Federalism and Economic Asymmetries

Abstract

Finding a balance between unity and diversity has been a constant concern in constitutional law, an issue that has often been addressed through federalism and sub-state nationalism. Yet, the list of characteristics that fit into the sub-state national mold (in the sense of linguistic, religious or, more generally, ethnic) does not exhaust the reasons why areas feel distinct: some reasons may in fact have a socio-economic or political nature. Therefore, regions characterized by some form of socio-economic asymmetry may also mobilize and seek forms of accommodation of their specificity. The aim of the paper is to offer a theorization of socio-economic regions and identify how constitutions can balance their unifying role while fostering socio-economic diversity. In particular, the following questions will be explored: how can we define socio-economic regions? Are socio-economic issues real or imagined? Is there some (legal or moral) obligation to acknowledge their interests? In the affirmative, what types of constitutional answers can be given? In this regard, some of the tools that will be explored include subsidiarity and asymmetrical solutions, always keeping in mind the need to reconcile federal-based arrangements with solidarity among the various territories of the state. While scholarship in the social sciences has intuited the reality of socio-economic societies, it has labeled them as an example of “economic regionalism” without much theorizing it; the study of socio-economic societies thus brings an original and important contribution to public law scholarship.