Forced to Fight: Coercion, Blocking Detachments, and Tradeoffs in Military Effectiveness

Abstract

Our theories of soldier motivation have largely overlooked the role that coercion plays in manufacturing and maintaining unit cohesion. Yet nearly 20% of all belligerents in wars since 1800 have deployed specialized units designed to monitor and sanction their own soldiers violently. Despite the widespread nature of these detachments, however, we have neither a systematic treatment of their tactical and operational effects nor of the tradeoffs associated with their battlefield use. This paper draws on new crossnational data and a case study of Soviet practices at Stalingrad and Kursk to explore four tradeoffs stemming from the use of blocking detachments. In brief, these detachments can bolster a military's staying power, but at the cost of sharply increasing casualties and worsening loss-exchange ratios. In keeping with the volume's intent, the paper concludes with a broader discussion of these tradeoffs at the war-fighting and political levels before proposing additional avenues of research on coercion and soldier motivation.