llamados “nuevos movimientos sociales”. Con esto, la “sociedad del desprecio” y la correspondiente lucha por el reconocimiento no necesariamente encuentran sus referentes en las luchas sociales que se presentan en los contextos de la sociedad capitalista avanzada. Por último, se analizan los alcances de la teoría del reconocimiento en relación con los objetivos emancipadores planteados en la primera generación de la Escuela de Frankfurt.

Este artigo trata das divergências centrais entre a teoria do discurso de Habermas e a teoria do reconhecimento de Honneth com especial atenção para a dimensão jurídica de integração social em sociedades modernas. A crítica "comunitarista" realizada por Honneth a Habermas constrói uma teoria cultural da modernidade de acordo com a qual as transformações sociais que levaram à institucionalização do princípio jurídico da igualdade ocorreram mediante lutas moralmente motivadas e fundadas em semânticas coletivas. A hipótese central é a de que, apesar de um tal giro "comunitarista", a teoria crítica do reconhecimento em Axel Honneth não necessita abrir mão de seu conteúdo crítico-normativo, o que só pode ser verdade, no entanto, se forem cumpridas algumas condições.

The origins of Axel Honneth's theory of recognition lie in his earlier project to correct the conceptual confusions and empirical shortcomings of historical material ism for the purpose of an adequate post-Habermasian critical social theory. Honneth proposed to accomplish this project, most strikingly, by reconnecting critical social theory with one of its repressed philosophical sources, namely anthropological materialism. In its mature shape, however, recognition theory operates on a narrow concept of interaction, which seems to lose sight of the material mediations with which intersubjective relations are imbricated. The paper argues that a circumspect return to this twofold materialist heritage could substantively correct and enrich contemporary critical theory. The paper provides an illustration of this with the paradigmatic example of work.

This paper argues for the significance of Axel Honneth's theory of recognition for understanding recognition of prior learning (RPL). Case studies of the experiences of RPL by paraprofessional workers in health and social care in the UK and Sweden are used to explicate this significance. The results maintain that there are varying conditions of recognition. These conditions are often fluid, negotiable and ambivalent. However, RPL appears to support self-realisation and self-awareness, when it co-occurs with individual's identification with associated practices. Workplace salary, affordances for practice and collegial values may shape the esteem and thus the potential for self-realisation. RPL can thus help facilitate the development of a more positive relationship to individuals engaged in RPL processes, enhancing their learning and development.

Axel Honneth draws a distinction between three types of recognition: (1) love, (2) respect and (3) social esteem. In his The Struggle for Recognition, the recognition of cultural particularity is situated in the third sphere. It will here be argued that the logic of recognition of cultural identity also demands a non‐evaluative recognition, namely a respect for difference. Difference‐respect is formal because it is a recognition of the value of a particular culture not “for society” or “as such”, but for the social group involved. Yet, although it is formal, difference‐respect cannot be reduced to respect for personal autonomy and its preconditions, as Honneth wrongly suggests in Redistribution or Recognition? It is argued here that difference‐respect is oriented towards another dimension of the person, namely social attachments. This kind of respect entails a separate register of formal recognition with a corresponding concept of personal identity and a parallel category of social disrespect. What morally justifies difference‐respect from a recognition‐theoretic approach is the practical relation‐to‐self that thus becomes possible, namely self‐respect as a sense of belonging. The formal conception of the good life that Honneth articulates should include the insight that this sense of belonging is as much a necessary condition for the good life as is personal autonomy.

Honneth's fundamental claim that the normativity of social orders can be found nowhere but in the very experience of those who suffer injustice leads, I argue, to a radical theory and critique of society, with the potential to provide an innovative theory of social movements and a valid alternative to political liberalism.

This essay analyses the interaction between Marxism and Cultural Studies in the genesis of Honneth's theory of recognition. I reconstruct the passages through which Honneth, by drawing on the writings of some of the major cultural theorists and in reference to the works of the young Marx, develops the conceptual foundations of his paradigm (I), with special attention to the themes of social labour and the relationship between work and recognition (II). I then point out the epistemic and practical qualities of Honneth's theory in relation to its origins in Marxism and Cultural Studies; notably its capacity of detecting even the forms of social protest which have not yet reached the threshold of public expression, and its providing an explanation for those revolts which would otherwise seem to be only led by destructive rage (III).