Abstract
In this paper, we consider a class of infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. We look at strongly symmetric perfect public equilibria with memory K: equilibria in which strategies are restricted to depend only on the last K observations of public signals. Define Γ K to be the set of payoffs of equilibria with memory K. We show that for some parameter settings, Γ K = Γ ∞ for sufficiently large K. However, for other parameter settings, we show that not only is lim K → ∞ Γ K ≠ Γ ∞ , but that Γ k is a singleton. Moreover, this last result is essentially independent of the discount factor.
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