From hierarchical to panoptic control: The Chinese solution in monitoring judges

Abstract

Abstract In the wake of the 2014 judicial reforms, are Chinese judges in most circumstances free in their decision-making? Based primarily on interviews with judges, this article argues that although a truncated hierarchy has led to increased judicial autonomy, the state maintains its tight grip over judges. In its new form, the state’s control is more indirect, external, ex post, diffused, and ideological. It allows the state to closely monitor judges’ entire handling of cases (hence the designation “panoptic”). It has some similarities with, yet fundamentally differs from, existing patterns in authoritarian states. While judges’ accountability continues to be largely a bureaucratic matter, this Chinese form of control has nonetheless been effective at a time of soaring caseloads, a slimmed-down judiciary, and increasing insistence on legitimacy. This article seeks to deepen understanding of developments in Chinese courts and, more widely, judicial politics in authoritarian states.