Fremdes Blut, heilige Rache und die Invasion im Schafspelz

In this short study, the author, save using Cicero's concept of the Natural Law, tries to derive inside the determinants concerning the birth of the political system of the principate of the Roman State. Cicero's ideas help figure out that, owing to the consolidation of aristocratic and democratic rudiments in the structure of the Roman state sparkled by given historical constellations, a specifically Roman legal concept of justice and natural law is formed. Forced by its influence as if programmed, the republican political system evolves in the direction of the model of Principate. In this study, an effort is opened to authenticate that emperor Augustus obeys the demands of both political forces (populars and optimates) but in the process of implementing this given "programme". Therefore, the study contends that in the outcome, the emperor conciliates the objectives of the political forces (which are controversial) and erects such an institution of supreme authority which, in addition to becoming an instrument that consolidates the society, in the forthcoming history of the Roman state serves as a progressive element. Cicero's concept of natural law determines that democratic, aristocratic, and monarchical status was integrated into the legal consciousness of the Romans. Save using Cicero's concept of natural law, subsequent analysis of the political programmes of the optimates (aristocratic party) and the populars (democratic party) revealed that on the eve of Caesar's dictatorship, the Roman society at large was ready to vote for a monarchy-type of government based upon the pattern of the political system of principate. It was determined in this way that the principate of Emperor Augustus had emerged in a regular manner. The latter conclusion enables us to solve the endless historiographical discussions related to the origin of Augustus' principate in favor of those who support the defenders of a teleological point of view.

Мішель Віллей (1914-1988) – французький філософ та прибічник природного права. У даній статті критично розглянуте одне з ключових понять його теорії – правова діалектика. Проаналізовані основи теорії Віллея в контексті філософсько-етимологічних підвалин поняття діалектики. У статті досліджено звернення автора до праць Аристотеля та Фоми Аквінського з метою обґрунтування згаданої концепції діалектики. Вивчений досвід використання автором діалектики для обґрунтування природного права. Критично розглянуто відповідну філософію мовних структур та запропоновано новий напрям у розумінні поняття діалектики, що відповідає сучасній комунікативній концепції права.

Thomas Aquinas' concept of law is an example of the application of Aristotelian teleology to the integral theory of ethics, law and governing. Aquinas' concept of natural law is called moral law by many scholars. Man is able to anticipate the law of action in relation to eternal law, and such participation in eternal law Thomas calls natural law. The ethics starts from the principle good is to be done and evil is to be avoided. This principle is the basis for the rest of the ethical precepts concerning what is to be done and what is to be avoided. Man has innate general orientations on how to live and behave in this world. Conscience evaluates and judges the motives and moral qualities of actions. This is the main idea of natural law, which is described in the article.

The article presents research of the widespread tendency to justify the concept of natural law within empirical sociocultural and anthropological factors in order to deprive it of its metaphysical character, which corresponds to sociological methodology. Emphasis is laid on the assumption of fundamental compatibility of the concepts of natural and sociological law, which, according to the author, is false. This outlines the related goal of the thesis that lies in proving formal logical and methodological incompatibility of the aforementioned concepts as well as inability of the sociological interpretation of natural law to solve the problem of lack of trust therein. Emphasis is also laid on inability of sociological methodology to solve the problem of ethical justification of the correctness of legal standards and behavior, which is clearly manifested in the projections of legitimacy and values. It is emphasized that the ethical foundations of law are not derived from the actual condition and require absolute values of transcendent (metaphysical) nature. The conclusion is made that natural law and sociological law are comparable but logically incompatible concepts, since they are formed according to opposite essential features determining the oppositeness of the elements that constitute their scope. In addition, the notions and concepts under research are opposite according to the ontological principles of origin and essence as well as according to the cognitive ideals forming the principles of their methodology. Together, this makes it possible to insist on the oppositeness of their nature. However, their oppositeness does not exclude complementarity in performance of the methodological work they do, albeit in their own way. Therefore, the gaps in knowledge of the ontological foundations of the theory of natural law are not a reason to abandon its instrumental capabilities as a value-oriented measure for the norms established by people. To restore trust in natural law, sociologization thereof is not enough, since the empirical methodology of sociologism creates only the illusion of solution to the problem of justifying the ethical foundations of the legal order solved by the concept of natural law in a different cognitive way. Key words: natural law, sociological law, sociologization of natural law, sociological methodology, metaphysics, legitimacy, values.

Straipsnyje apžvelgiami Tomo Akviniečio laisvės teorijos tyrimai XX amžiuje. Pirmiausia aptariami Tomo prigimtinio įstatymo sampratos, arba jo etikos statuso, tyrimai. Tai tyrimai, orientuoti į žmogaus laisvės problemos sprendimo prielaidas. Čia analizuojama, kiek pagrįsta tradicinė neotomistinė pozicija laikyti Akviniečio etiką prigmtinio įstatymo teorija, o prigimtinį įstatymą - laisvos žmogaus veiksenos principu. Kita straipsnyje apžvelgiama kryptis - bendroji jo laisvės ir laisvos žmogaus veiksenos teorija. Analizuojamas labai platus problemų spektras, apimantis laisvo veiksmo struktūrą, valios ir intelekto santykį.

The concept of natural law is fundamental to political philosophy, ethics, and legal thought. The present article shows that as early as the ancient Greek philosophical tradition, three main ideas of natural law existed, which run in parallel through the philosophical works of many authors in the course of history. The first two approaches are based on the understanding that although equipped with reason, humans are nevertheless still essentially animals subject to biological instincts. The first approach defines natural law as the law of the strongest, which can be observed to hold among all members of the animal kingdom. The second conception presents natural law as the principle of self-preservation, inherent as an instinct in all living beings. The third approach, also developed in antiquity, shifts the focus to our rationality and develops the idea of natural law as the law of reason within us. Some Christian thinkers who consider the origin of reason in us to be divine, identify the law of reason inherent in us with God?s will. This paper gives a brief exposition of the development of these three concepts of natural law in philosophy, with emphasis on the intertwining of these three concepts, which we, however, understand as primarily and essentially independent. The paper concludes with an overview of twentieth-century authors who exclusively focus on only one of the three concepts. The aim of this article is to argue against these one-sided interpretations and to uphold the independence and distinctness of the three historical conceptions of natural law.

The rule of law: Natural, human, and divine

The paper is devoted to the prospects of transformation of the idea and concept of law as a result of technosocial systems development. The author reconstructs genesis and evolution of technosocial systems and substantiates the thesis about connection between these systems and the prospects of understanding the nature and meaning of law. The paper analyzes the latest developments of management theorists, sociologists and philosophers that reveal new contours of the nature-society system and theoretical and legal significance of conclusions to which they lead. The author pays special attention to the correspondence of the orders of action and the orders of knowledge in conditions that are determined by the disciplinary matrix of the science and scientific knowledge, as well as the interaction between theoretical discourse and social practices. In this context, the paper analyzes the impact of technosocial systems on legal awareness, legal worldview, rulemaking and law enforcement practices. The author makes a hypothesis about an essential change of law under the influence of digitalization of social life, hybridization of knowledge and its disciplinary transformation. The author focuses on cultural and historical determinism of the ideas and ideals of humanism and highlights the connection between the natural-scientific revolution of Modern times and the concepts of natural law and social contract. The author analyzes Michel Serres’ concept that proposes to supplement the social contract with another contract — the contract with nature. Another "thought experiment" suggests an essential change in the idea and concept of law.

The Philosophy of Law in Ulpian’s Life and TeachingSummaryThe purpose of this article, is to show, taking into account Ulpian’s life and teaching, that the Roman jurisprudence was interwoven with some elements of philosophy. The first part of the article illustrates the influence of Ulpian’s life history on his philosophical and legislative views, whereas the second part presents the latter.His knowledge of law, the posts which he occupied, and numerous works prove that Ulpian was preoccupied with studying „law through its first causes”. He asked about the essence of the law, about what the natural law is, and what justice is. He described the juridical reality using the language of law and philosophy. His concept of lawfulness can be perceived as integral, combining material and formal legality He did not depart from the ethical dimension of law although he respected the rigours of the formalised norms. Referring to aequitas did not disturb him in paying attention to certitudo legalis. In his concept of lawfulness one can see a reference to Cyceron’s ideas and in his concept of natural law one can observe a reference to the Stoics. In the field of the penal lawfulness one can perceive Ulpian as a precursor of the ability to perceive the human equality in the sphere of natural law, the concept elaborated as late as several centuries afterwards. Perceiving the equality of people, approximates him to the Christian’s philosophical idea.

Science and religion in the thirteenth century revisited: the making of St Francis the proto-ecologist: Part 1: creature not nature

This paper examines the concept of natural law, especially from the African perspective. It contends that natural law is something universal, and this being the case, Africa has its own version of it. Africa’s conception of natural law is anchored on the notion of the supreme duty as the giver of the law, and morality – the knowledge of good and bad as intricately inter-woven with this law. In this regard, the Africans appreciate the forbiddingness of certain acts as emanating from natural law, and to a large extent, enhancing human rights observance.

he article addresses, in the perspective of the history of modern philosophy, the issue of the transformation to which the concept of natural law was subject in the 17th and 18th centuries. The author shares the views of, among others, Habermas and Bobbio, according to which the modern concept of natural law has been made “more positive” or “disenchanted” (after Weber), and thus the traditionally understood law of nature was transformed into the concept of natural rights. The article distinguishes three forms of this process: the first one, i.e., the so-called bourgeois school of natural law (Grotius, Thomasius, Pufendorf); the second one, developed by representatives of the early (moderate) Enlightenment (Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu); the third one, the most radical one, represented by the thinkers the late Enlightenment, mainly French encyclopaedists and materialists (La Mettrie, Holbach, Condorcet, Paine). Their common feature was the gradual abandonment of the metaphysical or theological foundations of natural law in favour of a naturalised ethic.

The stage has now been set for the closer delineation of the natural law, the result of the efforts of the great scholastic theologians working on the rich material they found in the tradition. The elements in that tradition, as has been seen, were basically three: (1) a conception of the natural law, originally Stoic with a background in the pre-Socratics, Plato and Aristotle, translated into the Roman world, popularized by Cicero and finding its authoritative expression in the Roman law; (2) a conception of the natural law, complementing the preceding one, but tributary to St. Paul and the elaboration of his thought by the Fathers and ecclesiastical writers; and (3) the radical re-shaping of the Christian natural law in its identification, by Gratian and his followers, with what is found in the law and the gospel. The future history of the concept of natural law will be determined by the weaving together of these strands in the special environment of scholastic philosophy and theology. It is part of the thesis of this book that the profile that resulted in the work of St. Thomas Aquinas gets as close as is humanly possible to the natural law and that it has hardly been improved upon by his successors. To see this achievment in its context, we must first look-of necessity briefly and selectively — at some of his immediate forerunners.

Point of view: One of the basic concepts that underlies law as a phenomenon, as well as private law as one of the two areas of law, is the concept of natural law. This concept presupposes that rights and freedoms are an inalienable good of every person, regardless of the will of any external institutions. The ideas of natural law have been expressed in the concept of private law (the fundamental principles of private law are such principles as justice, good faith, reasonableness, dispositiveness, legal certainty, inadmissibility of interference in private affairs, inviolability of property rights, and freedom of contract).
 Object: The subject of the study is the problems of reforming of private law in modern conditions. The object of research is the social relations that arise in the plane of «person-person» and «state-person» in modern transformation processes.
 Methodology: The research methodology is formed by methods of analysis, synthesis, and modeling. Additionally, logical-legal, comparative-legal forecasting methods are used. The authors of the article tried to draw a parallel between the concepts of natural law, Roman law and private law.
 Results and discussion: An analysis of these concepts revealed that each of them is an integral part of the concept of modern Western civilization. At the same time, in modern conditions of pandemic, deglobalization, regionalization, collapse of human rights and the very concept of Western civilization, which is based on the ideas of humanism, liberalism, absolute human rights, inviolability of property rights and respect for privacy, are under threat.

In the seventeenth century, the concept of natural law was linked with that of “innate ideas”. Natural laws were said to be ideas imprinted by nature or by God on men's minds and were the very foundation of religion and morality. Locke's attack on innate ideas in the first book of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding is therefore considered to be an assault on natural law. Modern critics like Peter Laslett, W. von Leyden and Philip Abrams are of the opinion that Locke's critique of innate ideas in the Essay cannot be reconciled with the concept of natural law in the Two Treatises of Government.