From Asset to Liability: Rethinking the US-Israel Alliance in the Age of Forever Wars

From Clinton to Bush to Obama to Trump: the personalities, rhetoric, and policies of Presidents charged with defining US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era could hardly appear more different. Yet recent treatments of American grand strategy have sought to highlight a lack of debate about grand strategy, and to emphasize groupthink and “habit” within the US foreign policy establishment. This article argues that US grand strategy has changed, and suggests that those who prioritize continuities rely on an overly restrictive definition of grand strategy. Employing policy paradigms as an analytical framework, this paper finds significant variation in US grand strategy across the four post-Cold War presidencies. Where the variation between Clinton and George W. Bush’s presidencies can be explained by differing strategic ideas among American foreign policymaking elites, a trend towards less active hegemonic management running through the Obama and Trump presidencies is more structural in nature, reflecting both international constraints and generational change.

A Decade of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy∗

Journal Article Values, Interests, and American Grand Strategy Get access Daniel W. Drezner Daniel W. Drezner Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Diplomatic History, Volume 29, Issue 3, June 2005, Pages 429–432, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2005.00495.x Published: 13 May 2005

Introduction 1. The Social Sources of American Grand Strategy The Puzzle of Continuity and Change in U.S. Grand Strategy. The Contribution from Elite Studies and Class Analysis. A Critical Political Economy Approach to Grand Strategy Analysis 2. Three Waves of Non-territorial Expansionism: American Grand Strategy from the Civil War to the Cold War Capitalist Expansionism and Expansionist Foreign Policy. From Territorial Expansionism to the First Wave of Open Door Imperialism. The Second Wave: The Great Depression and the Pax Americana. The Third Wave: The 1970s Crisis and U.S.-Centered Neoliberal Globalization. The Ends and Means of Open Door Imperialism 3. America's Post- Cold War Grand-Strategy Makers and Corporate Elite Networks The Role of Corporate Elite Networks in Grand Strategy Formations. Analyzing Social Networks of Grand-strategy Makers: Data and Method. Governmental Career Paths of post-Cold War Grand-strategy Makers. Corporate Affiliations of the Clinton, Bush and Obama Administrations. The Shared Policy-Planning Network. Conclusion 4. American Grand Strategy after the Cold War: Clinton's Grand Strategy Makers and Neoliberal Globalization Clinton's Grand-strategy Makers. The Global Context: The End of the Cold War as an Opportunity for Expansionism. The Open Door Worldview under Clinton : Expansionism under the Banner of Globalization. A Grand Strategy of Neoliberal Globalization: Financial Markets, Free Trade and Airstrikes. Conclusion 5. American Grand Strategy after September 11: Bush's Grand-Strategy Makers and the Neoconservative Shift Bush's Grand-Strategy Makers. The Neoconservative Response to a "Squandered Decade": Context and Discourse. The Open Door Worldview under Bush: The Neoconservative Shift. A Neoconservative Grand Strategy: The War on Terror, Regime Change and Unyielding Neoliberalism. Conclusion 6. American Grand Strategy after the Global Financial Crisis: Obama's Grand Strategy-Makers and Imperial Restoration Obama's Grand-Strategy Makers. The Global Context: Eroding Legitimacy, Power Shifts and the Financial Crisis. The Open Door Worldview under Obama: Renewing American Leadership. A Grand Strategy of Imperial Restoration: Maintaining the Open Door from the Asia Pivot to the Drone Wars. Conclusion Conclusion

The Politics of Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy

Political marketing can be categorized with three aspects: the election campaign as the origin of political marketing, the permanent campaign as a governing tool and international political marketing (IPM) which covers the areas of public diplomacy, marketing of nations, international political communication, national image, soft power and the cross‐cultural studies of political marketing. IPM and the application of soft power have been practiced by nation‐states throughout the modern history of international relations starting with the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Nation‐states promote the image of their country worldwide through public diplomacy, exchange mutual interests in their bilateral or multilateral relation with other countries, lobby for their national interests in international organizations and apply cultural and political communication strategies internationally to build up their soft power. In modern international relations, nation‐states achieve their foreign policy goals by applying both hard power and soft power. Public diplomacy as part of IPM is a method in the creation of soft power, as well as, in the application of soft power.This paper starts with the definitional and conceptual review of political marketing. For the first time in publication, it establishes a theoretical model which provides a framework of the three aspects of political marketing, that is electoral political marketing (EPM), governmental political marketing (GPM) and IPM. This model covers all the main political exchanges among six inter‐related components in the three pairs of political exchange process, that is candidates and party versus voters and interest groups in EPM ; governments, leaders and public servants versus citizens and interest groups in GPM, including political public relations and lobbying which have been categorized as the third aspect of political marketing in some related studies; and governments, interest group and activists versus international organizations and foreign subjects in IPM. This study further develops a model of IPM, which covers its strategy and marketing mix on the secondary level of the general political marketing model, and then, the third level model of international political choice behaviour based the theory of political choice behaviour in EPM. This paper continues to review the concepts of soft power and public diplomacy and defines their relation with IPM.It then reports a case study on the soft power and public diplomacy of the United States from the perspectives of applying IPM and soft power. Under the framework of IPM, it looks at the traditional principles of US foreign policy, that is Hamiltonians, Wilsonians, Jeffersonians and Jacksonians, and the application of US soft power in the Iraq War since 2003. The paper advances the argument that generally all nation states apply IPM to increase their soft power. The decline of US soft power is caused mainly by its foreign policy. The unilateralism Jacksonians and realism Hamiltonians have a historical trend to emphasize hard power while neglecting soft power. Numerous reports and studies have been conducted on the pros and cons of US foreign policy in the Iraq War, which are not the focus of this paper. From the aspect of IPM, this paper studies the case of US soft power and public diplomacy, and their effects in the Iraq War. It attempts to exam the application of US public diplomacy with the key concept of political exchange, political choice behaviour, the long‐term approach and the non‐government operation principles of public diplomacy which is a part of IPM. The case study confirms the relations among IPM, soft power and public diplomacy and finds that lessons can be learned from these practices of IPM. The paper concludes that there is a great demand for research both at a theoretical as well as practical level for IPM and soft power. It calls for further study on this subject.Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

April 01 2004 New Perspectives on American Grand Strategy: A Review Essay Colin Dueck Colin Dueck Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado, Boulder. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Colin Dueck Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado, Boulder. Online ISSN: 1531-4804 Print ISSN: 0162-2889 © 2004 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2004 International Security (2004) 28 (4): 197–216. https://doi.org/10.1162/0162288041588287 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation Colin Dueck; New Perspectives on American Grand Strategy: A Review Essay. International Security 2004; 28 (4): 197–216. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/0162288041588287 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsInternational Security Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 2004 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2004 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

This article discusses how and under what conditions ideas coming from International Relations (IR) scholarship are used in foreign policy. We argue that the focus on policy relevance, which dominates the IR literature on the research-policy interface, is limited. Focusing instead on political utilisation highlights types and mechanisms of political impact, which are overlooked in studies on policy relevance. The fruitfulness of this change in focus is showed in an analysis of how Samuel Huntington's ‘clash of civilizations’ notion and Joseph Nye's ‘soft power’ concept have been used in US foreign policy. George W. Bush's explicit critique and reframing of ‘the clash’ thesis should not be interpreted as absence of impact, but as a significant symbolic utilisation, which has helped legitimate US foreign policy. Likewise, in the few instances in which the notion of ‘soft power’ has been used explicitly, it has played a conceptual and symbolical rather than instrumental role. More generally, this article argues that accessible framing and paradigm compatibility are essential for political utilisation of ideas.

Introduction Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox 1. The Future of Soft Power in US Foreign Policy Joseph Nye Jr. 2. From Hegemony to Soft Power Geraldo Zahran and Leonardo Ramos 3. Soft Power and Strategy:Developing a 'Strategic' Concept of Power Edward Lock 4. The Unbearable Lightness of Soft Power Christopher Layne 5. The Power Game, Soft Power and the International Historian Till Geiger 6. Challenging Elite Anti-Americanism in the Cold War Inderjeet Parmar 7. Technological Leadership and American Soft Power John Krige 8. The Military Use of Soft Power - Information Campaigns: The Challenge of Application, Their Audiences and Effects Angus Taverner 9. Public Diplomacy and the Information War on Terror Philip Taylor 10. Soft Power in an Era of US Decline Giles Scott-Smith 11. Cheques and Balances: the EU's Soft Power Strategey Christopher Hill 12. The Myth and Reality of China's Soft Power Shogo Suzuki 13. Responding to my Critics and Concluding Thoughts Joseph Nye

This chapter examines US foreign policy as ‘smart power’, a combnation of hard and soft power, in the twenty-first century. The beginning of the twenty-first century saw George W. Bush place a strong emphasis on hard power, as exemplifed by the invasion and occupation of Iraq. This was evident after 9/11. While the war in Iraq showcased America’s hard military power that removed a tyrant, it failed to resolve US vulnerability to terrorism; on the contrary, it may have increased it. The chapter first considers the Obama administration’s reference to its foreign policy as ‘smart power’ before discussing Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ policy, the role of power in a global information age, soft power in US foreign policy, and how public diplomacy has been incorporated into US foreign policy.

Acknowledgments ix INTRODUCTION: Change and Continuity in American Grand Strategy 1 CHAPTER ONE: Power, Culture, and Grand Strategy 9 CHAPTER TWO: Strategic Culture and Strategic Adjustment in the United States 21 CHAPTER THREE: The Lost Alliance: Ideas and Alternatives in American Grand Strategy, 1918-1921 44 CHAPTER FOUR: Conceiving Containment: Ideas and Alternatives in American Grand Strategy, 1945-1951 82 CHAPTER FIVE: Hegemony on the Cheap: Ideas and Alternatives in American Grand Strategy, 1992-2000 114 CONCLUSION: The American Strategic Dilemma 147 Notes 173 Index 215

Does “soft power” matter in international relations? Specifically, when the United States seeks cooperation from countries around the world, do the views of their publics about US foreign policy affect the actual foreign policy behavior of these countries? The authors examine this question using multinational surveys covering fifty-eight countries, combined with information about their foreign policy decisions in 2003, a critical year for the US. They draw their basic conceptual framework from Joseph Nye, who uses various indicators of opinion about the US to assess US soft power. But the authors argue that his theory lacks the specificity needed for falsifiable testing. They refine it by focusing on foreign public opinion about US foreign policy, an underemphasized element of Nye's approach. Their regression analysis shows that foreign public opinion has a significant and large effect on troop commitments to the war in Iraq, even after controlling for various hard power factors. It also has significant, albeit small, effects on policies toward the International Criminal Court and on voting decisions in the UN General Assembly. These results support the authors' refined theoretical argument about soft power: public opinion about US foreign policy in foreign countries does affect their policies toward the US, but this effect is conditional on the salience of an issue for mass publics.

The analyses of smart and soft power have developed little beyond what their critics would refer to as ‘soft theory’, and in both cases the theoretical development is less than ‘smart’. This article attempts to address these deficiencies in the theoretical development of smart power by: (1) articulating a more rigorous and systematic understanding of the processes of smart power; (2) explaining how changes in world politics have raised the value of smart power relative to hard power; (3) analyzing smart power in the context of recent US foreign policy, and (4) proposing several prescriptions that will encourage decision-makers to value and effectively use smart power strategies in their foreign policies.

This article seeks to overturn the conventional wisdom that World War II forced a decisive, bipartisan break in American grand strategy. As they had after World War I, American political elites debated the relative merits of unilateralism and multilateralism. Assessments of the relative costs and benefits of a cooperative and multilateral solution to American security depended on judgments about the likelihood of opportunism by America’s partners. Democrats were more trusting than Republicans, expecting cooperation where the latter anticipated defection. This led to different preferences for the creation and design of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty. Drawing on theories of ‘‘social orientation’’ and political ideology, I explain why the left is more trusting than the right. Rationalist accounts of the creation and design of the UN and NATO overstate the case for ideological convergence and therefore the importance of structure because they largely ignore behind-the-scene bipartisan consultations that allowed for a compromise prior to the votes on the respective treaties. My social psychological theory of international cooperation demonstrates that multilateralism is a dispositional trait, not a simple functional response to some objective security situation. One of the great truisms in the study of international relations is that World War II forced a decisive and bipartisan break in American foreign policy (Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007; Busby and Monten 2008). After 1945, the United States embarked upon a new internationalist path of engagement that broke with its previous grand strategy of political‐military isolation, ushering in a new age of peace and prosperity. This new course was most evident in its new enthusiasm toward international organizations. Whereas the United States declined to enter the League of Nations after World War I, it joined the United Nations and a few short years later signed and ratified the North Atlantic Treaty. Structuralists argue that the changing nature of military technology, the United States’ unprecedented power, the scope of its interests, and the growing threat of the

"Soft power" — a term that was introduced 30 years ago by the American theorist J. Nye, and associated with a specifi c US foreign policy doctrine, has been actively used around the world in recent years, and the concept itself is being rethought based on specifi c goals, objectives and resources available to individual countries or international organizations. "Soft power" has not received a place in the "offi cial doctrines", but has been adopted by such organizations as UNE-COCO and the Council of Europe, the European Union, as well as by the heads of national foreign ministries and top offi cials of states. “Soft” power and public diplomacy are rather “aggressively” incorporated into national agendas for the formation of a foreign policy image, however, countries do not attach much importance to the concepts of the above categories, using the same terminology of J. Nye. What remains common for all subjects is that with the help of “soft power” they intend to broadcast a certain myth that is presented as reality, no matter whether it is about security, equal opportunities or some kind of worldview and way of life. And the particulars differ quite strongly. If initially the term meant the export of the American dream outside, today it can be human rights, gender equality, "green" and "blue" economy, ecology, principles of tolerance, humanitarian aid, migration and other areas used not only and not so much the United States, but also the states of Europe, Latin America and Russia, which was one of the fi rst to introduce the concept of "soft power" into the political lexicon. This article discusses the transformation of the “soft power” discourse that has been taking place in the last decade, its adaptation to the needs of various actors (states and organizations), the expansion of the toolkit and the “blurring” of the very concept of “soft power” in conjunction with the -th challenges facing the world community.