Flexible management of fishing rights and a sustainable fisheries industry in Europe

Abstract

Abstract Although overexploitation of commercial fish stocks in European waters has been in the public debate now for more than 20 years, the European Union has so far failed to implement sustainable fisheries management. Millions in subsidies paid to the fishing industry have led to significant excess capacity in the fishing fleet. Various feeble attempts to stop overexploitation of marine resources have failed. The cause is that fishing policy is highly dominated by short-term socioeconomic interests. There is an urgent need for a new fisheries management system in Europe that supports reductions in the fishing fleet, increases responsibility among fishers and guarantees long-term conservation of natural marine resources. Transferable rights to fish have proved a reliable and effective means of creating incentives to conserve marine resources. By strengthening individual fishing rights under flexible quota management systems, the EU Member States could, within the Common Fisheries Policy, make a significant contribution to conserving fish stocks, to reducing excess capacity and to raising the profitability of the fisheries industry. A closer look at existing reservations against a flexible management system shows most of the objections to be overstated or capable of resolution.