Feasibility analysis of water resources market transaction of water diversion project based on evolutionary game

Abstract

Abstract Water diversion projects realize the change of water rights ownership by diverting water resources, but most of the water diversion projects are dominated by the government in the operation stage, which can't realize complete market-oriented transaction of resources. In this study, the water source area, project management department and users involved in water resources trading of a water diversion project are regarded as stakeholders, and an evolutionary game model is established to analyze the feasibility and restrictive conditions of the free trading of water resources in the water diversion project. The research results show that the three parties can realize the balance and stability of interests (the water source area supplies good water, the project management department supplies sufficient water, users take water according to the supply), which means that the water market transactions are feasible. Meanwhile, it also gives clear restrictions on the water price of the three parties transaction: the project management department water price for purchase is less than on the premise of lower than + , the sale water price is not higher than . The free trading of water resources in the water diversion project under the market mechanism is of great significance for clarifying the water rights and reducing the financial pressure of the government.