Foreign Policy Instrument, Actor, or Infrastructure? Conceptualizing the Wagner Group in Sudan

The article considers and analyses the basic principles and directions of Russian foreign policy activities during the presidency of V.V. Putin from the moment of his assumption of the post of head of state to the current presidential term. The authors determine the basic principles of Russia's foreign policy in the specified period and make the assessment to them. The study uses materials from publications of both Russian and foreign authors, experts in the field of political science, history and international relations, as well as documents regulating the foreign policy activities of the highest state authorities. The paper considers the process of forming the priorities of Russia's foreign policy both from the point of view of accumulated historical experience and continuity of the internal order, and in parallel with the processes of transformation of the entire system of international relations and the world order. The article notes the multi-vector nature of Russia's foreign policy strategy aimed at developing multilateral interstate relations, achieving peace and security in the interstate arena, actively countering modern challenges and threats to interstate security, as well as the formation of a multipolar world. The authors conclude that at present, Russia's foreign policy activity is aimed at strengthening Russia's prestige, supporting economic growth and competitiveness, ensuring security and implementing national interests. Internal political reforms contribute to strengthening the political power of the President of the Russian Federation and increasing the efficiency of foreign policy decision-making.

This paper examines the role of civil society as an instrument of foreign policy, exploring its potential benefits and risks. Traditionally, foreign policy analysis focused on decision-making processes and the primacy of the state. However, the end of the Cold War, the rise of post-positivist approaches, and the increasing interconnectedness of global issues have led to a broader consideration of policy instruments, including the involvement of non-state actors like civil society. The study employs a comparative approach to analyze the benefits of civil society in promoting democracy and addressing global challenges against the risks of biased utilization and dependency on state support. It examines case studies, including the role of USAID in Myanmar and the Israel-Palestine conflict, as well as the Indonesian context, where the government engages civil society in development and foreign policy. The findings highlight the need for a balanced approach that leverages civil society’s strengths while mitigating its risks as an instrument of foreign policy.

John W. Holmes, optimism, and making of Canadian foreign policyOptimism is an instrument of policy.John W Holmes, 1983'In an age in which Canadian foreign policy appears to be increasingly defined by pessimism, it is nice to hear voice of optimism, all more so when this voice represents some of finest traditions in practice of Canadian foreign policy. There will always be those (and there is strong vein of them here in Canada) who believe that optimism has no place in practice of foreign policy. And certainly, while hard power and military calculus will always have role in foreign policy, they are not only factors, or necessarily most important instrument, particularly for small country like Canada. Holmes understood this intimately, and his clever and narrow construction of optimism as tool of policy (and not basis of policy) contains wisdom that could enrich our present foreign policy debate.This article has three purposes. First, I use an extreme example to demonstrate that optimism can indeed be an instrument of policy. Second, I try to dissect few of conditions under which it might be both necessary and successful. Finally, I focus on present state of Canadian foreign policy and assess what role, if any, optimism may have to play.Optimism - a disposition or tendency to look on more favourable side of events or conditions and to expect most favourable outcome or the belief that good ultimately predominates over evil in - is rare in world of international affairs. In classic international relations theory, citizens depend on their government to act rationally. In an anarchical society, states live under constant threat of being undermined, overrun, or exploited. Government should, if anything, look at world through pessimistic eyes in order to imagine and prepare for worst possible scenarios.This simple view of our country and world is, of course, contestable. Canada does not exist in state of total anarchy. Indeed, in both near abroad and across Atlantic we have friends and allies who generally act favourably towards us. Collectively, we agree to constrain our behaviours in mutually acceptable ways and as result enjoy somewhat narrower and more manageable (although not nonexistent) set of existential threats. So our relations with both our NATO allies generally and United States specifically mean that we must not always adopt most pessimistic outlook when confronting problems. Indeed, our history of cooperation with these allies has cultivated trust economy where we can have better than pessimistic expectations of their behaviour towards us, and one another, man some realist theories might predict. But even within these more nuanced structures of interstate relations there must be limits to optimism. The opportunities to exploit situation, for members to free-ride, and for balance of power to shift all mean that, as general rule, choosing optimism as basis for foreign policy would be unwise.This, however, is not what Holmes maintained. Holmes's reference to optimism is as an instrument. He saw optimism not as basis for foreign policy but as mental state we individually and collectively should not abandon as we tackle difficult issues. In his definition of optimism, Holmes argued that [a]n awareness of all difficulties is essential, but an attitude of confidence is indispensable.2 Holmes was, and is, correct. Optimism has long been an important tool for foreign policy for Canada and others, and an essential one at that.Holmes uttered this dictum in October 1983 during speech about United Nations, an organization that he believed at time had been jeopardized by actions of United States generally, and President Ronald Reagan specifically. And while Holmes had special ability to convince even most cynical to consider his ideas seriously, for those not yet persuaded that optimism is an instrument of foreign policy, United Nations is poor case study. …

Most states’ foreign policies are secular in orientation and focus. A few make religion a prominent component of their ideological approach to foreign policy. States whose foreign policies are consistently or irregularly informed by religion include Egypt, Iran, India, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. In each case, these states’ foreign policies feature domestic religious actors seeking to have regular or intermittent involvement in foreign policymaking. The impact and capacity of such religious actors is linked to the ideological and/or national interest priorities of incumbent governments. That is, religious actors may have an input into foreign policymaking, which reflects a concern more generally with the association between material concerns—including national security issues—and religious and ethical ideas, norms, and values. In addition to states with input from religious actors in foreign policymaking, there are several important nonstate actors whose religious beliefs centrally inform their foreign policies, which often focus on activities in the United Nations, the world’s largest and most comprehensive organization with near-universal state membership. The United Nations is a key focal point to pursue such policies, and three such actors are discussed: the Holy See/Vatican (and, more generally, the Roman Catholic Church), the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the World Council of Churches (WCC), whose religious orientations are, respectively, Roman Catholicism, Islam, and non-Catholic Christianity. The importance of religious actors in foreign policy, in relation to both selected states and nonstate actors, is explored.

This study aims to unveil the nexus between the governments of the Baltic states and think tanks (TTs), which work on foreign and security policy. The article argues that the Baltic governments wish to use TTs as instruments of foreign policies, as they are highly interested in influencing well-known TTs abroad to further their national interests. The Baltic states undertake a good deal of effort to contribute to debates in the capitals of the powerful nations through the TT channel, hoping that some form of support can be gained for their positions in the international arena. Meanwhile, the governments expect domestic TTs to be visible internationally and influence policy debates by sending Baltic-favourable messages to foreign policy communities. On the other side of the nexus, TTs adapt to government expectations while also trying to maintain some level of independence. The process of using TTs as instruments to further the aims of governments is based mainly on the perceptions of government officials themselves, who are convinced that TTs should serve policy goals. Governments dominate the nexus because TTs depend on governmental support and/or wish to be helpful in furthering governmental goals.

Explanations of Russia's foreign energy policy typically focus on major events, such as the gas conflicts with Ukraine, and argue that these events represent simplistic patterns of behavior, reflecting the policy-makers’ emphasis on politics, commercial gain, corruption, or ad hoc opportunism. This analysis goes beyond these explanations to argue that the Russian leadership pursues a rational set of political and economic goals in its foreign energy policy, but that it is constrained in its efforts by the set of tools available to it. To understand the resulting patterns of behavior, it is necessary to devote more analytical attention to Russia's foreign policy tools and their limits. The article draws on a new dataset of Russia's policy tools in 31 energy conflicts with 20 countries from 2000 to 2010. These conflicts are defining moments in Russia's foreign policy because they put to the test the toolkit that Russia has assembled to impose its will on a counterpart. The study finds increased use of transit pipelines, generally decreased use of subsidies and persistent use of efforts to purchase assets in foreign countries, cutoff pipeline supplies, and attempts to use energy to achieve specific political goals. By emphasizing the tools that Russian policy-makers use to conduct policies, the article provides a more nuanced analysis of the capacity and limits of Russian foreign energy policy than is currently available.

As it is widely recognized, countries employ various distinct strategies and instruments in order to accomplish their foreign policy objectives. That means there are several kinds of foreign policy (FP) instruments or tools. A typology of FP instruments should arguably include the following categories: (1) political, (2) economic, (3) cultural, and (4) military instruments. Political instruments (1) encompass the various sorts of diplomacy; the building of international coalitions or alliances; the creation of international organizations or the instrumentalization of existing ones; and the promotion of international regimes. The economic instruments (2) of foreign policy comprise foreign aid; economic and trade policies; and economic sanctions. There are at least three kinds of (3) cultural instruments: the establishment and promotion of a national identity; the search for improving the country reputation abroad through so-called “nation branding”; and knowledge and values promotion. The military instruments (4) of foreign policy are persuasion via military threat or pressure and the use of plain force, i.e. the making of war. After presenting the distinct drivers for international policy diffusion, the chapter contends that policy diffusion should be understood as a rather usual and important FP instrument. In order to demonstrate how frequently the promotion of policy diffusion (PD) has been used as a means to accomplish foreign policy objectives, the chapter discusses how PD may be associated with the several foreign policy instruments that were just presented. Afterwards we give examples from both Brazilian and Chinese experiences, past and present.

Kenya’s defence policy is an integral part of the country’s foreign policy since it gained its independence. Kenya’s foreign policy has become more assertive due to globalization, which has significantly impacted the country’s defense policy. Globalization processes have produced new transnational non-state security threats. Hence the defense policy has become more forceful to accommodate these new security threats thereby producing new defense and foreign policy actors that significandy influence foreign policy behavior. This chapter is divided into five sections. The first examines the theoretical relationship between foreign policy analysis, globalization, and the new security dilemma so as to provide a framework that helps describe, analyze, and explain defense and foreign policy behavior in Kenya. The second provides a general account of the country’s foreign policy from 1963 to 2013 and indicates the way in which foreign policy has been realigned and how existing and new foreign policy actors have emerged. The third section looks at the relationship between globalization, constitutionalism, and the country’s defense policy with the aim of demonstrating how this relationship has produced new defense policy actors. The fourth section examines Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia as a radical outcome of the decision-making processes of the country’s realigned defense and foreign policies, while the fifth looks at this military intervention and its implications for security within the context of the new security dilemma and subsequently defense and foreign policies.

Chinese companies have invested substantially in countries abroad in recent years, including countries in Africa. This article investigates the activities of Chinese energy companies in Africa, looking at the cases of Angola and Sudan. It develops a theoretical framework that can examine the role of non-state actors in foreign policy. The article presents evidence that non-state actors play a role for Chinese foreign policy and sometimes go against the policy line from Beijing. Theoretically, it illuminates the increasing role played by national oil companies (NOCs) in foreign policy and contributes with explicitation of the role played by NOCs for the foreign policy of the state. The article also contributes with insights regarding the importance of concerns with domestic stability (weiwen) to Chinese foreign policy and how this motive relates to the Chinese NOC activities in a number of countries.

How important is the President for US foreign policy? Studies in American politics—the Two Presidencies literature — assert that the president is much less constrained by Congress and other domestic forces in foreign policy than in domestic policy. Studies in international relations also often assume that the president is the most important actor in foreign policy and is relatively unconstrained by domestic politics. Additionally, studies in international relations often assume that each issue area in foreign policy can be studied in separation. We challenge each of these views. Using new data on roll call votes in Congress and on Presidential-Congressional budget interactions, we argue that 1. Foreign policy instruments should be analyzed jointly and comparatively because they are substitutable, 2. Some foreign policy instruments are more constrained by Congress and domestic forces and look more like domestic issue areas, 3. Other foreign policy instruments, because they can be linked more directly to national security, allow the President more discretion and influence over their use. Our research has two larger implications. Presidential bargaining with Congress over foreign policy matters since the Presidents tends to be more favorable on average to international engagement; rising congressional influence may circumscribe America’s role in the international system.

Five years ago observers might have doubted that national foreign policies would continue to be of importance: it seemed inevitable that collective European positions were becoming ever more common and effective. Now the pendulum has swung back with a vengeance. The divided European responses to the prospect of war with Iraq in 1990-91, and to the war in the Balkans have made what happens in the national capitals seem divisive. The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy is a timely survey of the interplay between the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy and the long-established national foreign policies of the Union's Member-States. The book contains a chapter on each country in the Union as well as a chapter on the United States in its role as the 'thirteenth seat at the table'. There is also a chapter on the European Commission, whose role in the external relations of the Community steadily grew during the 1980's. This book will be invaluable for students and scholars of the European Union and of international politics. It will also be of great interest to practitioners in all countries concerned with Europe's role in international affairs.

Today's Russia consistently stands for the national interest. Russia bases its foreign-policy activities on several priorities and strategic goals. These goals are to create favorable conditions for the country’s sustained development, to keep national security and to establish strong positions for Russia on the global stage. Today these areas of focus are implemented within a rapidly changing international environment that impacts all strata of Russian society. Therefore, it is essential not only to analyze the country’s strategic foreign policy goals at the doctrinal level and level of implemented foreign policy actions but also to study the attitudes of Russian citizens toward them, especially among young generation, who represent the future in in the present. The purpose of this paper is to conduct a sociological analysis of youth attitudes regarding the formulation and implementation of Russia’s basic foreign policy strategic goals and priorities in the context of ongoing international transformations. The paper makes analyzing official foreign policy documents of the Russian Federation and presents data from studies conducted between 2023 and 2025 among youth of Penza, Saratov and Tyumen. The analysis revealed that young generation unanimously recognize the primary necessity of ensuring Russia’s security and that of its citizens across various aspects of life. The need to protect the country’s territory youth is especially painful. According to the youth’s self-assessments, external threats, especially from NATO and other unfriendly nations, rank high on the list of national security risks. Although most of the youth believe that Russia should serve as an international guarantor of peace, they do not prioritize this goal above all else, instead favoring existential values. Survey data also reveal connections between certain foreign policy orientation among youth and specific demographic characteristics and individual social resources. The results provide a comprehensive overview of youth perspectives on Russia’s foreign policy goals and priorities, illustrate the level of support for the country’s international course, and inform youth policy and educational processes at higher education institutions.

The paper deals with the role of "soft power" in the foreign policy of modern Russia. Soft power is a concept developed by Joseph Nye. It divided the methods of foreign policy of countries into hard and soft. The first group of methods includes armed violence, military intervention, economic pressure, bribery. The second group of methods is attractiveness of economic growth and well-being of the population, creative power of the nation, attractive foreign policy strategy, culture, and science. Along with political, economic, military methods of influence, no less important are methods, related to education, science, mass information and culture. Considering the rich history of Russias cultural influence on Mongolia in the socialist period, cooperation in this area seems promising and significant for modern Russian-Mongolian relations. Among the positive grounds for the successful use of Russian education as an instrument of foreign policy influence towards Mongolia are the historical tradition of involving Mongolian citizens in the system of higher education of the Soviet Union, the Russian language that relatively widely spread in Mongolia, the presence of branches of several Russian universities of Moscow, Ulan-Ude, and Irkutsk in Mongolia. At the same time, there is a number of impediments related to successful use of education as an instrument of Russias foreign policy in Mongolia.

The paper begins by recalling academic debates on foreign policy and identity and the ways in which state identity is produced, reproduced and challenged. The boundary-producing role of foreign policy is fore grounded as is its contribution to identity creation. The paper then assesses the extent to which such an analysis can be applied to the European Union. Does the Union possess a ‘foreign policy’ in the sense that we understand states to have foreign policies? Does the Union’s international activity create boundaries and identities comparable to those created by states’ foreign policies? The paper goes on to argue that the EU’s identity as a foreign policy actor is at least in part a function of contested national narratives, that the Union suffers from a weakly instantiated sense of self and foreign policy identity and that its fragile democratic legitimation is a partial outcome of that weakness. Thus, if their goal is a strengthening of the capacity, credibility and effectiveness of a ‘common’ foreign, security and defence policy, European policy elites are well advised to focus less on process and procedure and more on the strengthening of discursive political spaces from which discernable European narratives might be drawn.

In this paper, we address the topic of policy actorness in Italian foreign policy to characterize the understudied role of the President of the Italian Republic (PoR). We apply quantitative narrative analysis (QNA) as the methodological tool of our study, answering two research questions to which the academic literature has so far produced limited responses: (a) whether the PoR can be considered a relevant actor in Italian foreign policy and (b) which factors can affect the Italian PoR’s relevance in foreign policy. Considering the Italian PoR’s Diary as the unit of analysis and source of data, we study the two crucial cases of Ciampi’s presidency (1999–2006) and Napolitano’s first presidency (2006–2013). QNA allows us to quantify and compare, while maintaining an actor-centred approach, the relations of the two PoRs with the most relevant actors in foreign policy. The results of our analyses highlight the relevance of the Italian PoR figure, identifying the main areas of influence of the Italian head of state and their changes over time. We conclude providing a few hypotheses to interpret the outcomes of our analyses on the PoR’s role in Italian foreign policy.