From Heaven to Hell under the Trump Administration

State of the Union Addresses (SOUA) by two recent US Presidents, President Obama (2016) and President Trump (2018), and a series of recent of tweets by President Trump, are analysed by means of the data mining technique, sentiment analysis. The intention is to explore the contents and sentiments of the messages contained, the degree to which they differ, and their potential implications for the national mood and state of the economy. President Trump's 2018 SOUA and his sample tweets are identified as being more positive in sentiment than President Obama's 2016 SOUA. This is confirmed by bootstrapped t tests and non-parametric sign tests on components of the respective sentiment scores. The issue of whether overly positive pronouncements amount to self-promotion, rather than intrinsic merit or sentiment, is a topic for future research.

State of the Union Addresses (SOUA) by two recent US Presidents, President Obama (2016) and President Trump (2018), and a series of recent of tweets by President Trump, are analysed by means of the data mining technique, sentiment analysis. The intention is to explore the contents and sentiments of the messages contained, the degree to which they differ, and their potential implications for the national mood and state of the economy. President Trump's 2018 SOUA and his sample tweets are identified as being more positive in sentiment than President Obama's 2016 SOUA. This is confirmed by bootstrapped t tests and non-parametric sign tests on components of the respective sentiment scores. The issue of whether overly positive pronouncements amount to self-promotion, rather than intrinsic merit or sentiment, is a topic for future research.

State of the Union Addresses (SOUA) by two recent US Presidents, President Obama (2016) and President Trump (2018), and a series of recent of tweets by President Trump, are analysed by means of the data mining technique, sentiment analysis. The intention is to explore the contents and sentiments of the messages contained, the degree to which they di_er, and their potential implications for the national mood and state of the economy. President Trump's 2018 SOUA and his sample tweets are identi_ed as being more positive in sentiment than President Obama's 2016 SOUA. This is con_rmed by bootstrapped t tests and non-parametric sign tests on components of the respective sentiment scores. The issue of whether overly positive pronouncements amount to self-promotion, rather than intrinsic merit or sentiment, is a topic for future research.

At the center of this work is the analysis of the consequences of implementing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (also known as - the Iran nuclear deal) on divergent foreign policy approaches as the main indicators of the mismatch in relations between the United States and the European Union during the administration of the 45th US President Donald Trump. While the US unilaterally withdrew from this agreement, EU member states remained in it. The United States and the European Union, on the one hand, and Iran, on the other, had completely different definitions of their own national security, insisting on their unilateral security, while failing to redefine the problem in the direction of mutual security. However, in addition, the US and EU member states, although both concerned about their own security due to the possible emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran, instead of a complementary approach to the issue had a mutually competing one. Using the case study method, as well as the analytical-deductive method and the content analysis method, the author explains the difference in this approach through the concept of the strategic culture of the US and the EU and concludes that they are a consequence of the different understanding of international relations, but also due to the different identity characters of these two actors. The main thesis of the paper is that the US administration of Donald Trump, with its more realistic and Hobbesian view of international relations, and a different understanding of the US national interest in the Middle East, adopted a different approach to curbing Iran's nuclear armament ambitions compared to the approach of the European Union, which is conditioned by a more liberal and Kantian nature of its view on international relations. With unilateral foreign policy actions, Trump's administration risked causing damage and shaking its own credibility in relations with the European Union. On the other hand, the European Union remains committed to multilateralism and the preservation of the Iran nuclear deal. The subject of this research is the direction of the foreign policy actions of the United States and the European Union, in the period from the unilateral withdrawal of Trump's cabinet from the Iran nuclear agreement on May 8th, 2018, until the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, a general of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard on January 3rd, 2020 in the Republic of Iraq. The current state and perspective of contemporary transatlantic political relations in the context of unilateral withdrawal will be taken into consideration. In accordance with its new foreign policy agenda and strategy, and more inclined to a realistic view of international relations, the Trump administration risked deeper conflicts and divergence with the European Union over regional security issues. Thus, there was a threat to limit the further deepening and strengthening of the transatlantic partnership with the leading member states of the European Union, especially with the government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the government of the Republic of France. Additionally, the subject of research will be the patterns of behavior, embodied in speeches and foreign policy actions, which are consistent with the different approaches of the US and the EU to the problem of preventing the theocratic regime in Iran from developing its nuclear program. Accordingly, the focus will be on the period of the Trump administration, which, with its political will to break off with the legacy of the Obama administration, began to perceive Iran as a factor causing instability in the Middle East region. The Trump administration did not ratify the Iran nuclear agreement and continued to act under its obligations, solely because of the unfavorable benefits and a large number of shortcomings for the US. Thus, the paper will analyze whether the US administration of Donald Trump had a concrete foreign policy strategy in relations with the European Union and Iran. Also, the paper will try to answer the question of whether a unilateral or multilateral approach to regional security problems is more fruitful, taking into consideration the question of whether the unilateral approach of the only superpower in the world is more effective or, on the other hand, an international coalition of states is needed to suppress the Tehran's nuclear ambitions.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to empirically examine whether the massive spreads and fatalities of the COVID-19 pandemic in the USA, the country with the most advanced medical technology in the world, are symptomatic of leadership failure. The authors posit that when political leaders, such as the President of the USA, in conjunction with a group of state governors and city mayors, employed conspiracy theories and disinformation to achieve their political goals, they contributed to the massive spreads and fatalities of the virus, and they also undermined the credibility of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the health-care professionals in providing the pertinent control guidelines and true scientific-based medical information.Design/methodology/approachThe authors conducted a review of current studies that address the handling of global infectious diseases to build a better understanding of the issue of pandemics. They then employed a theoretical framework to link the massive spreads and fatalities of the COVID-19 pandemic to political leaders, such as President Trump and the group of obsequious state governors and city mayors, who propagated conspiracy theories and disinformation through social media platforms to downplay the severity of the virus. The authors compared the massive spreads and fatalities of the COVID-19 pandemic in the USA under President Trump to President Obama who handled H1N1, Ebola, Zika and Dengue. More importantly, the authors compared President Trump's handling of the COVID-19 pandemic to other political leaders in advanced countries where there were no concerted efforts to spread conspiracy theories and disinformation about the health risks of COVID-19 pandemic.FindingsThe authors' theoretical analysis alluded to the fact that political leaders, such as President Trump, who are engulfed in self-deceptions, self-projections and self-aggrandizements would engage in self-promotion and avoid accountability for their missteps in handling global pandemic shocks. In contrast, political leaders in other advanced countries did not downplay the severity thus their ability to curtail the spreads and fatalities of the COVID-19 pandemic.Research limitations/implicationsThe theoretical viewpoints presented in this paper along with the derivations of the spreads–fatalities curtailment coefficients and the spread–fatality upsurge coefficients under Presidents Obama and Trump, respectively, may not be replicable. Given this plausible limitation, future research may need to provide a deep analysis of the amplifications of conspiracy theories and disinformation because they are now deeply rooted in the political economy of the USA. Furthermore, since scientists and medical professionals may not be able to forecast future epidemics or pandemics with pin-point accuracy nor predict how political leaders would disseminate health risks information associated with different pathogens, it is imperative that future research addresses the positive or adverse effects of conspiracy theories and disinformation that are now easily propagated simultaneously through different social media platforms, which are currently protected under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. The multiplier effects of conspiracy theories and disinformation will continue to amplify the division about the authenticity of COVID-19 pandemic and the emergence or reemergence of other pathogens in the foreseeable future.Originality/valueThe authors derived the unique spreads-fatalities curtailment coefficients to demonstrate how President Obama used effective collaboration and coordination at all levels of government in conjunction with medical experts to curtail the spreads and fatalities associated with H1N1, Ebola, Zika and Dengue. They further derived the spreads-fatalities upsurge coefficients to highlight how President Trump contributed to the spreads and fatalities of COVID-19 pandemic through his inability to collaborate and coordinate with state governors, city mayors and different health-care agencies at the national and international levels.

Strategic plans are a foundational element of the Federal Performance Framework introduced by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 2012 to encourage agency implementation of the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010. This study compared federal Chief Financial Officer (CFO) agency strategic plans written between Fiscal Years (FY) 2012 and 2019 under Presidents Obama and Trump, respectively. A component analysis of selected agency strategic plans revealed that CFO agencies adhered to a rational plan design before and after the presidential transition. But under President Obama, agency plans adhered more closely to the design criteria in OMB implementation guidance. A decrease was observed in the number of strategic goals and strategic objectives in agency strategic plans written under President Trump. Under both Presidents, CFO agencies pursued a mix of strategic objectives including a larger percentage that were externally-oriented, mission-related outcomes or objectives in both administrations. A higher percentage of strategic objective statements in all of the CFO agency plans written under President Trump were more externally-oriented and included more mission-related outcomes, when compared to agency plans written under President Obama.

Purpose This paper aims to examine how disruptive presidential leadership reshapes the business–government nexus by analyzing the Trump administration as a critical case of political and economic transformation. It explores how unilateral governance, policy volatility and weaponized interdependence compelled firms to adopt short-term, defensive and state-contingent innovation strategies. Through a comparative analysis of the Obama, Trump and Biden administrations, the study seeks to clarify how differing leadership styles influence corporate behavior, policy uncertainty and long-term institutional resilience. Ultimately, the paper reframes presidential power as a structural force shaping corporate adaptation, innovation trajectories and the stability of capitalist governance. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a comparative qualitative design, integrating theoretical analysis with empirical evidence across the Obama, Trump and Biden administrations. It combines insights from presidential power theory, institutional economics and business strategy to construct an analytical framework linking leadership style to corporate adaptation under policy uncertainty. Data sources include policy documents, economic policy uncertainty indices and secondary literature on trade, innovation and regulation. Comparative case analysis is used to trace causal mechanisms connecting disruptive governance to firm-level strategic responses. This multi-level approach allows for identifying both short-term adaptive behaviors and long-term institutional consequences within the evolving business–government nexus. Findings This study finds that the Trump administration’s disruptive leadership produced policy chaos that often operated as administrative incompetence, forcing firms into defensive, opportunistic and state-contingent innovation. Executive orders, tariffs and regulatory reversals aimed less at creating opportunities than at protecting existing hierarchies. Short-term gains in sectors like semiconductors came alongside fractured supply chains and declining predictability. Firms either aligned with shifting state priorities or diversified abroad to manage volatility. Ultimately, chaotic governance accelerated adaptation, but eroded the coordination, regulatory stability and institutional trust needed for long-term competitiveness. Originality/value This paper reframes presidential power by linking disruptive leadership, and the chaos that signals Trump’s administrative incompetence, to firm-level strategic behavior. Instead of treating policy uncertainty as external, it shows how leadership style and governance design actively produce it. Integrating theories of presidential power, business influence and institutional resilience, the study bridges political science and corporate strategy. A comparison of the Obama, Trump and Biden administrations reveals how politically generated chaos becomes a structural force shaping innovation, exposing the trade-offs between short-term adaptability and long-term institutional stability.

Previous articleNext article FreeReading Regents and the Political Significance of LawCristina M. RodríguezCristina M. Rodríguez Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreWhen the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, in June 2020, advocates celebrated. DACA—an acronym that no longer requires definition—lived to see another day.1 Newspaper headlines marked the decision as a decisive rebuff of the Trump administration’s efforts to end the Obama-era program that shielded so-called Dreamers from deportation while authorizing them to work in the United States.2 Initiated in 2012, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program had survived almost four years of a presidential administration overtly hostile to immigrants and immigration—a government bent on unraveling as much of the administrative and political legacy of its immediate predecessors as possible.3 The Supreme Court largely affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s holding that efforts by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to rescind DACA were arbitrary and capricious and therefore invalid, sending DHS back to the drawing board to accomplish its objectives.4 With the 2020 presidential election less than five months away and the very real possibility of regime change in the air, the decision seemed decisive. The Supreme Court had saved DACA, at least for the time being.On the other side of the presidential election, we can now say that the Dreamers and their lawyers succeeded in using the courts to run out the clock on one of the more high-profile efforts of the Trump presidency. This success calls for an explanation. The original legal theory of DACA was predicated on its discretionary and therefore defeasible character. The government justified DACA as a series of individual acts of prosecutorial discretion, defined as the inherent discretion law enforcement officials possess to forbear from enforcement, at their convenience, in order to prioritize enforcement resources. DACA’s founding document—a memorandum issued by the Secretary of Homeland Security—included the disclaimer standard in Executive orders and agency guidance documents: “this memorandum confers no substantive right.”5 DACA’s promise, then, lasted as long as the Executive wanted it to. The promise was durable as long as President Obama remained in office but unenforceable should the Executive branch fall into the hands of officials hostile to the program.Given the apparently weak anchor DACA provided, why was it so difficult for a new administration, whose enforcement priorities did not include categorical forbearance for Dreamers, to reorient the enforcement system in its preferred direction? A conventional answer, repeated as a description of many of the Trump administration’s stumbles across regulatory arenas, was that officials were incompetent, sloppy, and disingenuous. The myriad court opinions in the DACA rescission litigation of the Trump years, from across the country and up and down the judicial hierarchy, reflected a version of this thesis. No court concluded that DACA was required by law. All parties, including the Supreme Court, seemed to agree that an administration could end the program.6 But despite efforts to respond to the demands and criticisms of the lower courts, the Trump administration could not find its way to its desired conclusion.But if the Court has implicitly acknowledged that DACA is not legally required and expressly stated that the government has the authority to wind it down, in what sense was Regents a major victory? In this essay, I argue that Regents is not a triumph in immigration law or even a decision of immigration law; far from it, the opinion contains a roadmap to DACA’s demise. The decision’s salutary outcome for immigrants also distracts us from a more ominous turn in the Roberts Court toward a reading of the immigration laws that empowers both Congress and the President to do as they please—a reading exemplified by one of the Term’s other decisions, Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, in which the Court rejects a Suspension Clause challenge to expedited removal proceedings.7Regents does reflect a kind of political triumph, however, not just because DACA was saved but because the Court calls attention to the profound interests its recipients have in remaining in the United States and thus to their new social status, separate and apart from their legal status. And yet, within the Regents decision itself, as well as in the legal claims made against the Trump administration, are the very tools with which courts might again stymie political change designed to advance immigrants’ rights, relying on the exacting procedural regularity championed in Regents by Chief Justice Roberts.I. The Trump Administration’s Failed RescissionChief Justice Roberts opened his opinion in 2012, at the moment of DACA’s inception. But to understand what DACA sought to achieve as a matter of administration, it is important to understand what it replaced. As most every court to have heard a DACA-related dispute has recognized, implicit in the operation of an immigration enforcement regime is the authority of Executive officials to set priorities for law enforcement agents. Those priorities can encourage agents to forbear from arresting or deporting otherwise removable non-citizens as part of a larger systemic interest in channeling resources toward removals in the government’s highest interests. Beginning in 2010, Obama-era DHS officials articulated a set of priorities in guidance documents (known as the Morton Memos) in an effort to encourage line-level officials to consider non-enforcement against certain types of individuals, including those who met the criteria that would eventually define DACA – the hundreds of thousands of non-citizens lacking immigration status who had been brought to the United States as youth.8 After two years of trying to steer the enforcement system with these exhortations, DHS officials determined that few obvious or publicly visible changes to enforcement practices had occurred. The Department’s political leadership, in conjunction with the White House, thus devised DACA to protect Dreamers from deportation. The program, adopted by what came to be known as the Napolitano memorandum, invited applications for forbearance from those who satisfied carefully drawn eligibility criteria, virtually ensuring, though not guaranteeing, protection and work authorization for Dreamers.9By the time President Donald Trump took office, more than 750,000 Dreamers had been granted DACA status,10 which provided them actual and psychological relief from removal and enabled them to enter the workforce and live as if their immigration status were immaterial. As a candidate, Donald Trump vowed to rescind DACA immediately, but in his initial months in office, President Trump himself expressed ambivalence and even reservations.11 In September 2017, however, Attorney General Jefferson Sessions sent a one-page, four-paragraph letter to Acting DHS Secretary Elaine Duke to “advise” that DHS should rescind the Napolitano memorandum initiating DACA on the ground that DACA was “an open-ended circumvention of immigration laws” and “an unconstitutional exercise of the authority of the Executive Branch.”12 The next day, in what had to have been a coordinated decision within the administration, Secretary Duke released her own memorandum terminating DACA,13 citing the Attorney General’s letter and the litigation that had called into question the legal authority for a second but now moribund Obama-era deferred action policy (Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA)).14 The timing and content of each of these two administrative documents became central to the Supreme Court’s resolution of the legal question before it—whether the Trump administration’s efforts to rescind DACA had been lawful.The court case began in three different circuits, where an array of plaintiffs raised numerous substantive claims, two of which ended up before the Supreme Court: that the rescission of DACA was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and that the rescission violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. In its culminating opinion, the Supreme Court first concluded that DACA did not fall into the class of non-enforcement decisions long held to be unreviewable by courts on the authority of Heckler v. Chaney.15 DACA amounted, instead, to a full-blown program for granting immigration relief and attendant benefits, justifying judicial review—review that jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) also did not preclude. The Court then proceeded to hold that the rescission of DACA in its entirety was indeed inconsistent with the requirements of the APA but that none of the plaintiffs’ allegations established a “plausible” claim of racial animus under the Equal Protection Clause.But DACA was a discretionary program that the administration should have been able to undo easily, not a program that should have survived more than three years of a concerted rescission effort (assuming Trump officials’ hearts were in it). Why did a clearly permissible outcome evade the Trump administration? Though incompetence has been charged repeatedly in public commentary, the explanations offered by Chief Justice Roberts underscore that the federal courts’ conceptualization of the administration’s fault changed throughout the litigation.In his letter to Secretary Duke, Attorney General Sessions justified the rescission as legally required, in part citing the litigation risk that maintaining the program posed, given that the Fifth Circuit had invalidated President Obama’s similarly structured DAPA initiative.16 At the time, Adam Cox and I argued that the administration was hiding behind flimsy legal arguments to duck political responsibility and accountability for ending a widely popular and successful program.17 The lower courts quickly put a stop to this evasion by demanding that the Trump administration provide reasons for the rescission beyond what the courts viewed to be erroneous legal claims.18 Judge John Bates in the District for the District of Columbia actually gave the administration an opportunity to remedy the APA violation by providing the court with a more extended rationale for the rescission.19 The administration obliged with a memorandum from a new DHS Secretary, Kirstjen Nielsen, in which she purported not to disturb the Duke memorandum and its legal conclusions but added multiple policy reasons to justify the rescission.20 By elaborating on its legal reasoning and offering a policy rationale for ending DACA that could justify the rescission if the court continued to find the legal reasoning wanting—just the sort of rationale courts typically do not second-guess—the path to rescission seemed to have been cleared.And yet, at the Supreme Court, the sufficiency of the Nielsen memo went untested. In its opinion, the Court dismisses the memo’s relevance because it had been framed as an elaboration of the Duke memo and yet bore “little relationship” to the original purported basis for the agency action.21 Under hornbook administrative law, then, the Nielsen memo constituted an irrelevant post hoc rationalization. In support of this conclusion, the Court lists the familiar case law, for which the standard citation is SEC v. Chenery Corp.22, and the reasons for rejecting an elaborated justification and insisting that the agency start a new policy process or issue a new decision to invoke new reasons: that such requirements promote accountability, ensure the parties and public can respond to the agency’s authority, preserve the orderly process of review, and constrain the agency from making its reasons and therefore its policy a moving target.23Thus focused on the Duke memo, the Supreme Court offers a two-part reason for finding the rescission procedurally flawed, each part of which I consider in more detail in Part II. The first is a legal rationale not yet hit upon by the federal courts but offered by the respondents from the District of Columbia: according to the Court, the Sessions letter had concluded that DACA was unlawful because it contained the same legal defects the Fifth Circuit had found in DAPA. Because the Fifth Circuit focused its analysis on the benefits DAPA conferred (primarily eligibility for work authorization), the Secretary failed to appreciate that the Sessions letter left her with discretion to decouple the two parts of DACA and consider whether its forbearance policy standing alone, without benefits, passed legal muster.24 The second of the Court’s rationales also sounds in basic administrative law—that when it changes a policy, an agency must consider the reliance interests engendered by that policy, not because those interests are necessarily legally dispositive, but because they are always substantively relevant.25 Leaving aside the puzzlement expressed by Justice Thomas in his partial dissent—why should these reliance interests matter if some or all of the program itself was without legal foundation?—the Court gave the administration two clear assignments on remand if it hoped to continue the rescission effort.With this move, Chief Justice Roberts found a political sweet spot for someone hoping not to take sides on the merits. He did not allow the rescission to proceed, but he also avoided concluding that DACA was lawful. He thus did not close the door to an eventual gutting of DACA through elimination of the path to work authorization that made it so valuable. But whether Regents amounts to a “win” depends both on whose perspective we take and the timeframe we adopt. In the months after the decision, DACA recipients had clearly triumphed. The story’s denouement unfolded in a courtroom in the Eastern District of New York. After Regents, the government did indeed return to the drawing board. Attorney General William Barr rescinded all DOJ authorities relevant to the case, including a 2014 memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel elaborating why the much larger DAPA program was consistent with the INA and within the Secretary’s authority.26 At DHS, Acting Secretary Chad Wolf rescinded the Nielsen and Duke memoranda and styled his own memo as beginning the process of considering DACA anew. He pledged that, while DHS conducted its fresh process, the agency would honor existing DACA grants but would no longer adjudicate new or pending applications. In his memorandum explaining these steps, Acting Secretary Wolf acknowledged the reliance interests of existing DACA holders by repeating back the Supreme Court’s articulation of those interests. But he then offered: “[w]hatever the merits of these asserted reliance interests on the maintenance of the DACA policy, they are significantly lessened, if not entirely lacking” for those who had never received deferred action in the first place.27Litigants immediately challenged this new quasi-rescission. But rather than determine if DHS had properly adhered to the procedural path cleared by the Supreme Court, Judge Nicholas Garaufis found Wolf’s appointment to have been unlawful, thus invalidating his actions as lacking authorization—a conclusion reached by numerous courts reviewing various DHS actions in the waning days of the Trump administration.28 Whether DHS could correct this structural defect and try yet again to rescind DACA became moot with the election of Joseph R. Biden to the presidency in November 2020. Biden pledged during the campaign to shore up DACA. Not long after his inauguration, he followed through by declaring his intention to “fortify” the program.29But even though the election brought the rescission saga to an end, a deeper, more speculative strain of Regents is now in play. Despite being a procedural decision on its surface and in its holdings, Chief Justice Roberts’s novel reasoning forecasts still more legal wrangling over both DACA’s validity and, more generally, the capacity of a new president to chart a different path on immigration policy.II. Immigration and the Roberts CourtRegents ensured that DACA would survive into a new administration determined to preserve it. But the decision itself is neither a victory for immigrants’ rights in a jurisprudential sense nor a particularly probative data point in a more holistic account of immigration law in the Roberts era. Most immediately, the opinion provides a roadmap to DACA’s demise by inviting litigants and judges to separate its two pillars—categorical forbearance from removal on the one hand and eligibility for work authorization and benefits tied to deferred action status on the other—and to invalidate the latter. Beyond DACA, the prospects for a jurisprudence that restrains the coercive power of the government against non-citizens grew even dimmer this Term, despite Regents. In the unrelated decision, the Roberts Court yet another challenge to the of a enforcement and removal power expressly by what to be the Court’s from its of of the INA with a for basic process This opinion much less interest from the and public than the of DACA, but it is of far to the of immigration law first to DACA through the courts is its which the Regents Court to do As DACA was an exercise of the Secretary’s enforcement of typically from judicial The so-called benefits of DACA from the decision to forbear from removal in of and administrative back that those benefits to a of deferred it that the Obama administration deferred action as the through which to provide Dreamers some relief because of these legal discretion to an established regulatory with a and process by which recipients of forbearance could for authorization documents in various of the litigation over both DACA and the Supreme Court and the lower courts have the government’s across that the are unreviewable of enforcement In Regents, the Court to Heckler v. and its holding that the decision to to the law is not to judicial because it is to agency discretion, that is not a non-enforcement By an process to who met criteria, the administration a for immigration not a non-enforcement By DACA as a program with each to legal review, the Court thus the for the government by the of what the administration to accomplish in a way that more procedural and the of judicial despite finding DACA to be the Court does not to the of its parts on the merits. the Court fault with the Secretary’s own to decouple DACA’s two and then the and of a In finding this legally to the Secretary, Roberts is the Sessions letter to Secretary Duke, as the Chief Justice himself the Secretary’s in not clearly the Roberts and legal on DACA as a But Roberts on the that DACA policy has the same legal defects that the courts as to to chart his through the In the litigation over the Fifth in v. United had determined the relevant legal question to be whether the Secretary had authority to DAPA recipients for benefits, not whether he had authority to forbear from the class of who into the In other even under letter and the of litigation risk raised by the Fifth the Secretary could have a version of DACA. And under administrative v. agency to rescind a policy must consider in its whether the of the existing might be Because forbearance was at the very of DACA, DHS to have a policy of without and the Sessions letter did not that Regents opinion thus gave the Trump administration a a to DACA and for The agency could return to the drawing find the benefits to be legally while maintaining a policy, which it then could have out if it had articulated policy reasons for this of enforcement that took into account reliance interests on which And as in what out to be the waning months of the Trump administration, Chad Wolf the rescission process to a that the Court’s before Judge Garaufis found his authority the Court’s roadmap is no longer of to the administration But it does steer litigants of for to challenge DACA’s very down a clear path that the Court Despite not DACA’s the and reasoning of the Court’s opinion are both forbearance the of work authorization and other benefits is in This in part from the on by the Chief Justice of the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in v. United which after a lower court decision an immigration relief program not actually at issue in Regents and that did not in a Supreme Court decision on the merits. be Attorney General Sessions put the Fifth Circuit opinion at issue by to on it in his DACA letter to the But not does Chief Justice Roberts v. United States and the of DAPA into his of the of the DACA he in an extended of the Fifth Circuit’s analysis when Secretary that she had no legal discretion to continue DACA. In his of the decision, Chief Justice Roberts up making a case for the of the And by that the Secretary consider this he is at the very least that it well be legally if not legally put if the Chief Justice it that a forbearance policy the legal it would have been for to the matter back to the agency for of an to the litigation over DAPA its not to raised the categorical forbearance it same legal Justice Thomas in his Regents opinion from the APA in which he Congress has not categorical to the removal But by the time the DAPA case had reached the Fifth that court seemed to have forbearance as a of the authority to prioritize removal for a court to the forbearance of DACA would be a of a very basic enforcement As Adam Cox and I have DACA is no less enforcement discretion for the of discretion to the Secretary and away from individual even as individual agents continue to that we have a presidential administration that to rather than wind down DACA, the central of in the Regents opinion into the courts the Biden administration to continue eligibility for work authorization other to recipients of deferred action under the DACA DACA’s to its on the to this Though a promise of forbearance the and psychological with the of eligibility for work authorization is what has made DACA for hundreds of thousands of non-citizens without legal status who are Chief Justice Roberts does not on the merits whether DHS has the authority to eligibility for work But he also does not take the of of the lower courts, which the Trump administration’s conclusion that DACA was He offers as an for the agency a that work authorization for being Sessions had but on with if the administration had through with such an and it had reached the Supreme Court a second time, Roberts and his upon would have in that of work authorization was After the making deferred action recipients to for back to the The administration would then have had to rescind or those after through and and why it was so – that, as even Justice recognized, would be no But would the Chief Justice have sent the Trump administration back for more memoranda he them to and for all up with articulated policy reasons for all of DACA, the for the Court to the of DACA on the the Court was to a decision on the the 2020 election have its the Biden administration has its intention to DACA through and This to more procedural to the program in the of it through what be a legal by the of and some of its in the District of where the who invalidated DAPA now on the and when DACA to the Court under this new no one should be if forbearance at the end, it to Congress to provide a anchor of for the The way the Chief Justice in Regents the work authorization question as for legal and the expressed by some of the at in the DAPA case back in justify the litigation risk with DACA as the Court does indeed to on a version of DACA, its decision Regents as an of the Court’s of administrative and an that Executive be by clear and even In so the Court would the of the Executive branch to and into its of a deportation regime that Congress thus far has been or to This of the Executive in the of accountability and the of would in turn another of immigration law that the Supreme Court but has been in years, including during the a of decisions over the years, the Court has the of its opinion in Regents, finding that DHS has power to to the immigration laws in of In at least two the Court rejects the of and on the political in that from And in other the Court provisions with to that would be of immigrants’ including in that in basic In other the real of the Roberts Court’s immigration jurisprudence has been to the political in with waning interest in the Executive the power Congress has to

ABSTRACTThe early days of President Donald Trump's second administration have witnessed an onslaught of executive orders and other administrative actions designed to weaken environmental policy, punish political opponents, and consolidate executive power. This perspective compares Biden's and Trump's administrative strategies from the perspective of polycentric governance. We argue that administrative strategies can destroy, create, and change policy forums to pursue the President's political agenda. These changes in the structure of polycentric governance often focus on intergovernmental coordination and must be considered in light of the constitutional constraints of the judicial and legislative branches of government. It remains to be seen the extent to which Trump's administrative strategies will be successful—or cause a constitutional crisis by eroding democratic norms and guardrails.

Purpose – This study analyzed the effect of the Trump Government’s protectionist trade policies on foreign ownership. Specifically, this study empirically analyzes the hypothesis that foreign ownership will decrease after the Trump Government rather than before the Trump Government. Design/methodology – The hypothesis of this study is based on the expectation that US protection trade policy will negatively affect the profitability of Korean companies. The dependent variable in this study is the foreign ownership ratio, and the independent variable is a dummy variable representing before and after the Trump Government. Multiple regression analysis was performed, including the control variables suggested in previous studies related to foreign ownership. Findings – As a result, foreign ownership increased after the Trump Government rather than before the Trump Government. This study further analyzes whether the main variables affecting foreign investor’s decision-making are differences before and after Trump Government. The export ratio, profitability and dividends did not differ before and after Trump Government. However, the level of information asymmetry decreased after the Trump Government than before the Trump Government. This suggests that US protection trade policies do not adversely affect the profitability of Korean companies. However, Korean firms are improving their information environment because US protectionist trade policies can lower profitability and negatively impact capital raising. In this regard, the foreign ownership ratio seems to differ before and after the Trump Government. Originality/value – This study contributes in that it presents data that US protectionist policies can affect Korean corporate governance. This study has implications from the short-term analysis of US protection trade policy.

This paper aims to review the literature regarding the impact of Donald Trump's candidacy and presidency on the health of immigrants in America. The increase in detentions of alleged undocumented immigrants under the Trump presidency, especially his administration's attempts to detain children apart from their families, have placed thousands into conditions that can have long-lasting physical and mental health effects. Similarly, the Trump administration's efforts to increase deportations and restrict legal immigration has lead to immigrants' seeking fewer health-care resources for fear of jeopardizing their or their loved ones' chances of remaining in this country. The rhetoric used and policies pursued by Donald Trump have had a measurable adverse impact on the health of documented and undocumented immigrants in America.

Background Immigrants comprise a sizable proportion (15%) of the population living in the United States (U.S.). Given these proportions, it is imperative that we understand immigrant experiences of well-being and stress toward improved well-being and integration. Methods To examine the experiences of first- and second-generation immigrants using a comparative approach, we utilized data from two surveys collected under Trump (n = 490) and Biden (n = 306) administrations. Both studies employed non-probability quota and convenience sampling techniques. Questions about experiences of stress (PSS-4), discrimination (Everyday Discrimination Scale), resilience (Brief Resilience Scale), border stress (Border Community and Immigration Stress Scale), immigration policies (general questions) were included in the surveys. Each study sample included diverse racial groups across both immigrant generations. We report frequencies, descriptive statistics, and ANOVAs/post hoc test results. Results Findings highlight that levels of both stress and discrimination among non-White participants under the Trump administration were significantly higher than those of White participants, though neither relationship was significant under the Biden administration. Further, White participants exhibited higher resilience under the Trump administration, but not under the Biden administration. Discussion and Conclusion To our knowledge, this is the first study to comparatively examine immigrant experiences under the two most recent federal administrations. This study is seminal in highlighting discussions and making policy recommendations to limit immigrant exclusion, curtail exclusionary policies regarding travel bans, and improve pathways to citizenship, enhancing immigrant integration in the U.S. Roles of social workers in supporting immigrant communities and pathways for future research with immigrants are discussed.

Since the inception of the open-door policy in 1978, China has progressively become more integrated into the global economy through trade, foreign direct investment, and, more recently, outward direct investment. This economic integration has gained momentum with initiatives like the ‘Go Global’ strategy, China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, and the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. China’s economic ascent, coupled with its increasing political influence and military power, prompted the United States (US) to initiate a strategy of rebalancing in the Asia Pacific region, starting with the Bush administration and continuing through the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. During the Trump administration, this rebalancing strategy was supported by decoupling strategy, ultimately leading to a trade war with China. Despite its intention to avoid the initiation of a new Cold War and to adopt a more moderate stance towards China, the US-China trade war has evolved further into a tech war under the Biden administration. Given this context, this article aims to outline the primary characteristics of the US economic policy towards China during the Biden administration, comparing it to the Trump administration and assessing its impact on both nations. The central argument of this article is that the primary characteristics of the US economic policy towards China under Biden administration are rebalancing and decoupling, carried over from the policies of the preceding Trump administration, and there are clear signs that these characteristics are deepening. Furthermore, the article demonstrates that the extensive decoupling measures enacted by the US have proven effective in diminishing China’s role in global industrial and supply chains, particularly in industries related to semiconductors and chipmaking equipment.

Researchers have recently examined changes to American environmental policy under the Trump administration's first term, and to a lesser extent, under the Biden administration. Scholars have largely not considered changes to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), one of the earliest environmental laws in the United States, and a law that requires federal agencies to consider the environmental and social impacts of their proposed actions prior to implementation. The Trump administration adopted major changes to the NEPA regulations in 2020, and the Biden administration reviewed and revised these changes in 2022 and 2024. Using the flexible pattern matching methodological approach, I examine how these changes match or mismatch with the combined theoretical concepts of neoliberal bureaucratization and rationalization. Though the Trump (first term) and Biden administrations have been portrayed as radically different on environmental policies, my findings suggest the importance of taking a more nuanced perspective in understanding the similarities and differences in NEPA regulatory change under these two administrations.

In the years ahead, historians and political scientists will dissect the Trump presidency and offer their academic assessments. The January 6, 2021, attack on the US Capitol by President Trump's supporters cast a large shadow over his controversial presidency. The long-term legacy of President Trump has yet to be written.This book by Frank Thompson, Kenneth Wong, and Barry Rabe neither lauds nor condemns the Trump presidency. These three eminent political scientists assess the first three years from the perspective of the administrative presidency, and they compare the Trump administration's actions with those of his immediate predecessor in three domestic policy arenas: health care, climate change, and education. The authors have extensively studied their respective policy venues for years, and they bring insight and perspective to their case studies.Frank Thompson's work on Medicaid and federalism will be familiar to readers of this journal. No less distinguished is Kenneth Wong's scholarship in education policy and Barry Rabe's study of environmental policy. They defend the decision to evaluate Trump's first three years rather than his whole term in order to bring the book to press before the 2020 election. The authors argue in the preface that despite the COVID pandemic in the final year of the Trump administration, that year was not substantially different from the first three in the employment of the administrative presidency.The core of the book is a three-chapter section in which each author develops a case study in their respective policy arenas. The cases examine the strategies and tactics used by the Trump administration in its attempts to repeal or change Obama administration actions in various policy domains. For readers interested in health policy and the Affordable Care Act (ACA), this case study is an excellent summary history of the Trump administration's efforts to repeal and sabotage the most significant policy accomplishment of the Obama administration. The chapters on education and climate change also enable the readers to quickly grasp the major issues and controversies in those spheres.In the preface and introduction, the authors place this study within disciplinary conceptual ideas on executive branch action and federalism, which are the twin frameworks for organizing the book. This is followed by a chapter on the legacy of the Obama administration, which catalogues the extensive employment of the president's administrative powers to achieve policy goals in the three areas. Only in health care was an Obama-era legislative accomplishment the catapult for administrative actions. As the cases show, the Trump administration only sought legislative action in health care, but it employed presidential powers in all three spheres to overturn policies inherited from the Obama administration.The intensity of the Trump administration's efforts is illustrated in the chapter titles. There was a “war” on the ACA, an effort to “search and destroy” climate change policies, and the “reversal” of education initiatives. The cases catalogue for the reader the myriad of tools employed to modify, repeal, and change Obama administration policies. These include executive orders, rulemaking, waivers, directives, and support for legal challenges.The integration of the case-study lessons comes in the final chapter, which begins by characterizing the Trump administration approach as a “hostile takeover.” The authors utilize a set of basic conceptual categories to draw generalizations from the three distinct cases. They conclude that there was not a systematic and consistent Trump administration approach in each area.In the summary analysis, the authors examine the Trump administration's objectives in the three areas and compare them in terms of magnitude, extent of empowerment of state/local governments, and constraints sought to limit authority of local governments. They found that the objectives were far more sweeping for health and climate than for education. “Opportunistic federalism” was the label they applied to whether the action sought to empower or constrain states. They did not find a consistent philosophy of federalism but rather a variety of strategies. In the climate case the Trump administration sought to limit California's freedom to establish emission standards, but the administration gave states greater discretion in regulating power plants. Through ACA sabotage the administration reduced states' ability to do outreach, but they also sought to give greater discretion to states with Medicaid waivers.In the integrative final chapter, the authors return to recent history by tracing similar instances of presidents using executive powers to advance policy objectives as far back as the Carter administration. Then President Reagan sought to unravel actions taken by President Carter; President Clinton used executive powers to undo some of the policies of the previous Republican administrations; and the pattern repeated with President George W. Bush and President Obama.The authors also highlight the emerging role of the state attorneys general, who in recent years have been more aggressive in bringing lawsuits in attempts to overturn presidential administrative endeavors. This has been true for both Republican and Democratic attorneys general. They demonstrate with examples from the cases how this is a new twist in the long history of cooperation and competition in American federalism.This legal strategy has been strengthened by the greater politization of the federal courts through a more strongly partisan approach to judicial appointments, especially in the Republican Party. The authors demonstrate the likely prospect that administrative federalism battles may be waged in the courts with greater frequency in the future.The book begins and ends with brief discussions of the dangers and prospects of the administrative presidency for American democracy. A full discussion of this important consideration of the expanding administrative presidency is left to another book. They do point out that federalism is both a constraint on a president's abuse of power through use of executive authority, and a limit on the scope of executive powers to achieve national objectives. The emerging greater role of state attorneys general in challenging presidential actions is highlighted in the conclusion and offers vivid examples of a perhaps underappreciated trend.One reads a book review to help answer the question, “Should I buy this book?” Yes, you should buy this book. It features three excellent case studies of the administrative presidency in the Trump years. Even if none of the three studies are of special academic interest, the reader will quickly grasp the critical issues from 2017 thru 2019 surrounding ACA, climate change, and education. If your interest is the presidency, this book offers significant insights into the Trump administration's use of executive powers to advance a conservative domestic agenda. The review of the Trump administration is offered not in isolation but in the context of the use of presidential powers since President Reagan.In the aftermath of the November 2020 election, Ronald Brownstein (2020) offered a sober assessment for Democrats based on the fact that they had won the presidency but lost ground in the House of Representatives, which has few precedents. If the 2020 election is a preview of the coming decade, we might expect Democratic party success at winning the White House but with a Republican-dominated Congress.The authors vividly demonstrate how divided government has contributed to expansion of the administrative presidency for both Democrats and Republicans. In our constitutional system, federalism and the courts restrain executive powers; but given the increasing polarization of the electorate and the parties, we might anticipate greater use of the administrative presidency to achieve domestic policy goals in the absence of unified government. This book illustrates the strategies and tools for an expanded administrative presidency. The Trump successes were limited, and most seem susceptible to reversal if the Biden Administration uses many of the same tools employed by the Trump administration. The strategies of the Trump administrative presidency may become the norm in the decade ahead.