From Financing Production to Producing Finance

Capitalists in most authoritarian regimes have been described as “cronies” of political elites, but why do some crony relationships produce growth, while others produce stagnation or even destructive economic crisis? And if business actors are “co-opted” by authoritarian regimes, as China’s entrepreneurs have been said to be, what explains why business and the state turn on one another? Precarious Ties offers a novel account of relationships between business and political elites in three authoritarian regimes in developing Asia: Indonesia under Suharto’s New Order, Malaysia under the Barisan Nasional, and China under the Chinese Communist Party. All three regimes enjoyed periods of high growth and supposed alliances between autocrats and capitalists, but state-business relations in Indonesia and China became destructive and dangerous when those countries undertook efforts at financial liberalization. This book characterizes this destructive form of state-business relations as mutual endangerment, in which vulnerable business elites are entwined with political elites in ways that imperil both sides, manifest in asset expatriation, weaponized information, and rampant economic looting. Indonesia and China experienced mutual endangerment because of fundamental distrust between business elites and the state combined with financial opening. In contrast, Malaysia’s business elites expected cooperation from the regime, and state-business relations have cycled through mutual alignment and competitive clientelism, but never became destructive. Precarious Ties examines how conflict during regime formation affects political trust and dynamics of financial development in authoritarian regimes. The experiences of these three dynamic countries in authoritarian Asia ultimately reveal the inherent instability of state-business ties.

The article explores the process of “nationalisation of the Russian elite”. “Nationalization of the elite” is presented as a reorientation of assets, business practices, the production of meanings of the political and economic elite into the contour of the Russian fields of interaction. The author characterised the Russian political system as a “state of limited access”, where actors of the political and economic field compete for rent distribution. The turn from the legitimate offshore practices of the pre-sanctions period to the mobilisation version of the formation of elite consensus in the context of “new normality” is analysed. The author considered political protests of 2012 and sanctions against Russia in 2014–2019 as factors of the “nationalisation of the elite”. The author proved that the interests of the state-apparatus and the state-nation in the issue of “nationalisation of the elite” have points of contact. An analysis of the assets of the Russian business elite in comparison with the business elites of other countries shows their privatisation and rental nature. The amount of assets held outside the Russian jurisdiction indicates a lack of trust in the business elite towards the stability of the “rules of the game” in Russia. These factors legitimise the process of “nationalisation” in public space. Within the framework of the concept of the bundle of property rights by A. Honore and the concept of communication codes, the theoretical aspects of the nationalisation of the business elite and the political elite are analysed. Finally, the author points to the problem of the possibility of “nationalisation of the nation” as a continuation of the mobilisation scenario.

The article is dedicated to the problem related to the process of the formation of the political elite of Ivano-Frankivsk region. The main political actors of the regional political elite were specified by the formal features (their influence on the strategic political decisions) and its main groups were investigated (national deputies of Ukraine, heads of local governments and state authorities, heads of regional organizations of leading political parties, business elite, ideological and communicative elite, etc.). The main focus of the study was on the formation through elections and appointments of deputies (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, regional council), as well as public authorities (regional state administration and its structures), which allowed to identify and analyze the main procedures and mechanisms of elite formation in the region, reflecting the complex processes of its change/reproduction on its own basis, renewal through the involvement of new members of society. Based on the analysis of a broad empirical base, the correlation of the process of elite formation of IvanoFrankivsk region with the general tendencies of transformation of the political system of Ukraine, the influence of the center-peripheral paradigm is confirmed. Thus, in the conditions of formation of a hybrid political regime, despite the significant dynamics of renewal of the main institutions of power in the region, this process at the turn of the XX−XXI centuries took place mostly in the form of circulation or reproductive circulation − a limited, formal process of renewal of the political elite, which was under the influence of leading political and economic groups. There was a gradual narrowing of institutional channels for recruiting political elites in the region, which turned it into a social group with incomplete social representation. Significant weight in the process of forming the political elite of Ivano-Frankivsk region „closed” procedures and nomenclature mechanisms, frequent changes during the elections and appointments of leading political actors, which did not always happen with heredity, significantly reduced the overall potential of the regional political elite, which is still not realized in the full measure. Key words: regional political elite, Ivano-Frankivsk region, formation of political elite.

By geography, population, and public policy, Canada is a Pacific Rim country. Despite grandiose plans and rhetoric, however, Canada's economy is in retreat, dominated by the southern direction of investment and trade ties with the United States and reinforced by the huge levels of foreign investment that are increasingly rationalized along North American triad lines. The western Canadian provinces are the most Asian oriented, but Canada's business elites, scoring ever lower on measures of international competitiveness, are withdrawing to a regional base. Canada's capacity to diversify the industrial base and build new trade alliances is deeply constrained by the country's deficit and debt problems, as well as business and political elites who remain wedded to an Atlantic Rim focus.

1. There are a number of background characteristics that are common to business executives everywhere. On the one hand, the majority of Egyptian, Indian and American executives are middle and upper-middle class groups in origin. Only the components of the middle class vary from one country to another, reflecting each relevant socio-economic structure. Thus, whereas business and professional backgrounds predominated for American executives, civil servants led all others followed by white-collar and professional backgrounds for Egyptian executives. That civil servants' background lead all others is perhaps a reflection of the dominant role of government in Egyptian society. On the other hand, the majority of executives in three samples are urban in origin. Our comparative analysis of the social background of Egyptian, Indian and American executives thus suggests that it is almost a universal truism that a man's chances of becoming a top business executive are considerably affected by his point of origin both on the social and physical spaces. 2. There are a number of background characteristics unique to Egyptian executives. Much higher proportions of Egyptian than Indian or American executives started their careers as military officers or civil servants, a reflection of the militaristic and socialistic nature of contemporary Egyptian society. The Egyptian business elite, therefore, appears to be relatively non-parochial in experience. These differences in career patterns are associated with corresponding differences in career speeds. In sharpest contrast to their American counterparts, Egyptian executives took shorter than average time to achieve their elite positions. Lateral entry into the business world and the high rate of college-educated there, appear to reduce considerably the number of years Egyptians have had to serve in order to achieve their present positions. 3. Egyptian executives are much more like Indian than they are like American executives in terms of their age, education and urban origins. This pattern has its explanation too, mostly in the similarity of the economic situation, social organization and ideological orientation of these two developing countries. 4. Lastly, our comparative analysissupports as well as generates a number of hypotheses. (a) The fact that the majority of the executives of three somewhat different countries look alike in terms of their geographic and socio-economic origins, may, at least in part, confirm the prediction made by elite theorists that the managers of all industrial societies will inevitably become a distinct elite regardless of the political system within which they operate. 1 (b) Certain features of a country's social structure appear to be related to certain background characteristics of its native business elite. It was found out, for instance, that the educational level of a business elite is inversely related to the present stage of industrialization of its contextual society. Similarly, the geographic background of an elite is inversely related to the degree of urbanization of its surrounding society. It is only through further research that the validity of these hypotheses can be proven.

Elites and Prospects of Democracy in East Timor

Large Australian and Swiss banks have been trimming their workforces since the mid-1990s. With further rounds of downsizing activities predicted, this study sought to identify, examine, and compare the adopted organizational downsizing implementation strategies. The primary purpose of this cross-cultural study was to determine how large Australian and Swiss banks implemented downsizing in their most recent endeavors. The research has revealed three key findings. First, Australian banks primarily adopted workforce reduction strategies, whereas Swiss banks employed a mixture of organization redesign, workforce reduction, and systemic strategies. Second, Australian banks had considerable depth in their downsizing, whereas Swiss banks had more breadth in their overall strategies. Third, Australian banks favored reorientation approaches, whereas Swiss banks embraced reinforcement approaches. It remains unclear as to why large Australian and Swiss banks differed in the selection of implementation strategies and why they diverged in their overall approaches to downsizing. Further research is required to explore aspects that are likely to influence the adoption of downsizing strategies in both Australia and Switzerland.

Large Australian and Swiss banks have been trimming their workforces since the mid-1990s. With further rounds of downsizing activities predicted, this study sought to identify, examine, and compare the adopted organizational downsizing implementation strategies. The primary purpose of this cross-cultural study was to determine how large Australian and Swiss banks implemented downsizing in their most recent endeavors. The research has revealed three key findings. First, Australian banks primarily adopted workforce reduction strategies, whereas Swiss banks employed a mixture of organization redesign, workforce reduction, and systemic strategies. Second, Australian banks had considerable depth in their downsizing, whereas Swiss banks had more breadth in their overall strategies. Third, Australian banks favored reorientation approaches, whereas Swiss banks embraced reinforcement approaches. It remains unclear as to why large Australian and Swiss banks differed in the selection of implementation strategies and why they diverged in their overall approaches to downsizing. Further research is required to explore aspects that are likely to influence the adoption of downsizing strategies in both Australia and Switzerland.

Much of the recent literature about local governance of Britain’s cities has examined the power of a newly evolving ‘business elite’. However, in trying to understand changing governance forms, these analyses have generally lacked sensitivity to the role of actors (businesspeople) and their representative organizations. Analytical categories drawn from social movement theory (SMT) are introduced to develop a more actor‐centred approach to the role of business interests in urban management. While not attempting to claim that business represents a social movement within Britain’s cities, it does illuminate how effectively or otherwise businesspeople develop an identity based around their representative organizations and specific business agendas, define non‐business actors as opponents, and deploy and implement the agendas they create. We then use these SMT categories to examine the creation of business agendas in three English towns – Barnsley, Mansfield and Accrington.

THE POWER ELITE IN THAILAND: A General Survey with a Focus on the Civil Bureaucrats

Over the last two decades, a growing literature has examined the emergence of a transnational business elite. However, the pathways of transnational mobility have not been fully characterized. In this article, we use a combination of sequence analysis and the concept of a career script to investigate the geographical mapping and organizational contexts in which transnational mobility occurs. To achieve this, we rely on a database of 186 executives from the 28 largest Swiss banks, as well as 20 interviews with chief human resource officers and 15 interviews with banking executives. Our findings contribute to relativize and differentiate the phenomenon of transnationalization of business elites by underlining the importance of the career context and by identifying distinct interpretations of international career resources according to different types of banks.

This exploratory paper discusses the undemocratic agenda setting of elites in Britain and how it has changed politics within a form of capitalism where much is left undisclosed in terms of mechanism and methods. It argues for a more radical exploratory strategy using C. Wright Mills’ understanding that what is left undisclosed is crucially important to elite existence and power, while recognising the limits on democratic accountability when debate, decision and action in complex capitalist societies can be frustrated or hijacked by small groups. Have British business elites, through their relation with political elites, used their power to constrain democratic citizenship? Our hypothesis is that the power of business elites is most likely conjuncturally specific and geographically bounded with distinct national differences. In the United Kingdom, the outcomes are often contingent and unstable as business elites try to manage democracy; moreover, the composition and organisation of business elites have changed through successive conjunctures.

The article examines the peculiarities of the formation of the regional political elite of Lviv region in the period from 1990 to 2019. The main attention is focused on three tasks: who should be referred to the category of "political elite" of Lviv region; what are the main ways of its formation, starting from the period of formation of Ukraine as a state to the present stage; what is the quantitative assessment of the political elite of Lviv region. In particular, it was determined who should be considered the political elite of the region. Using the method of positional analysis used in the study, the regional political elite was classified into formal and informal. It is determined that the formal political elite holds certain positions in the power vertical, which formalizes its involvement in political decision-making. Instead, the informal elite is represented by individuals who, without holding leadership positions, form a certain type of relationship with the masses, play an important role in important decision-making and influence the exercise of political power in the region through their resources (financial capital, authority, access to the formation of public opinion and its manipulation, etc.). The process of renewal of Lviv's formal political elite since 1990 was analyzed and it was found that it was during this period that the embryos of democratic processes and the transition to multiparty system were observed in the region. It was noticed that quite often the regional political elite of Lviv region used the representative bodies of the region as a starting point for further career growth, which led to a constant movement and influx of new faces. It has been studied that among the informal political elite, the most powerful group can be considered the business elite, which in addition to financial levers of influence often uses the manipulation of public opinion through access to media resources. It is noted that the renewal in this group of elites is much slower than among the formal political elite. Separately, it is a quantitative assessment of the regional political elite of Lviv region. As it is difficult to talk about specific quantitative calculations, it is noted that this category includes both a relatively small cohort of people (from several hundred) who control most of the resources and established strong ties at the regional and national levels, and significantly expand it the number of people (up to one thousand two hundred), including the most influential politicians (MPs of Ukraine), heads and deputies of local councils, the leadership of the regional state administration and its departments, heads of regional organizations of political parties and major informal leaders in the region

The elite group, which is capable of exercising direct influence on industrial activities, consists of top managers at large corporations. Studies on who are members of this so-called business elite and how they have come to acquire such positions will give important clues to the understanding not only of the industrial world but also of the present status of the entire Japanese society. Knowledge about the origins and careers of the business elite leads to answers to the questions How do people become business elites? and, at the same time, With whom does society replenish the business elite? In this sense, the origins and careers of the business elite reflect characteristics of the social structure of the times.

In many Asian countries, the early decades of independence after World War II were marked by tension between ‘indigenous’ political elites and business elites that were in large part alien, or from minority ethnic groups. This tension was one reason for the preference that most governments showed for statist and nationalist economic policies. It has abated in most cases; political and business elites now tend to pursue more co‐operative strategies. Much of the explanation for this lies in changes in the international political economy that made market‐oriented economic policies more attractive to political elites. There are in addition internal political reasons for this rapprochement. These vary from case to case, and have been explored in most detail by scholars in relation to the Southeast Asian countries where Overseas Chinese have dominated larger scale business. This article extends this literature by examining the causes of the gradual rapprochement between ‘majority’ politics and ‘minority’ business in Sri Lanka.