Abstract
Recent events have conspired to prompt a broad reassessment of feminist theory's impact on law. A flurry of conferences on feminist jurisprudence have given activists an occasion to engage in self-scrutiny. Courses springing up at law schools nationwide have offered participants the chance to measure what has been won against the challenges that remain. Two recent books by Catharine MacKinnon have invited readers to consider the changes that moved her from the margins of a politically stymied group to the forefront of an intellectually vibrant movement. Much of this retrospection has scrutinized feminism's impact on substantive laws in areas such as the workplace or the family. Only recently have scholars and activists begun to ask about feminism's impact on legal method: the ways in which legal inquiry is framed and legal arguments are made; the claims to know on which both are based.' In most of this work,
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