Freedom of Association in France

The guardianship action is a mechanism for the protection and guarantee of fundamental constitutional rights. Its origin is delimited by what is established in article 86 of the national constitution, and developed by Decree 2591 of 1991 and by the repeated pronouncements of the Constitutional Court that have been issued on the matter. Specifically, the constitutional court has developed a jurisprudential line related to the origin of the protection action against individuals who provide a public service, framing within this issue what is related to the origin of the protection action against banking and/or financial entities, who, by showing a degree of superiority in the contractual relationship with users, may commit abuses or make decisions that affect fundamental constitutional rights. Although there have been some pronouncements from the highest constitutional body, there is no easily understandable academic work among ordinary society that makes it possible to accurately identify when the protection action is appropriate against this type of individuals who provide a banking and financial service, for which reason It is necessary to address the subject of study, for which we will initially delimit the guardianship action conceptually, later its origin against individuals will be explained and then, based on inductive reasoning, its origin will be identified against banking and financial entities, managing to demonstrate what are the problematic situations that can generate the violation of fundamental rights and what are the most violated or thre

У статті аналізуються ключові рішення Конституційного Суду Угорщини у сфері прав людини, ухвалені ним у 1990–2011 рр., зокрема таких аспектів, як розуміння ним сутності прав людини, методики їх оцінки та захисту в процесі здійснення конституційного судочинства. Для досягнення такої мети увагу зосереджено на низці рішень Конституційного Суду Угорщини, в яких найбільш рельєфно проявляються його юридичні позиції у сфері прав людини. Зроблено висновки, зокрема, щодо того, що впродовж більше двох десятиліть Конституційний Суд Угорщини послідовно проводив правові позиції щодо розуміння природи прав людини, серед яких домінує ідея єдності людського життя та гідності людини як джерела для фундаментальних конституційних прав, які тлумачаться в контексті відповідних міжнародних договорів.

This paper focuses on the consequences of a situation having evolved from a process ongoing at both the level of the European Union and the individual national level of EU Member States, generally known as constitutionalization of private law, or as the horizontal effect of fundamental rights arising from international, European and national constitutional provisions on human rights, in the specific conditions of the Czech Republic. Czech lawmakers introduced references and even partially adopted into the text of the Civil Code fundamental/human rights, by which it bared the yet rather latent question of mutual definition and mutual relationship of fundamental constitutional rights and private law principles. Assessing this relationship and its impacts forms the core of this paper. In conclusion, the author offers a proposal for resolving systemic discrepancy of the effect of human rights in the conditions of private law.

250Relationship of international law and municipal law — Treaties — Effect in municipal law — EEC Treaty, 1957 — Fundamental rights under national Constitution — Whether proceedings may be instituted before Constitutional Court alleging unconstitutionality of acts of European Community institutionsHuman rights — Procedure for enforcement — Fundamental rights under Spanish Constitution, Articles 14 to 30 — EEC Treaty, 1957 and secondary legislation — Possible conflict with fundamental rights under Constitution — Whether acts of Community institutions subject to constitutional review to establish compatibility with fundamental constitutional rights — The law of Spain

The Second Amendment is suffering from an inferiority complex. Litigants, scholars, and judges complain that the right to keep and bear arms is not being afforded the respect and dignity befitting a fundamental constitutional right. They assert that on its own terms and relative to rights in the same general class, the Second Amendment is being disrespected, under-enforced, and orphaned. They argue that the Second Amendment is regarded as peripheral, fringe, anachronistic, second- rate, and second-class – in sum, as one commentator states, it is the Rodney Dangerfield of the Bill of Rights. Reviewing the available evidence, this Article generally rejects second-class claims as either false or overstated. Many of the claims are based on false premises, including the notion that the Supreme Court and lower courts immediately and aggressively expand the scope of fundamental rights once they are recognized, that all fundamental rights are created and enforced equally, that the absence of strict scrutiny is demonstrative of lower-class status, and that low success rates demonstrate under-enforcement. As defined in District of Columbia v. Heller and interpreted in the lower courts, the Second Amendment exhibits all of the hallmarks of a fundamental constitutional right. It is a non-absolute, non-economic, individual dignity right that is considered implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Constructed in the image of the Free Speech Clause and analogized in those terms by many courts, the right to keep and bear arms exerts a powerful influence on constitutional discourse and political outcomes. To be sure, success rates for Second Amendment claims have been low, and lower courts have hesitated to interpret Heller broadly. However, the available evidence does not show that either the results or the restraint are the product of judicial hostility, resistance, or political ideology. Although it has been silent for a decade, the Supreme Court has surely not abandoned the Second Amendment for all time. Indeed, other fundamental rights have experienced the same, or in some cases greater, periods of neglect or inattention. Our experience with fundamental rights shows that what courts have made of the Second Amendment in its first decade will not dictate what the right will become in its second decade and beyond. Whatever it becomes, by whatever dynamics will affect it, the Second Amendment's path should be charted according to an accurate assessment of both its real and relative current status.

Spain inherited the French tradition of “nullities” but, since the end of the Franco dictatorship and the passage of a new constitution in 1978, a doctrine of evidentiary exclusion has developed which is perhaps the most rigorous in Europe. The move from dominance of the “search for truth” to emphasis on the protection of constitutional rights began with a decision of the new Constitutional Court of Spain in 1984, in which it held that violations of fundamental constitutional rights should lead to exclusion of evidence gathered as a result thereof. This decision led to the enactment of a law in the Judicial Code, which required exclusion of any direct and derivative evidence gained from violation of fundamental rights, that is, a clear adoption of the doctrine of the “fruits of the poisonous tree”. This Chapter documents this development and the application of the doctrine to violations of the right to privacy and to illegal confessions, but also lays out some subtle changes in the approach of the Constitutional Court which were triggered in a decision of 1998, where the court required trial courts to engage in a kind of balancing before it found whether evidence gathered following a fundamental violation was linked to the violation by a “nexus of illegality”. This has opened the door to exceptions to the earlier regime of nearly absolute exclusion in cases of constitutional violations.

What is democratic backsliding?

Disasters caused by large-scale disasters and infectious diseases have fatal consequences for human social life and health, leading to enormous social and economic losses and the creation of an unstable social environment. Despite human's constant desire for safety and the establishment of a legal and institutional safety management system, the frequency of large-scale disasters and disasters is increasing and turning human society into a dangerous society that will be processed. Without explicit grounds for security rights as a fundamental right under the Constitution, the legal system and legal contents of the state's safety protection and security are formed with safety-related sub-laws, adding to legal confusion in practice related to safety protection and security. In the process of developing into advanced countries, social safety insensitivity is still prevalent, and the industrial environment based on performanceism remains the same, and safety-related social expenses account for a significant portion of the national finance. As for safety issues, post-disaster safety management is also important, but it is essential to reduce disaster and disaster- related social costs through proactive safety management. Pre- and post-safety management related to disasters and disasters should be accompanied by introducing it as a constitutional fundamental right as an independent regulation of the right to safety and the realization of the right to safety through individual laws. It is necessary to be faithful to the pursuit of happiness and security guarantees of the people by introducing constitutional safety right, creating a safety environment through the realization of safety rightsthrough individual laws, and establishing a systematic safety management system. The protection and guarantee of constitutional safety right guarantees the people's enjoyment of fundamental constitutional right, while also practicing the obligation to guarantee safety as a fundamental right of the state. This paper presents an alternative to systematizing constitutional theory to protect and guarantee the right to safety as a fundamental right to facilitate the performance of the state's security guarantee obligations under the Constitution through research and analysis on the basis of the right to safety in our Constitution. In addition, when the constitution is revised in the future, we would like to propose a plan to embody it as a constitutional regulation when introducing the right to safety.

Protection of constitutional identity in light of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Poland – a comparative study

El derecho fundamental a una muerte digna requiere del conocimiento jurídico, ético y médico. Decisión de fin de vida

It is now almost 20 years since the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was signed (hereinafter the ‘Charter’). Its importance as a further primary text has meanwhile regularly come into the focus of the CJEU. In the three recent cases Funke Medien NRW, Spiegel Online and Pelham, the CJEU had the opportunity to clarify the importance of the Charter’s fundamental rights regarding the limitations and exceptions to the exclusive rights of copyright. While clarifying certain issues, the CJEU, however, also raised some intricate issues with potentially far-reaching consequences. The three questions raised by the German Federal Supreme Court in this regard were: (1) do the provisions of EU law on copyright exceptions or limitations allow any discretion in terms of implementation in national law; (2) in what manner are the fundamental rights of the Charter to be taken into account when determining the scope of the exceptions or limitations provided for in the InfoSoc Directive; and (3) can the fundamental rights justify exceptions or limitations to the exclusive rights, beyond the exceptions or limitations provided for in Art. 5(3) of the InfoSoc Directive? The CJEU answered the first question with a general ‘yes’, and the third one with a clear ‘no’ and explained how fundamental rights should be taken into account regarding the second question. At the same time, this raises the question of the scope left to the Member States to apply their own fundamental constitutional rights. In short, the question is about locating and adjusting the protection of fundamental rights in the European multi-level system.

Purpose: The right to education is a fundamental right for all members of society, serving as a cornerstone for promoting population growth and facilitating equal educational opportunities without discrimination. Vietnam, a nation committed to fulfilling its international obligations, including ensuring access to education as a fundamental constitutional right, is not without its challenges. These challenges, ranging from inadequate infrastructure to social and economic disparities, present opportunities for growth and improvement. This article examines the legal framework and implementation of education access laws in the United States, with the aim of identifying strategies that can be selectively adopted to enhance Vietnam's education system. By doing so, Vietnam can create a supportive legal environment for innovation in education and training, paving the way for a brighter future. Methodology: The study involves a comparative analysis of the education systems in Vietnam and the United States, focusing on the legal provisions and practical implementations that facilitate access to education. Findings: The analysis reveals that, despite Vietnam's commitment to ensuring education as a fundamental constitutional right, the country faces challenges such as inadequate infrastructure and social and economic disparities. These challenges present opportunities for improvement through the adoption of best practices from the U.S. education system. Originality: This research provides a unique perspective by highlighting the potential for Vietnam to enhance its education system through the selective adoption of strategies from the U.S. legal and educational framework. This approach aims to create a supportive legal environment for innovation in education and training, contributing to a brighter future for Vietnam.

In the Federfarma case (2005), the Italian Consiglio di Stato refused to ask the European Court of Justice to give a preliminary ruling, stating that the fulfillment of EC obligations would have implied the violation of a fundamental constitutional right. The Federfarma decision is noteworthy for many oddities, but its main reason of interest lies in the conception of fundamental rights which it expresses – to put it shortly, fundamental rights as “freedom of the State”. This conception is relatively new, but not unusual, and is crucial for the judicial management of a multilevel system of governance. This Article argues that the discourse on fundamental rights underpins a marked flexibility and indeterminacy in the relations between autonomous jurisdictions. However, in the long term, a case-sensitive application of fundamental rights may increase the loss of legal certainty and accountability. Depending on how they are understood and applied, fundamental rights can produce the effects of mutual delegitimisation between the orders in conflict, of uncertainty of law and political overexposure of judicial power. The dynamic of legal and institutional pluralism demands the creation of procedural channels that work as tools of dialogue. Rights alone are not enough in a multilevel system.

The convergence of constitutional fundamental rights and administrative enforcement power should pursue multiple legal values, which requires that the operation of the power therein should be more division of labor than cooperation, and that constraints and synergies should be given equal importance. The article will construct the basic constitutional rights and administrative power into the constitutional construction of the subject and the subject of the executive branch, the introduction of the evolution of the game theory to construct the constitutional construction of the subject and the subject of the executive branch of the evolution of the game model, and the design of the game model of the gain function, the replication of dynamic equations and ESS equilibrium point. The initial value of each parameter in the evolutionary game model is set, and the evolutionary stable point of administrative power is simulated by MATLAB software, and the influence of the reward and punishment allocation coefficients on the evolutionary results of the system is explored. When the system evolution stable point strategy is (0,0) and (1,1), the two sides of the game tend to the stable equilibrium state of active cooperation, strengthened regulation and strict supervision. When the reward distribution coefficient and the punishment distribution coefficient gradually increase, the two sides in the evolutionary game system tends to stabilize the point (1,1) the faster the rate will be. In the process of constructing the fundamental rights of the constitution, combining internal and external with the administrative rights list monitoring mechanism can realize the optimal restriction on the application of administrative rights and promote the orderly and stable operation of administrative power.

The American criminal justice system is often criticized as complex and inefficient, better serving the interests of criminals than the interests of justice. While the criminal process may indeed be cumbersome, the system's procedural safeguards exist to ensure the protection of defendants' fundamental constitutional rights and, instrumentally, the rights of all citizens. These rights include the right to an attorney, the right against compelled selfincrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to call and confront witnesses. These explicit constitutional guarantees, coupled with various procedural safeguards, form the basic framework of our adversarial system of justice. Protecting these rights warrants a certain amount of complexity and inefficiency. Initially, a criminal defendant enjoys the full panoply of these rights and protections. If he pleads not guilty, he retains all of these constitutional rights and leaves the prosecution with the burden of proving guilt. Alternatively, a defendant may choose to plead guilty, waive his constitutional rights, and thereby forgo his right to put the state to its proof.' Judgment is then entered against him, and a sentence imposed. Because defendants who explicitly plead guilty waive many of their fundamental rights, the Constitution and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure impose certain safeguards in such situations. As stated by the Supreme Court in Boykin v Alabama, the Constitution requires that a defendant waive his rights explicitly, and that this waiver be accompanied by evidence that his plea was knowing and voluntary.2 FRCrP 11 (Rule 11) adds a layer of procedural requirements: the judge must question the defendant personally in open court to ensure the plea is made knowingly and voluntarily, inform the defendant of his rights and the conse-