Abstract
The paper considers Matthew Kramer's notion of free-floating norms as a way of defending inclusive legal positivism. I argue first that there are numerous counterexamples to Kramer's approach. I then go on to argue that Kramer's approach represents a prevalent, yet mistaken, approach in contemporary legal philosophy of trying to answer empirical questions by conceptual arguments. I conclude that this approach should be abandoned.
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