Abstract
3. Adams on Counterfactual Accounts of Weil-Being. 3.0. Well-being as a Challenge to Naturalism. In Chapter Three Adams dis cusses and criticizes those accounts of a person's well being which character ize it in terms of counterfactuals regarding (idealizations of) her actual desires and preferences. These criticisms are important for the question of ethical naturalism because any plausible naturalist position will have to portray a person's well-being as somehow or other supervening on features of her psy chology and her environment. The sorts of analyses Adams criticizes are the most prominent analyses consistent with this constraint, so it is important to see whether or not Adams' criticisms of them undermine the prospects for ethical naturalism generally. As it happens, I agree that analyses of the sort Adams criticizes don't work, so this is another case in which I believe that he has raised crucial questions for the ethical naturalist. I do not have a fully worked out alterna tive naturalist account of well-being. Instead, I'll sketch the direction in which I believe such an account should be developed. I'll begin with a distinction which will prove important.
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