Foreword

Abstract

FOREWORD .his issue of the SAIS REVIEW comes out at the end of 1989, a year which has witnessed two momentous foreign policy debates. The first, climaxing last spring, concerned the question of whether the Cold War was finally over. The second, ignited last summer by Francis Fukuyama's highly provocative and thoughtful article, "The End of History?" revolves around the question of whether major ideological conflict (and hence, goes the argument, history) has ended.1 The first debate appears by now to have spent itself, with those laying wreaths on the Cold War triumphant . Of course, just how dependent the debate's outcome was on a temporary mood in superpower relations and on the fortune and charisma of one Soviet leader remains to be seen. The current debate over history's end will also soon exhaust itself. The reasons are two-fold. First, too many different interests (including international affairs journals) have invested too many resources in the continuation of history to accept passively its cessation and wholesale replacement by "boring" technical matters. History has, in other words, more than enough defenders. Second, and more important, is the fact that Fukuyama's thesis— that economic and political liberalism has conquered all ideological rivals, and consequently, large-scale conflict will soon be extinct—is flawed. To begin with, Fukuyama's explicit assumption that international conflict is determined primarily by ideological rivalry is highly debatable, even in the ubiquitous long run. Traditional great power motivations, which 1 . Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," TAe National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 3-18. vi SAIS REVIEW Fukuyama is willing to acknowledge as essential in the case of China's foreign policy, will not simply be swept away by the end of ideological rivalry. Indeed, in the absence ofsuch rivalry, they may generate greater interstate conflict. This is one of the points made (correctly) by those who argue that the cessation of the Cold War and its ideological intensity will not eliminate the possibility of hot wars, much less the reemergence of superpower tensions. Further, as welcome as liberalism's current success is, it would be foolhardy to assume (and especially to plan on the assumption) that this temporary victory is anything but that—temporary. One need not be a devout believer in communism's regenerative capabilities to hold that liberalism's monopoly on ideological universalism is vulnerable to challenge . From where is hard to predict. But surely it does not stretch the imagination to see how certain calamitous events, such as a global economic depression, could quickly threaten liberalism's appeal and give rise to new rival ideologies—some modern variation of fascism, for example . Indeed, if anything must be assumed, it should be what Vojtech Mastny, in this issue's opening article, concludes from his survey of recent historical periods—that "the seemingly irreversible [in this case, the triumph of liberalism] is often reversed." Finally, Fukuyama's thesis suffers from the assertion (perhaps, tongue in cheek) that the post-historical period will be marked by "boredom" — that is, by "economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems , environmental concerns, and the satisfaction ofsophisticated consumer demands." To return to Fukuyama's analysis of China: while declaring Beijing's ideological expansionism to have virtually disappeared, he highlights its commercially motivated transfer of ballistic missiles to the Middle East. Given this proliferation's dangerous implications for regional stability and U.S. interests, as described in this issue by Thomas G. Mahnken and Timothy D. Hoyt, this purported change in motivations and policy is almost enough to make one long for the good old days of ideological conflict. In short, even if one accepts Fukuyama's assertion that ideological rivalry is now over, the remaining challenges of international relations, given their complexity and consequences for all humans, do not allow us the luxury of celebrating the end of the Cold War or the demise of history. This is one of the themes of this issue of the SAIS REVIEW, which focuses primarily on the threats that the upcoming decade poses to U.S. national interests. In the symposium which opens this issue, thirteen prominent policy specialists tackle the task of prioritizing the challenges that will...