Fairness is what you can get away with: Proposer and responder behaviour in a Collective Action Ultimatum Game

THE research reported in this paper arose from a previous experimental study conducted by the authors.' That study involved bargains struck between two subjects who had opposing payoff functions and full information of one another's payoffs. By a flip of a coin one participant could choose a noncooperative outcome, unilaterally: the winner of the coin toss could simply choose an outcome which gave him $12 and left the other subject nothing, whether or not the loser agreed. However, if the two subjects cooperated, they could obtain from the experimenter $14, which could be split between the subjects in any mutually agreed-on manner. Cooperative game theory predicts that the subjects will cooperate and divide the rewards $13 to $1 (the Nash bargaining solution: an even division of the $2 gain from trade). Under no circumstances should the winner of the coin flip settle for less than $12, according to game

The term procedural frames is introduced and defined as different representations of structurally equivalent allocation processes. Study 1 compared 2 well-known games, sequential social dilemmas and ultimatum bargaining, that share the same structure: Player 1 creates an allocation of a resource and Player 2 decides whether to allow it or deny it. Study 1 found that Player 1 made more favorable allocations and Player 2 accepted more unfavorable allocations in a social dilemma frame than in an equivalent ultimatum bargaining frame. Study 2 revealed the critical deterininant was whether Player 2 had to respond to an allocation by accepting or rejecting it (as in the ultimatum game) or by making a claim (as in the social dilemma). Two additional studies explored how these actions are perceived. The inconsistency of behavior across procedural frames raises methodological concerns but illuminates construal processes that guide allocation. Two of the most-studied paradigms in mixed-motive research have been social dilemmas and ultimatum bargaining games (Komorita & Parks, 1995). These allocation procedures differ substantially in how the actions of participants are described. In ultimatum bargaining games, players propose a division of a common resource and accept or reject the proposal; in social dilemmas, players make a claim from a common resource. However, versions of these games have been developed that are structurally equivalent but that appear to induce different rates of cooperation. Players appear to be more generous in sequential social dilemmas than in ultimatum bargaining games. The following research tests the existence of the social dilemma-ultimatu m bargaining framing effect. The findings offer insight into a specific bias in bargaining, which we call the claiming effect, as well as the more general role that the subjective interpretation of action plays in allocation decisions.

This comment is part of a symposium on Ekkehart Schlicht, On Custom in the Economy (1998)

Recent work on collective action appeals to a range of philosophical constructs to explain the difference between collective and individual actions—from joint or shared intentions, we-intentions, and participatory intentions, to collective beliefs and desires, mutual obligations, and so on. I believe this is a mistake. In this paper, I defend a deflationary account of collective action, which holds that the difference between individual and collective actions can be explained purely in terms of the behaviour of the participants. This account faces the challenge of explaining how collective action can be intentional if it is to be reduced to the behaviour of individuals: intentionality is usually held to distinguish actions from accidents (and thus, one would expect, collective actions from accidents), but according to some philosophers, individuals cannot intend to do collective actions. To respond to this concern, I show that individual agency can extend beyond the individual to encompass the actions of others.

We examine the 1914-1918 creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as a form of the ultimatum game. The negotiations among the Serbian Cabinet and the yugoslav Committee representatives of the Habsburg Souths Slavs from 1914-1918 exemplify three versions of this game. The first version is a typical (rational choice) type of the ultimatum game in which the receiver is satisfied with any offer by the Proposer. The second version is an instance of behavioral game theory. When the Proposer gives an unfair offer, it provokes an emotional reaction in the receiver who will reject it at the cost of harming themselves. We observe this behavior in the emotional behavior of frano Supilo, a Croat and one of the leaders of the yugoslav Committee. The third version of the behavioral ultimatum game can be observed in the behavior of Serbian Prime minister nikola Pašić who opposed any concessions to the yugoslav Committee, thus giving an ultimatum to the Croat side to accept the Serbian offer or remain with nothing, which was harmful to the Serbian side, too. This example is important because it produces two conclusions. first, historical games are often a mixture of several versions. Second, Proposers, too, can have an emotional reaction and give an offer that can hurt themselves. This aspect of the ultimatum game is less mentioned because it is difficult to simulate in experiments.

Social decision-making is commonly explored in the context of adult responder behavior in the ultimatum game. Responder behavior in the game has been proposed to be the consequence of two competing systems that control behavior: an affective system, which promotes an emotional response to unfair offers, and a deliberative system, which instead encourages a rational response to maximize in-game gains. In a secondary analysis of ultimatum game data in children and adolescents (N = 429), the present study demonstrated that trial-level metrics of responder behavior were reflective of a dual systems framework. However, no consistent relationship was found between responder behavior and trait-level measures of emotion regulation. Choice history was found to influence all measures of responder behavior in the game. These results support a dual systems account of social decision-making in children and adolescents and highlight choice repetition bias as an additional factor influencing decision-making within the ultimatum game. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

8 - Environmental protection through societal change: What psychology knows about collective climate action—and what it needs to find out

It is well-known that acting in an individually rational manner, according to the principles of classical game theory, may lead to sub-optimal solutions in a class of problems named social dilemmas. In contrast, humans generally do not have much difficulty with social dilemmas, as they are able to balance personal benefit and group benefit. As agents in multi-agent systems are regularly confronted with social dilemmas, for instance in tasks such as resource allocation, these agents may benefit from the inclusion of mechanisms thought to facilitate human fairness. Although many of such mechanisms have already been implemented in a multi-agent systems context, their application is usually limited to rather abstract social dilemmas with a discrete set of available strategies (usually two). Given that many real-world examples of social dilemmas are actually continuous in nature, we extend this previous work to more general dilemmas, in which agents operate in a continuous strategy space. The social dilemma under study here is the well-known Ultimatum Game, in which an optimal solution is achieved if agents agree on a common strategy. We investigate whether a scale-free interaction network facilitates agents to reach agreement, especially in the presence of fixed-strategy agents that represent a desired (e.g. human) outcome. Moreover, we study the influence of rewiring in the interaction network. The agents are equipped with continuous-action learning automata and play a large number of random pairwise games in order to establish a common strategy. From our experiments, we may conclude that results obtained in discrete-strategy games can be generalized to continuous-strategy games to a certain extent: a scale-free interaction network structure allows agents to achieve agreement on a common strategy, and rewiring in the interaction network greatly enhances the agents' ability to reach agreement. However, it also becomes clear that some alternative mechanisms, such as reputation and volunteering, have many subtleties involved and do not have convincing beneficial effects in the continuous case.

IntroductionSocial capital in the form of generalised trust and reciprocation is typically seen to be positively correlated with economic growth (Growiec and Growiec, 2014). Poland is often regarded as the most successful of the post-Soviet bloc countries in its transformation from a planned economy to a market economy. However, the level of generalised trust in Poland has been reported to be low, even compared to other post-communist countries (Growiec, 2011). This article is one in a series based on a project designed to elucidate how individuals' social capital relates to their behaviour in social and economic interactions1.This study was carried out at state universities, one in each of the sixteen Polish regions, whose main aim is to study the level of generalised trust and reciprocation among Polish students using experimental game theory alongside a questionnaire.The first article (Markowska-Przybyia and Ramsey, 2014) presented the games that the students played: the Ultimatum Game (Guth et al., 1982), the Trust Game (Berg et al., 1995) and the Public Goods Game (Isaac and Walker, 1988) and how these games were played in our experimental setting. The second article (Markowska-Przybyia and Ramsey, 2015) presented the results of the questionnaire. This article considers results from the Ultimatum Game and the Public Goods Game.Although many large scale studies using experimental game theory have been carried out in various countries, this is the first such study to be carried out in Poland (see G%siorowska et al., 2012 and G%siorowska and Helka, 2012 for descriptions of smaller scale studies in Poland).This paper investigates the relation of the behaviour observed in the Ultimatum Game and Public Goods Game with the answers to two questions related to the type of strategy that students regarded as being the most likely to result in success (henceforth referred to as the strategy questions). The article also gives a description (sociological and statistical) of the differences between students according to the answers given to these two questions. These questions look at two dimensions which are elements of any strategy aimed at economic success and how likely a student is to follow the type of strategy which is seen to most often bring success. One of these dimensions is referred to as the social dimension with cooperation at one end of this spectrum and individualism at the other end. The other dimension is the legal dimension with adherence to the law on one end of this spectrum and behaviour on the boundary of the law at the other end. Although the majority of students are proponents of cooperative behaviour, our results indicate that those who are proponents of individualistic behaviour do not feel any discord between their own views and the views of society as a whole. On the other hand, those who see behaviour on the boundary of the law as being the most likely to bring success very often feel discord, regardless of whether they see cooperative or individualistic behaviour as being the most likely to bring success. Those who stated that individualistic behaviour on the edge of the law was most likely to bring success statistically showed the most characteristic behaviour in these two games. They exhibited a low level of cooperative behaviour in both of the games considered. Those who stated individualistic behaviour in adherence with the law showed a low level of cooperation in the Public Goods Game (where there is no possibility of negative reciprocation), whereas they showed a high level of cooperative behaviour in the Ultimatum Game (where negative reciprocation is possible). This indicates that this group of individuals will act individualistically when possible, but in clear social interactions they accept and act upon informal norms. The relation between the answers to these two questions and students' social capital is also addressed.Section 1 describes the questionnaire and how the experiment was conducted. …

Creating the Conditions for Intergenerational Justice: Social Capital and Compliance

Purpose- The main subject of behavioral finance, which emerged with the deterioration of the rationality assumption of traditional finance theories, the fact that people are not creatures who will do everything to maximize their own benefits and think of nothing but utilitarianism, and that win-win playing can have a positive effect on the total return, is investor behavior. Because it will not be possible to understand the market without understanding the investor. For this reason, it is extremely important for researchers to know the behavior patterns of the investor and, more importantly, to identify the reasons for these behaviors. This study has been prepared in order to guide and assist researchers who are doing or considering doing research in this field. Methodology- Literature review was conducted in the study. Scientifically defined dictator game, ultimatum game and trust game are explained in detail. Findings- Literature examples of games that are easy to implement in experimental designs used in the evaluation of the causes and consequences of financial decisions are considered as findings. Conclusion- The aim of the study is to explain various behavioral games that are relatively easy and highly applicable to scientists who study investor behavior in the research area of behavioral finance. Behavioral games that started with game theory continued with dictator, ultimatum and trust games. Current studies show that the number and quality of these games still continues. Since the examination of investor behavior is extremely important due to its ability to reduce individual losses and to minimize market anomalies, this study is expected to guide future studies. Keywords: Behavioral finance, dictator game, ultimatum game, trust game, investor behavior JEL Codes: D90, G40, H30

We consider a spatial generalization of evolutionary game theory in which strategies are distributed over a spatial array of sites. We assume that the strategy corresponding to a given site has local interactions with the strategies sitting on neighbouring sites, and that the strategies change if neighbouring strategies are doing better. After briefly setting the stage with a formal definition of spatial evolutionary game theory, we consider the spatial extension of the Hawk-Dove game, and we show that the results are qualitatively different from those obtained from classical evolutionary game theory. For example, the proportion of Hawks in the population is in general lower in the spatial game than in the classical one. We also consider spatial generalizations of the extensions of the Hawk-Dove game obtained by including strategies such as Retaliator and Bully. Here, too, the results from the spatial game are very different from the classical results. In particular, with space Retaliator is a much more successful strategy than one would expect from classical considerations. This suggests that, in general, spatial structure may facilitate the evolution of strategies such as Retaliator, which do not necessarily prosper classically, and which are reminiscent of the \`nice', \`provokable' and `forgiving' strategies which seem to play a central role in the evolution of cooperation. The results indicate that including spatial structure in evolutionary game theory is a fruitful extension.

The Ultimatum Game is an effective tool for understanding how social decision-making is influenced by emotions in both research and clinical settings. Previous findings have shown that the Ultimatum Game can evoke negative emotions, especially anger and aggression. In a sample of non-clinical adults (N = 143) we evaluated the sensitivity of an anger-infused version of the Ultimatum Game to individual differences in anger and irritability. Findings showed significant relationships between anger and aggressive behaviors in the Ultimatum game, but no association between irritability and aggressive behavior were observed. This indicates that the anger-infused Ultimatum Game is a promising method for studying individual differences in trait anger and anger expression. However, the relationship between decision-making in the anger-infused Ultimatum Game and irritability is less straight forward and needs further investigation. Therefore, when studying the behavioral responses of irritability, it would be beneficial to capture other behaviors beyond aggressive responses.

Much research on collective environmental action has been conducted within the broader context of the study of new social movements. The environment as a universal object of political participation is taken for granted, as is its transnational aspect. However, collective actors organize a wide range of activities in different institutional settings, with different goals and different addressees, not only governments but also consumers and producers. There is not much reason to assume there is a fixed distinction between collective and individual behaviour on environmental issues and that there are uniform processes of becoming involved in collective action. Using data from Eurobarometer 37A (1992) for Belgium, Great Britain, the Netherlands and West Germany, the simple notion of collective environmental action is empirically criticized by showing: (a) dissimilar positions of collective involvement in environmental issues in national polities; (b) distinct national patterns of individual activitie...

Past research has linked honor to a higher tendency for retaliation. A common method is to compare groups that are either low or high in honor. While effective, this does not account for within-group variation, nor isolate honor as a distinct construct from alternative differences between groups that might affect the outcome. In the current study we investigated honor as a cultural mindset, using priming methodology in both Dutch participants (who are typically low in honor endorsement) and Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccan participants (who are typically high in honor endorsement), while controlling for trait endorsement of honor values. To quantify retaliation, we used two social dilemmas: presenting an unequal offer in the Ultimatum Game, and chips being taken in the Justice Game. The results showed that priming honor resulted in an increased willingness to pay for punishment in the Justice Game, but not higher rejection in the Ultimatum Game. This suggests that unfairness by itself is not sufficient to trigger retaliation; rather, a pronounced transgression is required—in this case something being taken what is considered rightfully yours. Furthermore, decision-making in both social dilemmas was not associated with cultural background or honor endorsement. This indicates that an honor mindset needs to be salient to affect decision-making, and can affect behavior over and above the endorsement of honor values.