Flathman's Oakeshott and Oakeshott's Pluralism

Abstract

Throughout his career Richard Flathman has returned again and again to Michael Oakeshott's theories of authority, individuality, and self-enactment?and with great profit to those of us who have followed his writings on these and related themes. So it comes as no surprise that Pluralism and Liberal Democracy's chapter on Oakeshott is one of the most illuminating and synoptic interpretations of Oakeshott's pluralism to appear in print. In what follows I will confine my remarks as much as possible to this chapter of the book. I want to underscore three main points: first, the importance of Flathman's philosophical understanding of the nature and origins of pluralism; second, what I take to be the strengths and weaknesses of his account of how individuals negotiate pluralism; and finally, the originality and importance of Flathman's emphasis on dispositional as opposed to institutional methods for dealing with pluralism. Because Flathman proceeds by way of a presentation of the writings of Oakeshott, my praise (and criticism) of the two are necessarily intertwined. Where I see a divergence in their ideas I will try my best to emphasize relevant differences.