French defense spending: War economy “à la française”

This article analyses the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), a landmark EU regulation proposed in early 2024 and currently under discussion by the European Parliament and Council, that marks a fundamental shift in European defence industrialpolicy. Moving beyond emergency responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, EDIP introduces comprehensive mechanisms for strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. Through analysis of the draft Regulation’s primary sources, the study examines how EDIP establishes permanent structures for defence industrial cooperation, including the innovative Structure for the European Armament Programme framework, sophisticated supply chain security measures, and mechanisms for Ukrainian defence industrial integration. The article argues that EDIP represents a strategic transformation from voluntary coordination to the active management of defence industrial capabilities, creating flexible yet robust frameworks for long-term European defence industrial development. While implementation challenges remain, particularly regarding security requirements and institutional coordination, EDIP establishes foundations for a more integrated European defence industrial base that will likely shape policy evolution beyond its initial 2025–2027 timeframe.

The article applies the economic theory of alliances to uncover military expenditure burden sharing in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during 1991–2020, prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In so doing, our analysis accounts for the relative locations of NATO allies through various spatial or economic weights applied to the allies’ defense spending. Such weights include NATO membership status, contiguity, US power projection, inverse distance between members’ capitals, economic trade, and contiguity to Russia. In the post-Cold War era, we uncover allies’ free riding on the aggregate military expenditure of other allies. Free riding also included reliance on the defense spending of NATO allies in proximity to Russia. Surprisingly, NATO allies reduced their defense spending as Russia increased its defense spending. The pattern of free riding and lack of response to heightened Russian defense spending likely encouraged the Russian invasion as NATO appeared divided.

This article presents on trends in military spending, building on the most recent military expenditure data by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). World military spending grew for the eighth consecutive year in 2022, up 3.7 per cent to an all-time high of $2240 billion. The increase in world spending in 2022 was largely due to three factors: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; the increase in military spending by Central and Western Europe countries as a reaction to the invasion and expenditure rises in major powers in Asia, namely China, India and Japan. There were two major military expenditure related developments in 2022 linked to the war in Ukraine. Firstly, Central and Western European responded to the deteriorating security situation by announcing plans to substantially increases their military spending. Some of the acutest increases in military spending took place in countries with close geographical proximity to Russia and Ukraine. Secondly were the immediate and record levels of military aid sent to Ukraine. Based on official figures for the largest donors and other assistance funds, at least $30 billion worth of military aid was given to Ukraine in 2022, with the US as the largest provider accounting for around two-thirds of all military aid

World military expenditure rose by 3.7 per cent in real terms in 2022, to reach a record high of $2240 billion. Global spending grew by 19 per cent over the decade 2013–22 and has risen every year since 2015. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a major driver of the growth in spending in 2022. Military expenditure in Europe rose by 13 per cent during the year, which was the largest annual increase in total European spending in the post-cold war era. The exceptional growth was largely accounted for by substantial increases in Russian and Ukrainian spending, but many other European countries boosted their military budgets in 2022. Spending increases in parts of Asia and Oceania also contributed to the global growth in 2022. This SIPRI Fact Sheet examines key regional and national military expenditure data for 2022 and trends over the decade 2013–22. The data, which replaces all military spending data previously published by SIPRI, comes from the updated SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.

This study investigates the dynamic pathways of organisational resilience among Ukrainian firms operating in a war economy. Our research highlights the profound impact of armed conflicts on commerce, emphasising the need for businesses to develop resilience strategies to mitigate risks and maintain operations. Through an examination of organisational data representing the 2‐year period following Russia's full‐scale invasion of Ukraine, our findings support the presence of two resilience pathways previously described in the extant literature, ‘bounce‐back’ and ‘bounce‐beyond’ and expose two new pathways which we have labelled ‘bounce‐less’ and ‘bounce‐boom.’ Our findings reveal the complex and varying paths of organisational resilience resulting from changes in market demand and resource availability, underscoring the importance of organisational adaptability, resourcefulness and innovation. We also propose a broader definition of resilience than is currently found in the literature – one which recognises the challenges of achieving a baseline of organisational survival in a time of crisis. The article concludes with practical implications and recommendations for future research on resilience in wartime conditions.

The vast decreases in United States defense budgets over the past 10 years have necessitated a fundamental change in the defense industrial base. The Cold War defense industrial base had cyclical peaks and valleys, most acutely sensitive to the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, but these fluctuations should not be compared to the current valley of drastic downsizing due to the fall of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War. In 1994, C. Michael Armstrong, Chairman of the Board and CEO of Hughes Aircraft Company, noted After World War II, we saw a demobilization of the military every bit as rapid as the defense industry surge that propelled the allies to victory. From 1946 on, national defense spending went into a nosedive, a plunge that did not stop until the Korean War. A generation later, after Vietnam, we again allowed our investment in national defense to lag, this time, even lower than the pre-Korean level. Today, we are below that pre-Korean level — below the post-Vietnam level — and by 1999, defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product will be lower than at any point since Pearl Harbor.

From 2009 to 2014, the medical units at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, gained extensive experience in the nondoctrinal employment of the Forward Surgical Team (FST) combined with an Area Support Medical Company (ASMC) or Brigade Support Medical Company (BSMC).The setup and execution of the so-called "Role 2-plus" offers multiple operational and clinical advantages over solitary employment, but also presents some significant logistical challenges without proper planning.2][3][4][5][6] Former commanders of these units would like to share and document some of the lessons learned during a time of exceptionally high operational tempo (OPTEMPO).

: The high operational tempo of Marine infantry battalions over the last four years has severely shortened the amount of time each infantry battalion has to train its Marines for the next deployment. Upon returning from a deployment, infantry battalions generally discharge or transfer nearly half of their personnel. The battalion then must recoup this loss of personnel from the School of Infantry (SOI), integrate the new Marines, and prepare them for deployment. In addition to this high turnover in personnel, the Department of Defense and the Marine Corps have recently fielded a large number of new and improved radios, optics, vehicles and weapons to deploying Marines that they must learn how to use effectively and efficiently. The increasingly complicated equipment, the large diversity of missions across the spectrum of conflict, and the high operational tempo threaten to overwhelm young Marines and prevent them from doing their jobs as well as they can. In order to increase operational efficiency in small units, the Marine Corps should assign Marines within each unit as subject matter experts to accomplish certain individual and unit tasks in depth.

The US has embarked upon a major transformation of its approach to defence industrial base planning. Although bureaucratic and industrial inertia, as well as budgetary constraints, may delay transformation, its effects will lead to radical changes in the US defence industrial base with new entrants and new combinations of players. The UK, with more modest defence ambitions, capabilities and budget, will seek to keep in touch with the US. However, a commercially‐led drive to embed UK industry even more deeply in the US defence market could be the last step in creating a largely US–UK North Atlantic relationship, with much of Europe very much a subsidiary business concern. This contains a risk that the UK will become increasingly dependent on the US for design and integration of major systems and national defence industrial capability focused on a limited number of niche technologies.

Forty-nine U.S. Army officers with recent combat experience were surveyed to assess their units' sleep patterns and to determine the tactics, techniques, and procedures used to counter the effects of sleep deprivation in their units. Despite Army policy requiring units to develop and implement sleep management plans, nearly 80% of the participants reported they had not been briefed on a sleep management plan during their most recent deployment. Over one half of the respondents reported that fatigue was a problem in their units. During high operational tempo (OPTEMPO), which occupied nearly half of their time in combat, participants report receiving only 4 hr of sleep daily. The vast majority of respondents (82.6%) reported feeling sleep-deprived at least occasionally while at high OPTEMPO. These findings have important implications for the operational readiness of all military units deployed to combat environments.

The issue of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its impact on countries' economic growth is critical in today's global landscape. The conflict has caused severe economic disruption, including disruptions to trade routes, investment uncertainty, a decline in the country's GDP, a rise in inflation and a significant increase in unemployment rates, both in Ukraine and in neighbouring countries. The purpose of the article is to analyse the impact of the war in Ukraine on the economic growth of Lithuania, which plays an important role in the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, the article covers the data for 2002-2023. In order to find a model of economic growth for Lithuania during the war in Ukraine, the following parameters were analysed: the number of immigrants from Ukraine in Lithuania, Lithuania's military spending, the long-term interest rate, the level of business confidence, Lithuania-Ukraine exports, Lithuania-Russia imports, Ukraine-Lithuania exports, Ukraine-Lithuania imports, foreign direct investment in Lithuania, financial help to Ukraine from Lithuania, renewable energy consumption, unemployment rate, and inflation. The subsequent factors have been selected on the basis of a review of the extant literature and an analysis of the research conducted by foreign and domestic scholars. The analysis of Lithuania's economic growth has been conducted using the Harrod-Domar model, which focuses on investments and savings as a means of increasing economic growth. The hypothesis concerning the factors has been tested using correlation analysis to ascertain the relationship between the dependent and independent variables, and to identify the parameters with the most significant impact on economic growth. A thorough regression analysis reveals a substantial non-linear association between Lithuania's economic growth, its military expenditure, the influx of immigrants from Ukraine, energy consumption and its provision of military assistance to Ukraine. To optimise the model's parameters, an assessment of expert opinions was conducted, utilising linear programming to maximise economic growth in Lithuania. As Lithuania is geographically proximate to both Ukraine and Russia, and has historically maintained robust trade relations with both nations, it is imperative to ascertain the potential ramifications of the war in Ukraine on Lithuania's economic growth. The research findings and the models developed can serve as a valuable analytical framework for the study of other post-Soviet economies, facilitating the evaluation of their economic development in the context of geopolitical conflicts.

In real terms, global military spending increased by 3.7% in 2022 to a record $2240 billion. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia played a significant role in the increase in spending, with military spending in Europe rising by 13% in the year – the highest yearly increase in total European spending since the conclusion of the Cold War. Significant increases in spending by Russia and Ukraine were primarily responsible for the remarkable gain, but several other European nations also increased their military budgets in 2022. This essay examines the impact of national choices regarding sovereignty, industrial issues, and strategic needs on procurement strategies, and then measures and discusses the changes and continuities in the European procurement process.

The invasion of Ukraine and the increase in military spending are causing the economy to overheat

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there has been a surge in transport fuel prices. Consequently, many European Union (EU) countries are cutting taxes on petrol and diesel to shield consumers. Using standard theory and empirical estimates, here we assess how such tax cuts influence the oil income in Russia. We find that an EU-wide tax cut of €0.20 l−1 increases Russia’s oil profits by around €8 million per day in the short and long term. This is equivalent to €3,100 million per year, 0.2% of Russia’s gross domestic product or 5% of its military spending. We show that a cash transfer to EU citizens—with a fiscal burden equivalent to the tax cut—reduces these side effects to a fraction.

Armed conflict and military activity can be highly destructive for the environment. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has unexpectedly elevated global media attention on the humanitarian, environmental and societal impact of the war, with media reporting on the environmental consequences beyond the scale of other contemporary conflicts.a However, while this attention on the carbon costs of conflict and military actives is welcome, significant data and knowledge gaps remain on the overall contribution that day-to-day military activities make to climate change.b Communicating the issues around military emissions is difficult, given both their complexity and because it is politically sensitive. This is particularly the case around military decarbonisation plans, which some regard as a low priority and a risk to military operational effectiveness or preparedness. This makes geoethics important and communication of the problem especially challenging during a time when military spending is increasing due to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. This perceived political sensitivity has contributed to the exclusion of military emissions from mainstream climate discourse, despite their potential scale. A study - led by Scientists for Global Responsibility - suggests that the world’s militaries are responsible for 5.5% of global emissions.c This is considerable yet many governments do not yet publish or fully understand the contribution that their militaries make to climate change. The significant data gaps mean it is inherently difficult to estimate the emissions of the world’s militaries as a whole. In turn, this makes it challenging to communicate the importance of the topic. This presentation will set out some of the initiatives – such as https://militaryemissions.org - which have been developed by civil society to communicate the problem to the broad range of stakeholders, including the public, the military, civil society organisations and policy makers. Given the diverse audience, a spectrum of communication narratives has been used, including a podcast series with the military think-tank Royal United Services Institute,d policy briefs,e webinars,f blogs, papers, and media articles. Effective, ongoing communication and education is vital to increase awareness around the military’s contribution to climate change and seek to ensure that any emerging climate and decarbonisation plans for the military are properly implemented and their effectiveness scrutinised.a CEOBS, 2022a. Sustainable recovery? First sustain interest in Ukraine’s environment.  https://ceobs.org/sustainable-recovery-first-sustain-interest-in-ukraines-environment/b Rajaeifar, M. et al, 2022.  Decarbonize the military — mandate emissions reporting. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-022-03444-7c SGR/CEOBS, 2022b. Estimating the Military’s Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions. https://ceobs.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/SGRCEOBS-Estimating_Global_MIlitary_GHG_Emissions_Nov22_rev.pdfd Greening Defence podcast series, available at https://rusi.org/podcast-series/greening-defence-podcastse CEOBS, 2022c. Policy brief: Military greenhouse gas emissions – transparency, reporting and action. https://ceobs.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/CEOBS_briefing_note_military_GHG_reporting.pdff COP27 virtual panel: Military Emissions Gap annual update 2022, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wRi5Apxht5M&t=3621s