Financial markets and the ethics of legal practice

Purpose: This study investigated the relationship between social, economic, ethical, and legal corporate social responsibility practices and customer retention among Airtel Uganda Limited mobile subscribers. Methodology: A descriptive research design was used following a quantitative approach. Data was collected from 336 randomly selected Airtel mobile subscribers from Wakiso district using a self-administered questionnaire. The data was analysed with the help of SPSSv24. The Cronbach’s alpha statistic was tested to establish the reliability of the study instrument and a value above 0.70-threshold was obtained on all constructs. Ethical principles were observed during the process of data collection and reporting. Findings: The study findings revealed the existence of a moderate positive significant relationship between social, economic, ethical, and legal practices and customer retention (r = .513; r = .553; r = .558; r = .573; p<.01) respectively. Collectively, the predictor variables explain 42.9% of the variation in customer retention at Airtel Uganda. Conclusion: It is concluded that corporate social responsibility practices are instrumental to customer retention at Airtel Uganda. Recommendations: It is recommended that Airtel Uganda strengthen its corporate social responsibility activities and ethical practices. There is also a need to strengthen the customer relationship management desk and the business development section to ensure continuous provision of value for money. Contribution: This study contributes to the understanding of how corporate social responsibilities that are an expense to a profit-oriented enterprise can be translated to generate more profits for the enterprise in the form of customer retention, especially in the telecommunications sector.

Background The nursing profession requires ethical and legal regulations to guide nurses’ performance. Ethical climate plays a part in shaping nurses’ ethical practice. Therefore, ethico-legal aspects and ethical climate contribute to improving nurses’ ethical practice and competencies with reducing medical errors in hospital settings. Objective This study examined the effect of ethico-legal aspects and ethical climate on managing safe patient care and medical errors among nurses. Materials and methods A cross-sectional correlational study was carried out on 548 nurses. Data were collected through self-administered questionnaires about nurses’ knowledge in both ethical and legal aspects, ethical practice, competencies, ethical climate and experience with medical error. Results The main sources of nurses’ knowledge of ethical and legal aspects were undergraduate lectures, job experience and colleagues. Nurses’ knowledge in both ethical and legal aspects, nurses’ ethical practice and competencies were insufficient. Nurses fairly perceived their ethical climate. Also, nurses experienced medical errors about 22.6% in their units. Nurses’ knowledge of ethical and legal aspects, as well as the ethical climate were positive predictors of inadequate nurses’ ethical practice and competencies. Additionally, nurses’ knowledge in both ethical and legal aspects, ethical climate and practice had a negative influence on the occurrence of medical errors. Conclusion Enhancing nurses’ knowledge in both ethical and legal aspects as well as ethical climate could significantly influence improving nurses’ ethical practice, competencies and reducing medical errors in the study units. Therefore, planning for enhancing the nurses’ ethico-legal learning and ethical climate seems to be mandatory.

Legal ethics is often described as an oxymoron or contradiction in terms - lay people find the concept amusing and lawyers can find ethics impossible. The best lawyers are those who have come to grips with their own values and actively seek to improve their ethical practise. This book is designed to help law students and new lawyers understand and modify their own ethical priorities, not just because this knowledge makes it easier to practise law and earn an income, but because self-aware, ethical legal practice is right and feels better than anything else. Packed with case studies of ethical scandals and dilemmas from real life legal practice in Australia, each chapter delves into the most difficult issues lawyers face. From lawyers' part in corporate fraud to the ethics of time-based billing, Parker and Evans expose the values that underlie current practice and set out the alternatives ethical lawyers might follow.

Introduction: Rehabilitation professionals are experts who work for various rehabilitation services, including Audiologists and Speech-Language Pathologists (ASLPs). In professional practice, understanding the interplay between ethics and laws is crucial for ensuring high standards of conduct and accountability. Recently, studies have started focussing on awareness of various ethical and legal practices in several professions. Despite its importance, there is a lack of studies focusing on various legal and ethical aspects of Audiology and Speech–language Pathology. Aims: The present study aimed to evaluate the effect of a medicolegal and ethical awareness program on awareness among ASLPs. Settings and Design: A quasi-experimental pre-test and post-test research design. Methods: A total of 41 ASLPs participated in the study. The participants completed the questionnaire before and after the “Legal Legislations in Audiology and Speech-language Pathology” program. The program highlighted medico-legal aspects, ethical practices, and case discussions. The participants’ responses were statistically analyzed. Statistical Analysis Used: Descriptive and Inferential statistics were done using SPSS software version 26. Results: The preawareness scores showed that most scored less, indicating poor awareness among ASLPs. However, the comparison between pre and post-test results showed significant differences in overall scores ( z = 861, P < 0.001). The descriptive analysis showed increased awareness of different Acts’ terminologies and rationales. Conclusions: The present study highlighted the awareness of various essential concepts in Audiology and Speech–language Pathology to improve the clinical and research practices among ASLPs. Future studies should focus on many practising professionals and students to improve the best practices.

The teaching of ethical and legal psychological practice represents a core task of clinical supervision and is covered in this chapter. Supervision presents its own unique ethical challenges as supervisors must balance supervisee development, client welfare, and risk management. Ethical and legal considerations in complex cases that occur in the school setting can present significant decision-making challenges but are excellent opportunities for supervisees to learn ethical practice. Ethics codes of professional organizations and risk management strategies are discussed and must be applied within a systematic decision-making model that considers the rights, responsibilities, and welfare of all affected parties including the supervisee and supervisor. This chapter presents an 8-step ethical decision-making model to apply to diverse case examples delineating supervisory issues and strategies. While ethical principles, legal requirements, and personal beliefs are related, at times they may be in conflict or difficult to reconcile presenting unique challenges discussed in supervision. Ethical practice places the welfare of clients at the core of psychological service delivery.

The aim of this paper is twofold: first, it seeks to provide a better understanding of lawyers’ ethics in practice in the field of publicly funded asylum law. It does so by examining Dutch asylum legal aid lawyers’ moral reasoning in respect of the ethically challenging issue of ‘the hopeless case’, employing a version of Christine Parker’s four approaches to moral reasoning in legal practice: adversarial advocacy, responsible lawyering, moral activism and relational lawyering. Second, it aims to demonstrate the applicability of Parker’s taxonomy, developed in a common law country (Australia), to a civil law country (The Netherlands). This paper shows, in line with what Parker argued, that lawyers may apply a combination of approaches – different ethical considerations carry different in weight in different circumstances. It provides illustrations of situations in which approaches coexist and compete and the circumstances in which one prevails over the other in the area under review.

Voice biomarker research is fueling a growing health-tech market, largely driven by start-ups. Yet, there is limited scholarship on how start-ups navigate the legal uncertainty surrounding voice data protection and the rising expectations for responsible AI. This study reviews the ethical, legal and regulatory practices as stated on the websites of 27 start-ups using voice as a biomarker in health-tech. The review reveals substantial disparities in the availability, readability and content of the information disclosed, especially regarding privacy policies, with only a few websites offering product-specific, transparent, and comprehensive privacy policies. Significant differences also emerged in the start-ups' terms of use and regulatory compliance statements, likely reflecting the novelty of the field, disparity in legal and regulatory requirements, and the absence of sector-specific ethical guidance. For example, while most start-ups reference compliance with data protection frameworks (e.g., HIPAA, GDPR), many fall short of best practices for transparency, accountability, and user-centered communication. We argue that the success of start-ups in health-tech depends on their capacity to capture and retain the attention of potential end-users and investors. By adopting accessible, transparent and forward-looking communication on how they frame their legal and ethical responsibilities in practice, start-ups can not only ensure legal and regulatory compliance but build trust and support sustainable innovation. This work identifies key best practices for voice AI start-ups to consider and lays the foundation for future research, including surveys and longitudinal tracking, to better understand the evolving landscape of ethical and legal practices in voice biomarker and voice AI health-tech.

I take it as a fact that most, if not all human societies would collapse without moral and legal practices in which people are held responsible for at least some of their actions. Are we committed by this fact to endorse specific ontological views? In this contribution I will address only part of this question. I will be concerned with whether moral and legal practices of holding people responsible presuppose a specific ontology of personal identity. Obviously, the idea that persons are responsible presupposes that our ontology contains persons. But do we need to be more specific as to what exactly it is that sustains the continued existence of persons over time in order to account for our moral and legal practices? My answer to this question will be negative. I will reach this conclusion by including in my discussion a feature of moral and legal practices that is regularly neglected in this context. The connection between (theories of) personal identity and these practices is usually scrutinised merely by focusing on the simple fact that we hold people responsible at one point in time for actions they performed at an earlier point in time. Apart from this, I will also focus on the fact that the consequences attached to responsibility tend to be influenced, in our practices, by the degree to which a person has changed in (relevant) psychological respects since the performing of the action for which she is held responsible.

Scott Hershovitz argues that law is a moral practice. In this response, I argue that he is right that we do well to turn our attention to moral questions. However, I argue that Hershovitz should embrace a more thoroughgoing eliminativism, according to which we don't say that law is a moral practice, but rather say nothing at all about law and address the moral questions directly. Hershovitz says that the rule of law requires us to see legal practices as sources of morality. But that requires settling what a ‘legal practice’ is, reproducing questions that more comprehensive eliminativism enables us to avoid. I argue that the rule of law cannot require seeing legal practices as sources of constraint in advance. Instead, we must always determine what is morally required in light of our practices in an all-things-considered assessment. Hershovitz further argues that lawyers are moral experts; I respond that none of us can claim moral expertise, but all of us have the moral responsibility to make our best assessment of what is morally required of us in a given situation, and we cannot rely on ideas of the law or the rule of law to settle that difficult question.

Promoting legality and productivity is a central issue in modern economies. In this paper, we investigate the implications of a public policy that aims at achieving these goals through the adoption of the so-called legality rating (LR). The latter reduces corporate risk uncertainty by abating asymmetric information between companies that use good legal, fiscal and ethical practices and the credit system. We match companies whose legal and ethical practices have been certified by the Italian government—through the assignment of the LR—with a sample of unrated firms, and apply recent advances in nonparametric frontier analysis to assess the economic performance. We highlight a positive relationship between legality rating and firms’ production efficiency. Our findings also show that legality rating policy is an effective tool to enhance inter-regional technological catching-up of businesses.

(2001). Informed consent: requirements for legal and ethical practice. Physiotherapy Theory and Practice: Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 97-105.

I Introduction Lawyers and legal philosophers have both recognized that our prevailing concepts of criminal responsibility and punishment depend upon a particular notion of personal identity, namely our possession of conscious minds to which are ascribed the qualities of unity, continuity through time, and the clear separation of each person from all others and the rest of the world. With the rebirth of interest in the philosophy of mind in the last twenty years, the nature of personal identity has again become philosophically important. The issue has gained philosophical notoriety with the publication in 1984 of Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons. (1) Parfit's book contains a long and detailed argument that seeks to refute the common view of personal identity, namely, that an individual's identity is a special further fact additional to the sequence of that person's mental states. Although not the first, Parfit's work is one of the most sustained efforts to advocate a reductive theory of mind. Much of our moral practice, and most laws in most major legal systems, treat the individual as the fundamental unit of moral or legal responsibility. Indeed, moral or legal practice that appeals to notions of collective guilt or the punishment of communities is generally to be criticized. Further, individual responsibility is not usually thought to fade or shift with the passage of time. If, however, there are credible arguments for a reductive account of personal identity, then some of the central presumptions of individual responsibility that underpin our moral practice and the criminal law begin to unravel. This paper investigates some of the problems that this recent work creates for criminal law, particularly those concerned with an agent's continuing responsibility through time for criminal acts and specifically, with the role of memory in our assignment of such responsibility. A central argument of this paper is that, at the instant a person commits an immoral or criminal act, neither moral nor criminal responsibility should be assumed for all time. Liability to punishment depends upon the responsibility of the individual for that punishment continuing to be generated afresh throughout the period from commission of the offense to the completion of any sentence. The problem of explaining how moral or criminal responsibility continues through time has been a central focus of the debate regarding the nature of personal identity. Many of those who advocate a reductive theory of mind accept that, with the diminishing psychological connectedness of an offender's later selves from his earlier selves, moral responsibility may diminish. Thus many reductionists consider it true that someone does not deserve to be punished as severely for a crime he committed a long time ago as he does for a recently committed crime. For most mental reductionists, it is the overall qualitative change in a person's character, personality, and memories, that diminishes the extent of the person's responsibility for past acts. Non-reductionists would usually accept that acute mental illness seriously diminishes or terminates liability for punishment. Other than the absence of acute mental illness neither reductionists or non-reductionists have argued that any specific mental state is an essential condition for an offender continuing to be liable to punishment other than an offender's knowing why he is being punished. Contrary to the position adopted by most mental reductionists, I will argue that memories of doing a wrongful act, and of one's self and one's life at the time of doing of the act, are pre-conditions for being held responsible for that wrong, and hence liable for punishment. I argue that loss of memory of these matters relieves a person of moral responsibility for an act, even if he continues to share strong connections with the prior self who committed the wrong. Thus, an offender whose character, personality, and moral beliefs have remained substantially unchanged, and who still has substantial memories of most parts of his prior life, ought not to be liable for punishment if he has suffered a loss of memory with respect to the period of his life during which he committed a particular offense. …

(2007). The Moral of the Story: Toward an Understanding of Ethics in Organisations and Legal Practice. Legal Ethics: Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 5-25.

This study examines the role of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on employee engagement and job satisfaction. Using 322 responses from employees of selected companies in Ghana, and employing hierarchical regression analysis, the study examines the direct impact of economic, legal, ethical and discretionary CSR practices on employee satisfaction and engagement in organisations. The study further explores the moderating role of employee age on the relationship between CSR and employee engagement and satisfaction. The results provide evidence that economic, legal, ethical and discretionary CSR practices influence higher employee engagement and satisfaction levels at work. However, the study finds no evidence of employee age moderating the association between each of the four CSR dimensions and employee job attitudes (engagement and satisfaction). These findings are insightful and provide a response to calls for research on these issues. The study contributes to the literature by demonstrating that ethical CSR practices strongly influence employees' satisfaction and engagement levels; legal and discretionary CSR activities also have an influence, though to a lesser extent; and the economic dimension of CSR activities has the least impact. The managerial, practical and further research implications of these findings are discussed.

Research Article| May 01 2018 Islamic Law, Truth, Ethics: Fatwa and Jurisprudence of the Revolution Youssef Belal Youssef Belal Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East (2018) 38 (1): 107–121. https://doi.org/10.1215/1089201x-4390015 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter Email Permissions Search Site Citation Youssef Belal; Islamic Law, Truth, Ethics: Fatwa and Jurisprudence of the Revolution. Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 1 May 2018; 38 (1): 107–121. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/1089201x-4390015 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter Books & JournalsAll JournalsComparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East Search Advanced Search This article is devoted to the study of questions of knowledge, law, and ethics in Islamic context. Starting with a discussion of assumptions about Islamic ethical practices in recent anthropological and historical works on the fatwa, it explores procedures of truth seeking and modes of reasoning in legal opinions authored by Islamic scholars, notably Yusuf al-Qaradawi, at the time of the Egyptian Revolution (2011). This text analyzes also the relationship between interiority and exteriority in ethical practices enabled by these legal options and exemplified by the assessment of the ruler’s faith. It studies the extent to which the very revolutionary gesture informs Islamic scholars’ own legal and ethical practice and enlightens anew the relationship between the inner and the outer as well as between the self and others. Finally, it explores the articulation between Islamic law and revolution in the Egyptian context and the ways in which the former’s authoritativeness and ethical performativity is reenacted, in contradistinction to Western liberal revolutions instituting a new legal order declaring its rupture with the past law and indifferent to the individual’s morality. Islamic law, fatwa, ethics, revolution, Egypt The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Copyright © 2018 Duke University Press2018 You do not currently have access to this content.