Flathman's Pluralism

Abstract

Can there be a general defense of pluralism? Richard Flathman's Pluralism and Liberal Democracy is certainly a book that aims to provide such a defense. The merits of the book are many; Flathman's interpretations of some leading thinkers of pluralism from William James onward into the twentieth century are subtly and richly developed, and comparisons among the thinkers often illuminate each one. Nevertheless, I think that there is a conceptual difficulty inherent in any attempt to praise plural ism as such. The reason is that pluralism itself is plural: it exists in several kinds, and some kinds seem to be in tension with other kinds or even incompatible with them. Indeed, it may be the case that each kind is incompatible with all the others. I will work with the initial assumption of incompatibility. (It is not necessary to my case to specify every kind of pluralism; only to show that the kinds I specify demonstrate incompatibility or come close to doing so; my hope is that I single out some important kinds.) If I am correct in thinking that there are incompatibilities, at least at first sight, then the project of producing a general defense of pluralism might have to be re-thought. If each kind of pluralism appears to exclude the other s, then it would have to be promoted at the expense of the other kinds; there would have to be a ranking and then a choice in the abstract.