From ideal to anti-ideal theory: political norms for a world beyond recovery

The distinction between ideal and nonideal theory is an important methodological concern in contemporary political theory. At issue is the extent to which political theorizing is a practical endeavor and, consequently, the extent to which real-world facts should either be factored into political theorizing or else be assumed away. The distinction between ideal theory and nonideal theory was first introduced by John Rawls in his classic A Theory of Justice. Rawls’s ideal theory is an account of the society we should aim for, given certain facts about human nature and possible social institutions, and involves two central assumptions. First, it assumes full compliance of relevant agents with the demands of justice. Second, it assumes that historical and natural conditions of society are reasonably favorable. These two assumptions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for his ideal theory. For Rawls, nonideal theory primarily addresses the question of how the ideal might be achieved in practical, permissible steps, from the actual, partially just society we occupy. The account of ideal and nonideal theory advanced by Rawls has been subject to criticism from different directions. Amartya Sen accepts Rawls’s distinction between ideal and nonideal theory but argues that Rawlsian-style nonideal theory is too ideal. Given the many and severe injustices we face we do not need to know what ideal (or “transcendental”) justice looks like; our focus should not be on how to transition toward this ideal. Instead, the advancement of justice requires a comparative judgment which ranks possible policies in terms of being more or less just than the status quo. G. A. Cohen, by contrast, argues that Rawlsian-style ideal theory is not really ideal theory as such, but instead principles for regulating society. Our beliefs about normative principles should, ultimately, be insensitive to matters of empirical fact; genuine ideal theory is a form of moral epistemology (an exercise of identifying normative truths).

Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform

The Uselessness of Rawls's 'Ideal Theory'

In reviewing some of the literature, ideal and non-ideal theories are presented as opposing or at least competing theories, in the same manner as are liberal and progressive theories of education. Some scholars suggest that ideal theory ought to precede non-ideal theory, while others suggest just the opposite. This is referred to in the literature as ‘the priority objection.’ Some suggest we don’t need ideal theory at all and should exclusively use non-ideal theory. Others focus on how this scholar misses the point, that scholar leaves something out, or this scholar has it right and here’s why. My objective in this paper is to argue that aside from important and scholarly discussions, ideal theory and non-ideal theory are artificially polarized. Further, and more radically, characterizing ideal and non-ideal theories as two separate enterprises and as ‘theories’ are category mistakes. Not surprisingly, because of the artificial polarization and category mistakes, the debate is rather confused and stuck. This paper attempts to untangle the confusion and open up the dialogue.

This Element provides an opinionated survey of the ideal and non-ideal theory debate in political philosophy. It adopts a minimal conception of ideal theory as “theorizing that aims to characterize ideal or perfect justice” and then investigates four major questions. First, does ideal theory provide a benchmark for evaluating what is more just than what? Second, does it provide a target for long-term reform? Third, does it provide a gauge of appropriate or permissible responses to injustice? Fourth, to what extent should we do ideal theory? The core message is that ideal theory is not uniquely or especially well suited to serving these roles, and deserves no pride of place in the discipline. Nevertheless, ideal theory is somewhat valuable and it should remain one active research program among many. Connections to related debates beyond political philosophy are briefly explored. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

This essay considers the relationship between ideal theory and non-ideal theory. It begins with Rawls’s conception of ideal theory and A. John Simmons’s articulation of non-ideal theory. Both defend the priority of ideal theory over non-ideal theory. The essay then considers three different conceptions of the social barriers standing in the way of an ideal society, taken broadly from Mill, Marx, and Foucault. Each conception of power suggests a divergent strategy for pursuing non-ideal theory. The Foucauldian conception also suggests reasons to mistrust our own political and moral judgments. The essay advocates a more limited view of the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory than is commonly described, in which ideal theory retains its logical priority but not its temporal priority. In other words, the essay argues that we will fare best when we focus first on reducing specific injustices while setting aside further speculation about the character of an ideal society.

When interest in political realism started to resurge a few years ago, it was not uncommon to interpret realist political theory as a form of non-ideal theorising. This reading has been subjected to extensive criticism. First, realists have argued that political realism cannot be interpreted as merely a form of applied political theory. Second, realists have explained that political realism can defend a role for unfeasible normative prescriptions in political theory. I explain that these developments, besides allowing us to reject interpretations of political realism as a form of non-ideal theory, have given us reason to think of political realism as a form of ideal theory. Yet, when ideal theory enters the picture, a series of methodological questions arise regarding the proper use of ideals. In this paper, I clarify how the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory ought to be conceptualised in realist political theory. I examine the two major interpretations of the role of ideals that have been provided so far – the target and benchmark interpretations – and I show that neither is compatible with some of the fundamental theoretical commitments of realist political theory. This both allows me to point out the requirements that an interpretation of the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory must meet to be defined as properly realist and allows me to emphasise the strengths of the realist approach. Accordingly, I propose a new interpretation of the role of ideals, one consistent with realist theoretical commitments: I suggest that realist political ideals ought to be interpreted as models.

Nonideal theory and critical theory are two approaches to social critique. Nonideal theory has become increasingly popular in post-Rawlsian political philosophy over the last 15 years (for an overview, see Valentini 2012). It is a broad church, but is often thought to be motivated by a dissatisfaction with ideal theory's lack of practical relevance (Swift 2008, 368). Issues that have preoccupied proponents of nonideal theory are partial compliance (see Rawls 1971, 8–9; Cullity 2004; Chahboun 2015), or the question of how to translate principles of justice into concrete policy recommendations (see, among others, Phillips 1985; Robeyns 2008). Critical theory, on the other hand, is often associated with the Frankfurt School (see Held 1980; Gordon, Hammer, and Honneth 2019), but also refers, more broadly, to work done by critical race theorists and feminist scholars (Mills 1997; Haslanger 2021). It shares with nonideal theory an orientation to real-world circumstances and a commitment to being relevant to action in the face of those circumstances. In the light of this, it is surprising that the relationship between nonideal theory and critical theory has not received more attention in the literature, for instance in the way that the relation between realism and nonideal theory has (for discussions of the latter see Cozzaglio and Favara 2022; Favara 2022; Sleat 2016; Rossi and Sleat 2014). This special issue seeks to fill this gap. The four contributions, while each developing a distinct understanding of this relationship, all agree that critical theory offers important insights which could strengthen the real-world relevance of the nonideal theory enterprise. The first contribution “Should nonideal theory rely on ideal theory? Lessons from the Frankfurt School,” by Kristina Lepold, addresses the question posed in the title that has been the subject of some debate among nonideal theorists. Drawing inspiration from the Frankfurt School, Lepold argues that if nonideal theory relies on ideal theory to identify injustices, it is a matter of chance whether nonideal theory can help members of the social world to understand the injustices they face. This, however, should give nonideal theorists pause for thought, for the ability of nonideal theory to successfully guide collective action to overcome injustice depends on its ability to contribute to such self-reflection. Lepold concludes by suggesting that nonideal theory should not rely on ideal theory, if it does not want to risk having no practical relevance. In the second contribution, “Non-ideal theory and critical theory and their relationship to standpoint theory,” Hilkje Hänel demonstrates that there is a methodological overlap between critical theory and some variants of nonideal theory when it comes to analyzing social reality. Both share a commitment to standpoint theory, that is, the assumption that one's social position is relevant to knowledge acquisition. This methodological commonality means that nonideal theory and critical theory face a similar challenge: the critical standpoint is always only a potential and never a given, which Hänel calls the “problem of ideology.” This problem can be addressed by drawing on a theoretical resource that is central to critical theory, namely ideology critique. In his contribution, “Critical Theory, Ideal Theory, and Conceptual Engineering,” Andrea Sangiovanni picks up on a similar thread. He argues that all social and political philosophy should become critical theory in the sense that it starts theorizing from the current social practices we find ourselves in. This is because disputes about normative concepts, like freedom or justice, can only be resolved by understanding the practical context in which they are meant to do their work. Rather than proceeding a priori, we need to ask which concept is most useful or appropriate in a given context, or which concept best captures the essential features of a set of social practices. In the final contribution, “Beyond the nonideal: Why critical theory needs a utopian dimension,” Titus Stahl examines central arguments by Marx, Adorno, and others against ideal or utopian theorizing. The essence of these arguments is that political theorists are incapable of envisioning ideal states of affairs under nonideal conditions because the latter severely limit their epistemic, imaginative and conceptual capacities. But Stahl argues that most of these arguments are unconvincing and shows how critical theory can be immanent, starting from within current society and its contradictions, and at the same time construct provisional ideal states of affairs that can orient collective action. Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL. The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Abstract:This essay discusses the relation between ideal theory and two forms of political moralism identified by Bernard Williams, structural and enactment views. It argues that ideal theory, at least in the sense Rawls used that term, only makes sense for structural forms of moralism. These theories see their task as describing the constraints that properly apply to political agents and institutions. As a result, they are primarily concerned with norms that govern action. In contrast, many critiques of ideal theory are structured and motivated by their commitment to an enactment model of political theorizing. This instead sees political agents and institutions as instruments for producing or promoting better states of affairs. Enactment models treat the evaluations that rank different states of affairs as justificatorily basic, rather than norms governing action on which structural models focus. This reveals an important feature of debates about ideal theory. Whether ideal theory is capable of appropriately guiding action will depend on what the criteria for appropriately guiding action are, about which different theorists have importantly different views. For example, some popular strategies for defending ideal theory fail, while it may be much less clear that some alternatives to ideal theory can provide action guidance than their advocates claim.

In the ideal vs. non-ideal theory debate contemporary political philosophers discuss the method of theorizing social justice. Some argue that theories of social justice should be ideal and justify exclusively in ideal theory a just society as goal for social reform. Others hold that theories of social justice should be nonideal and justify exclusively in non-ideal theory how to address social injustices in the status quo. This article shares the view of those who, like John Rawls, maintain that theories of justice must consist of an ideal and a non-ideal theory part. Yet it criticizes Rawls for prioritizing ideal over non-ideal theory and defends the mutual dependence or co-originality of ideal and non-theory. For not only does non-ideal theorizing depend on a goal of social reform justified in ideal theory. Ideal theorizing also depends on a non-ideal theory to determine whether and how the goal for social reform is feasible.

Time has come to apply the theories in the real world. We have seen that in the metaphysical laboratory, where we put them to crucial tests in our thought experiments, the theories conflict. Now time has come to investigate their implications in real life and to tease out their implications for priority-setting in health care. This task has to be accomplished in steps, however. It is important to distinguish between their implications for priority setting under the assumption of strict compliance (with one or another of the theories), and a realistic situation where it is expected that even people who accept one of the theories will, once their turn to carry the costs has come, try and bend the rules in their favour. Here a simplified notion of ideal and nonideal theory will be developed and put to use. And I will start by looking into the implications of the theories under the assumption of strict compliance (ideal theory), only later to turn to the problems associated with noncompliance (nonideal theory). All this prepares room for a discussion about the normative significance of noncompliance to be undertaken later in this book. The question then is whether the fact that noncompliance with the theories is to be expected spells problems for the theories as such. Does it count against their plausibility that people are not prepared to act in accordance with them?

This article begins by setting out Rawls's conception and defense of ideal theory as a necessary precursor to the kind of nonideal theory that can guide action in the real world. It then evaluates the critique of those, such as Amartya Sen, who insist that knowing what an ideally just society would look like is simply not helpful for that purpose. Having also addressed the complaint that the Rawlsian approach is ideological, and hence worse than useless, the discussion broadens out to compass the more wide-ranging critique of mainstream contemporary political philosophy leveled by so-called political realists. It then turns to Cohen's very different objection—that Rawls's ideal theory of justice is too tailored to empirical circumstance. It concludes with an attempt to identify the variety of different things that might be conceived as nonideal theory. Ideal theory may be understood in many different ways, but nonideal theory fares little better.

This paper has three aims. First, it argues that the present use of ‘ideal theory’ is unhelpful, and that an earlier and apparently more natural use focusing on perfection would be preferable. Second, it has tried to show that revision of the use of the term would better expose two distinctive normative issues, and illustrated that claim by showing how some contributors to debates about ideal theory have gone wrong partly through not distinguishing them. Third, in exposing those two distinct normative issues, it has revealed a particular way in which ideal theory even under the more specific, revisionary definition will often be central to working out what to do in non-ideal circumstances. By clarifying the terms on which debates over ideal and non-ideal theory should take place, and highlighting the particular problems each deals with, it tries to clear the ground for turning to the actual problem, which is what to do in our non-ideal and often tragic circumstances.

Ideals of justice may do little toward the correction of injustice in real life. The influence of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice has led some philosophers of race to focus on “nonideal theory” as a way to bring conditions in unjust societies closer to conditions of justice described by ideal theory. However, a more direct approach to injustice may be needed to address unfair public policy and existing conditions for minorities in racist societies. Applicative justice describes the applications of principles of justice that are now “good enough” for whites to nonwhites (based on prior comparisons of how whites and nonwhites are treated).

<p>This thesis focuses on what I have called “technological idealisations”, and how they are valuable to many current and future ethical debates. Technological idealisations refer to a methodology of using technology thought experiments to contribute to ethical debates. I do not claim this to be a new idea, and in fact will go on to give many examples of technological idealisation that already exist in the philosophical literature. The term describes the purposeful effort to collate these examples into a specific methodological framework; one which gives a particular kind of evidence which can ignore concerns of practicality and critically focus on the theoretical issues in a given debate. In order to explore this idea I will first be looking at past, better known, examples of idealisations to facilitate understanding of my own. I will look at Rawlsian ideal theory as a template for my own idealisations, as well as to explain how they can be valuable in contributing to debates (in Rawls’ case political and in my case ethical). Rawls’ split up the field of political theory into ideal and non-ideal theory. Non-ideal theory is practical and works within the constraints of current political reality. Ideal theory idealises the political conditions to allow theorising regarding perfect political theory. The same can be done for ethics and for technology as it relates to ethics, as is my goal. Following on from this, I also examine Johann Roduit’s use of ideal theory in the closely related field of human enhancement, in which he develops an interesting methodology of using ideals to guide human enhancement programmes. However, rather than being concerned with Roduit’s practical aim, my goal is theoretical. I want to take the ethical principles and theories themselves as ideals for technological development; in doing so technologies will be created, through the use of thought experiments, which agree with the theoretical aims of the theory or principle. These technologies can then be ethically examined and the resulting evidence can contribute (and has in the past contributed) to the ethical debate of those concepts and theories. The kind of evidence I see technological idealisations as offering ignores practical concerns and in doing so is also immune to criticisms of impracticality. This allows for more closely focused scrutiny of the ethical theories and principles themselves, undistracted by appeals to practicality which either argue for accepting a theory due to its utility or argue for rejecting a theory due to its impracticality.</p>