Free Will and A New Kind of Science

Abstract

What does Wolfram’s new kind of science (nks w ) imply about the decidedly non-new topic of free will versus determinism? I answer this question herein. More specifically, I point out that Wolfram’s nks w -based position on free will is centered on the nature of physical laws, rather than formal logic; briefly rehearse the longstanding ontology of main positions on free will versus determinism in the context of physical laws; after a more detailed look at Wolfram’s position, register agreement with him that in light of nks w , the belief that free will is real and robust is to be expected, and is rational; but explain that nks w provides no cogent rationalist basis for believing that we are in fact free. I conclude by pointing out that in light of the foregoing, if we are free, and can know that we are on the strength of what rationalists demand (e.g., proof), nks w , while perhaps truly new, is truly incomplete. In short, I show that Wolfram, on free will, is epistemologically insightful, but metaphysically deficient.