From Post-Soviet Legacy to Present Accountability: The Emergence of a Doctrinal Framework in European Union (EU) Sanctions Law against Russia

Battered by Geopolitical Winds, Bulgaria Struggles to Restart Much Needed Reforms

This case-note aims to analyse the legal implications of Article 11 of Council Regulation 833/2014, which prohibits the satisfaction of claims related to contracts affected by the European Union (EU) sanctions against Russia, focusing on the NV Reibel v. JSC VO Stankoimport case referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) by the Svea Court of Appeal. This case raises fundamental questions about the amicable settlement – and by extension, arbitrability – of claims under Article 11 and whether the Regulation forms part of EU public policy. This contribution examines whether amicable settlements are permissible under the Regulation and its role within the EU legal framework. It sheds light on the potential impact of a CJEU ruling on arbitrability across EU jurisdictions, particularly in light of differing national criteria for arbitration. It argues that the classification of Regulation 833/2014 as EU public policy would strengthen its enforceability, ensuring uniformity and coherence in its application across Member States. Such an approach would align with the EU’s broader objectives, such as promoting peace, security, and the integrity of the internal market, while avoiding the fragmentation of the regulation’s applicability to dispute resolution mechanisms such as arbitration. By establishing the regulation as EU public policy while preserving its arbitrability, the EU can enhance its ability to achieve its external policy goals without undermining the rights of parties to access justice, thereby maintaining the effectiveness and consistency of its sanctions regime, while keeping arbitration as a viable option to provide parties with a neutral and accessible forum for resolving disputes.

Ongoing geopolitical developments regarding Russia and Ukraine have resulted in discussions about the utility of sanctions. This article analyzes European Union (EU) sanctions on Russia following the annexation of Crimea by investigating whether EU-Russia oil and gas trade relations compromised the efficacy of restrictions. It thus argues that the EU did not sanction Russian oil and gas due to EU reliance on these resources. However, the absence of sanctions on these industries cannot be held responsible for Russia’s refusal to leave Crimea since restrictions that were put in place still notably impacted the Russian economy. Hence, other considerations, such as the general inefficacy of sanctions, unintended consequences of the EU restrictions, and deeper historical reasoning clarify why Russia’s occupation of Crimea persisted.

The article provides an overview of the key features of the European Union (EU) case law on sanctions. In particular, it analyses the grounds available to individuals or entities subject to EU sanctions to seek their annulment before the EU jurisdictional organs. These grounds include, most notably, the violation of essential human rights, the failure by EU institutions to state reasons and manifest error of assessment. Moreover, the article discusses the most relevant preliminary rulings on the interpretation of EU sanctions measures delivered by the Court of Justice of the European Union, as well as actions for damages and interim relief.

192 Despite the tremendous number of studies devoted to the effectiveness of economic sanctions, the unprecedented number of sanctions applied and the recent European Union (EU) reforms on sanctions, sanctions effectiveness should be still a matter of debate. More than a year after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but G7-led sanctions have not materially hindered Russia’s war effort. This study intends to address this problem by focusing on how to make the use and application of EU sanctions against Russia more effective. In doing so, I argue that the main impediments to EU sanctions effectiveness are systemic in nature and inherent to the EU sanctions policy framework. The piecemeal changes of the EU sanctions regulatory framework undertaken so far have not solved these systemic flaws that undermine the effectiveness of EU sanctions. A fundamental revision of the entire system of the EU sanctions policy framework is needed. This study proposes implementing a comprehensive principles-based framework for EU sanctions policy, where harmonisation and the risk-based approach are its foundations, to make sanctions more effective. The proposed sanctions principles-based framework is broader in its scope than is currently the case; it covers a broader set of principles. The proposed frame includes all the stages of the sanctions process, is addressed to a broader number of actors and its foundations are developed. I recommend that this sanctions principles-based framework should be mandatory for use. This is the first part of a two-part article. Part I of the article discusses the need for the revision of the regulatory approach to the EU sanctions policy to increase the effectiveness of sanctions. It includes the analysis of the EU sanctions as a foreign policy instrument and a comprehensive overview of the EU regulatory framework on sanctions as well as the analysis of imposition of the EU sanctions against Russia. Part I also discusses policy proposals for the effectiveness of the EU sanctions, such as harmonisation of the EU sanction policy and the application of a sanctions risk-based approach.

In the wake of unsettling conflicts and democratic backsliding, states and organisations increasingly respond with sanctions. The European Union (EU) is one of them: Brussels makes use of the entire toolbox in its foreign policy, and its sanctions appear in different forms—diplomatic measures, travel bans, financial bans, or various forms of economic restrictions. Yet, there is little debate between different strands in the literature on EU sanctions, in particular concerning measures under the Common Foreign and Security Policy and those pertaining to the development and trade policy fields. Our thematic issue addresses this research gap by assembling a collection of articles investigating the design, impact, and implementation of EU sanctions used in different realms of its external affairs. Expanding the definition of EU sanctions to measures produced under different guises in the development, trade, and foreign policy fields, the collection overcomes the compartmentalised approach characterising EU scholarship.

How many hands to make sanctions work? Comparing EU and US sanctioning efforts

Sometimes, the application of the economic sanctions imposed by the European Union (EU) arises in arbitration proceedings. This article examines the extent to which unilateral EU sanctions are applied uniformly in arbitration. Opting for arbitration between the parties instead of court proceedings, as well as the selection of a particular arbitration venue, may be used to avoid the application of EU sanctions. Although arbitral tribunals have considerable freedom in deciding whether to give effect to EU economic sanctions, which involves an inherent uncertainty in terms of their claim for uniform application, the fact that the parties choose arbitration does not necessarily exclude their application. EU sanctions constitute the public policy of the Member States. The potential for the annulment of the arbitral award by a competent court in an EU Member State or the denial of the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award in the EU may therefore be an incentive for the arbitrators not to disregard these sanctions and may discourage the parties from choosing arbitration or a particular location for arbitration only to escape the application of EU sanctions.

This chapter examines the most prominent forms of international organization sanctions, namely United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU) sanctions. It first examines the constitutional basis, scope, and administration of UN and EU sanctions. It then compares and contrasts these two models, discussing how the interests of peace and security, on the one hand, and human rights and the rule of law, on the other, can sometimes come into conflict in the application of international organization sanctions. It shows that the UN sanctions decision-making system tends to prioritize peace and security, whereas the EU sanctions decision-making system tends to prioritize the rule of law. The chapter argues that neither tradition of international organization sanctions has found the right balance, and that the ongoing contest between peace and security and the rule of law will continue to shape and constrain international organization sanctions decision-making for the foreseeable future.

critical analysis of antiimmigration discourses in European Union, 101-106 discourse, 98-101 political parties, 97-98, 101 Apple, 164-165 Arab Spring, 5-6, 33 Artificial intelligence, 86 Communiqu on International Role of Europe, 138-139 Concentric circles model, 9 Conference on the Future of Europe, 4 current problems affecting European integration, 4-8 new quests in EU, 9-12 scenarios for future of European Union, 8-9 Cooperation with non-EU countries, 114-115 Cooperative security, 185 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, 160 Copenhagen Criteria, 5, 237-238 Cotonou 2.0, 266 Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), 262, 265 historical background, 262-266 1980 Coup D'tat in Turkey, 6 COVID-19, 226 in Europe, 228-231 and financial problems in European Union, 37-39 as global health crisis, 35-37 pandemic, 7, 37,

This paper analyses the effects on Belarus of European Union (EU) sanctions against Russia, on the one hand, and Russian sanctions on Ukrainian and EU goods, on the other. International sanctions opened up new political and economic opportunities that the Belarusian authorities sought to capitalise on. But Minsk's attempts to swim between two waters (retaining the benefits Moscow offered while improving relations with the EU) have backfired and distrust towards Minsk has grown in Moscow, Brussels and Kiev. A theoretical approach is made to the foreign policy of small states, before this paper shows how Belarus has been harmed by its attempts to take advantage of EU and Russian sanctions regimes.

Despite the tremendous number of studies devoted to the effectiveness of economic sanctions, the unprecedented number of sanctions applied and the recent European Union (EU) reforms on sanctions, sanctions effectiveness should be still a matter of debate. More than a year after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but G7-led sanctions have not materially hindered Russia’s war effort. This study intends to address this problem by focusing on how to make the use and application of EU sanctions against Russia more effective. In doing so, I argue that the main impediments to EU sanctions effectiveness are systemic in nature and inherent to the EU sanctions policy framework. The piecemeal changes of the EU sanctions regulatory framework undertaken so far have not solved these systemic flaws that undermine the effectiveness of EU sanctions. A fundamental revision of the entire system of the EU sanctions policy framework is needed. This study proposes implementing a comprehensive principles-based framework for EU sanctions policy, where harmonisation and the risk-based approach are its foundations, to make sanctions more effective. The proposed sanctions principles-based framework is broader in its scope than is currently the case; it covers a broader set of principles. The proposed frame includes all the stages of the sanctions process, is addressed to a broader number of actors and its foundations are developed. I recommend that this sanctions principles-based framework should be mandatory for use.

From 1991 until 2012, the European Union (EU) applied sanctions on Myanmar with the purpose of promoting democracy and human rights. In addition, the EU called on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to exert pressure on Myanmar. This paper analyses, in the context of Myanmar’s 1997 accession to ASEAN, how the EU’s sanctions approach towards Myanmar was perceived within ASEAN and related repercussions of this approach on ASEAN–EU interregional relations. With the accession of Myanmar as the base story, it is argued that a regional organizations membership concept implies specific dealings with normative ideas such as democracy and human rights as well as strategies of punishment such as sanctions. The differing membership concepts of ASEAN and the EU explain ASEAN’s critical perception of the EU’s sanctions on Myanmar. Further, the conceptual difference in membership also explains that the EU’s pressure on ASEAN has severely impaired the interregional relations.

The European Union (EU) has been more incensed over Russian aggression towards Ukraine in 2022, when compared to Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014. This article questions this shift by looking at the EU's sanctions towards Russia. It argues that the relative unwillingness of the European Commission, and accordingly the imbalance or lopsided distribution of power within and amongst the relevant EU institutions, was one of the factors internal to the EU that prevented an effective response in 2014. Although external and contextual factors have been crucial, the EU has adopted harsher sanctions against Russia since 2022 because the Commission is not unwilling to act as it was in 2014, and dissenting members have found it difficult to obstruct the process in the Council of the EU. This article also extends the analytical repertoire of the bureaucratic politics model by demonstrating that it retains explanatory power even when the traditional parameters remain constant over time.

Protection of constitutional identity in light of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Poland – a comparative study