Facilitator or victim? On punishment for facilitating illegal border crossings during the Polish–Belarusian humanitarian border crisis

This contribution focuses on illegal border crossings in the region of Ventimiglia (Maritime Alps) from the end of the nineteenth century to nowadays. In particular, the main issues analysed will be migrants’ social, economic and political reasons for leaving homelands, the evolution of Italian laws aimed at preventing illegal border crossing and the typologies of flows and subjects who crossed the border during the period taken into account. After having pointed out my methodological approach in studying this issue, the second section will be dedicated to show stories of border crossing from the end of the XIX century to nowadays. The third part of the chapter will focus on the different typologies of migrant people and their evolution over time. In the conclusions, I will contextualise the history as a border device in relationship to sources, archives and the making history process, with reflections on autonomy of migration, illegal border crossing and production of knowledge.

The Global Evolution of Travel Visa Regimes.

This paper uses queuing theory to examine the linkages between legal and illegal immigration. This approach is particularly appropriate for periods of mass migration and can be used to look at how the magnitude of people trying to migrate affects the choice between legal and illegal channels. An empirical illustration shows how origin-country conflict and past migration differently affect current legal and illegal flows. With data for Schengen countries from Eurostat for documented immigration and the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) for illegal border crossings (IBCs), I implement a generalized method of moments (GMM) strategy using different estimates of conflict-related deaths and lagged flows of immigration as external and internal instruments, respectively. Violent conflict has a positive and significant effect on IBCs but not on documented migration flows. I find evidence of positive spillovers from the legal channel of immigration into the illegal channel but not vice versa.

Reviewed by: Border Crossings by Manuel [Álvaro Cunhal] Tiago Debora Zamorano Tiago, Manuel [Álvaro Cunhal]. Border Crossings. International Publishers, 2021. Pp. 115. ISBN 9780717808731. Border Crossings is a captivating collection of fictional stories about illegal border crossings by members of the Portuguese Communist Party in the 1930s and 40s. The characters in these stories crossed European borders fleeing from a dictatorship. These escapes encompass political exiles, self-exiles, underground communists, political beliefs, and seeking a better life. The author’s name, Manuel Tiago, was a pseudonym used by Álvaro Cunhal, the historical leader of the Portuguese Communist Party from 1961 to 1992. Cunhal spent nearly 35 years underground or in prison for his role in building the Communists into the only well-organized opposition to the dictatorship of Antonio Salazar and then Marcelo Caetano. Ultimately, this would lead to a coup in 1974. On top of being the leader of the Portuguese Communist Party, Manuel Tiago was a writer and a plastic artist. He understood the role of art as serving a political goal. Therefore, his writings and art were mostly done in secret to not arise commotion toward his political agenda. Despite being fictional, these stories certainly reflect authentic struggles of idealist people risking their lives for their values. The descriptions are genuine, and they transport the reader into the characters’ minds, allowing us to feel their fears, difficulties, and moments of relief and happiness after their fortunate crossings. One of the highlights of the book is its description of human characteristics such as cooperation, helpfulness, unity, and care. The narratives allow the reader to feel warm-hearted about the number of people who volunteer to help the characters crossing the borders in their endeavors. Furthermore, Manuel Tiago enriches the stories by providing the reader with knowledge of different places, landscapes, oceans, political tourism as Eric Gordon, who has translated this book, points out in the foreword (ix). Manuel Tiago also gives specific and detailed information on one of the characters’ passports in the “When You Least Expect It” story. The passport had two stamps in different colors, with the same date and the same border, mistakenly superimposed as the author mentioned. In the story, an expert also fixed the mistake and explained what the character of the story had to do and how to proceed. Such information shows the reality of human mistakes even in carefully outlined plans. One of the strengths of the book is the use of language misunderstandings that often happen when people who speak different languages try to engage in conversations. For example, in the “Brazen Pursuit” story, Alberto, the main character asked a family on the train what region of France they were from after listening to their conversation. They responded that they were Swiss. The translation made by Eric Gordon stay true to the original work in this sense. It did not exclude all the human feelings expressed in the stories and is still able to captivate the readers, making them to want to see the narrow escapes of the characters in each story. Additionally, it gives an overview of the nuances of the stories. For example, it briefly describes the foreign cities of the stories, the discomforts of travel, and the unity between the characters and the people they encounter. The book ends with a chapter on questions to ponder and discuss. This chapter is particularly important to help the readers think of human decisions and actions in the stories and make sense of them. For example, the decision on risk assessment is mentioned as one of the most critical issues in underground work (113). The question is: what makes a person take voluntary risks, as Alfredo took when leading Barra out of Portugal in the “Lies to East” story. [End Page 482] The author also calls the readers’ attention to sexism in one of the stories. The handlers of the crossers were not pleased that they were women. This could be an allusion to Cunhal bringing consciousness to the gender issues he had witnessed. In fact, while in prison, Cunhal obtained his law degree, and his thesis was about abortion. While he saw abortions as tragedy, he argued that for...

This article studies borders and border crossers in the area that became Burma, India, and Pakistan from the colonial period through to the immediate post-independence years in the mid-twentieth century. At independence, the new states’ borders not only confused vast sections of their populations by their imprecision but deprived them of their traditional practices of traversing forests, lands, and rivers to use those resources or visit kin. Border crossers’ complaints about the loss of customary access were largely ignored by the states, which tended to view crossers as illegal interlopers or plotters sent over by neighbouring polities. The states redoubled efforts to control such movement by strictly defining citizenship and foreignness, and by militarizing the border police. In addition, the introduction of boundaries between India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar caused conflict between diverse groups within the borderlands and between those groups and the state, often on the basis of religion and ethnicity, which persist to this day and has resulted in the displacement of thousands of people across the borders. An examination of states’ actions and popular reactions shows the evolution of states’ citizenship criteria, their implementation, and challenges to them by mundane or violent ‘transgressions’ of borderlanders. In doing so, it clarifies the mechanics—and the breakdowns—of state-making.

The Trump administration has made the construction of an “impregnable” 2,000-mile wall across the length of the US-Mexico border a centerpiece of its executive orders on immigration and its broader immigration enforcement strategy. This initiative has been broadly criticized based on: Escalating cost projections: an internal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) study recently set the cost at $21.6 billion over three and a half years; Its necessity given the many other enforcement tools — video surveillance, drones, ground sensors, and radar technologies — and Border Patrol personnel, that cover the US-Mexico border: former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff and other experts have argued that a wall does not add enforcement value except in heavy crossing areas near towns, highways, or other “vanishing points” (Kerwin 2016); Its cost-effectiveness given diminished Border Patrol apprehensions (to roughly one-fourth the level of historic highs) and reduced illegal entries (to roughly one-tenth the 2005 level according to an internal DHS study) (Martinez 2016); Its efficacy as an enforcement tool: between FY 2010 and FY 2015, the current 654-mile pedestrian wall was breached 9,287 times (GAO 2017, 22); Its inability to meet the administration’s goal of securing “operational control” of the border, defined as “the prevention of all unlawful entries to the United States” (White House 2017); Its deleterious impact on bi-national border communities, the environment, and property rights (Heyman 2013); and Opportunity costs in the form of foregone investments in addressing the conditions that drive large-scale migration, as well as in more effective national security and immigration enforcement strategies. The Center for Migration Studies (CMS) has reported on the dramatic decline in the US undocumented population between 2008 and 2014 (Warren 2016). In addition, a growing percentage of border crossers in recent years have originated in the Northern Triangle states of Central America (CBP 2016). These migrants are fleeing pervasive violence, persecution, and poverty, and a large number do not seek to evade arrest, but present themselves to border officials and request political asylum. Many are de facto refugees, not illegal border crossers. This report speaks to another reason to question the necessity and value of a 2,000-mile wall: It does not reflect the reality of how the large majority of persons now become undocumented. It finds that two-thirds of those who arrived in 2014 did not illegally cross a border, but were admitted (after screening) on non-immigrant (temporary) visas, and then overstayed their period of admission or otherwise violated the terms of their visas. Moreover, this trend in increasing percentages of visa overstays will likely continue into the foreseeable future. The report presents information about the mode of arrival of the undocumented population that resided in the United States in 2014. To simplify the presentation, it divides the 2014 population into two groups: overstays and entries without inspection (EWIs). The term overstay, as used in this paper, refers to undocumented residents who entered the United States with valid temporary visas and subsequently established residence without authorization. The term EWI refers to undocumented residents who entered without proper immigration documents across the southern border. The estimates are based primarily on detailed estimates of the undocumented population in 2014 compiled by CMS and estimates of overstays for 2015 derived by DHS. Major findings include the following: In 2014, about 4.5 million US residents, or 42 percent of the total undocumented population, were overstays. Overstays accounted for about two-thirds (66 percent) of those who arrived (i.e., joined the undocumented population) in 2014. Overstays have exceeded EWIs every year since 2007, and 600,000 more overstays than EWIs have arrived since 2007. Mexico is the leading country for both overstays and EWIs; about one- third of undocumented arrivals from Mexico in 2014 were overstays. California has the largest number of overstays (890,000), followed by New York (520,000), Texas (475,000), and Florida (435,000). Two states had 47 percent of the 6.4 million EWIs in 2014: California (1.7 million) and Texas (1.3 million). The percentage of overstays varies widely by state: more than two-thirds of the undocumented who live in Hawaii, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania are overstays. By contrast, the undocumented population in Kansas, Arkansas, and New Mexico consists of fewer than 25 percent overstays.

The Trump administration has made the construction of an “impregnable” 2,000-mile wall across the length of the US-Mexico border a centerpiece of its executive orders on immigration and its broader immigration enforcement strategy. This initiative has been broadly criticized based on: • Escalating cost projections: an internal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) study recently set the cost at $21.6 billion over three and a half years; • Its necessity given the many other enforcement tools — video surveillance, drones, ground sensors, and radar technologies — and Border Patrol personnel, that cover the US-Mexico border: former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff and other experts have argued that a wall does not add enforcement value except in heavy crossing areas near towns, highways, or other “vanishing points” (Kerwin 2016); • Its cost-effectiveness given diminished Border Patrol apprehensions (to roughly one-fourth the level of historic highs) and reduced illegal entries (to roughly one-tenth the 2005 level according to an internal DHS study) (Martinez 2016); • Its efficacy as an enforcement tool: between FY 2010 and FY 2015, the current 654-mile pedestrian wall was breached 9,287 times (GAO 2017, 22); • Its inability to meet the administration's goal of securing “operational control” of the border, defined as “the prevention of all unlawful entries to the United States” (White House 2017); • Its deleterious impact on bi-national border communities, the environment, and property rights (Heyman 2013); and • Opportunity costs in the form of foregone investments in addressing the conditions that drive large-scale migration, as well as in more effective national security and immigration enforcement strategies. The Center for Migration Studies (CMS) has reported on the dramatic decline in the US undocumented population between 2008 and 2014 (Warren 2016). In addition, a growing percentage of border crossers in recent years have originated in the Northern Triangle states of Central America (CBP 2016). These migrants are fleeing pervasive violence, persecution, and poverty, and a large number do not seek to evade arrest, but present themselves to border officials and request political asylum. Many are de facto refugees, not illegal border crossers. This report speaks to another reason to question the necessity and value of a 2,000-mile wall: It does not reflect the reality of how the large majority of persons now become undocumented. It finds that two-thirds of those who arrived in 2014 did not illegally cross a border, but were admitted (after screening) on non-immigrant (temporary) visas, and then overstayed their period of admission or otherwise violated the terms of their visas. Moreover, this trend in increasing percentages of visa overstays will likely continue into the foreseeable future. The report presents information about the mode of arrival of the undocumented population that resided in the United States in 2014. To simplify the presentation, it divides the 2014 population into two groups: overstays and entries without inspection (EWIs). The term overstay, as used in this paper, refers to undocumented residents who entered the United States with valid temporary visas and subsequently established residence without authorization. The term EWI refers to undocumented residents who entered without proper immigration documents across the southern border. The estimates are based primarily on detailed estimates of the undocumented population in 2014 compiled by CMS and estimates of overstays for 2015 derived by DHS. Major findings include the following: • In 2014, about 4.5 million US residents, or 42 percent of the total undocumented population, were overstays. • Overstays accounted for about two-thirds (66 percent) of those who arrived (i.e., joined the undocumented population) in 2014. • Overstays have exceeded EWIs every year since 2007, and 600,000 more overstays than EWIs have arrived since 2007. • Mexico is the leading country for both overstays and EWIs; about one-third of undocumented arrivals from Mexico in 2014 were overstays. • California has the largest number of overstays (890,000), followed by New York (520,000), Texas (475,000), and Florida (435,000). • Two states had 47 percent of the 6.4 million EWIs in 2014: California (1.7 million) and Texas (1.3 million). • The percentage of overstays varies widely by state: more than two-thirds of the undocumented who live in Hawaii, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania are overstays. By contrast, the undocumented population in Kansas, Arkansas, and New Mexico consists of fewer than 25 percent overstays.

The evolving role of the European borders necessitates policy revisions due to escalating security costs and the imperative for effective management. Physical barriers built by nations alone are insufficient for border security, as evidenced by European practices. On the other hand, the European Union allocates billions of dollars to border security itself, with Frontex, the EU’s border agency, receiving a substantial portion of the border security budget. The budget has increased by over 150 times in the past two decades, primarily driven by migration crises and the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the EU funding, member states have independently implemented border security measures, including temporary closures, additional security services, and the construction of fences and walls. While some countries have constructed walls, illegal border crossings have persisted, indicating the uncertainty surrounding their effectiveness. The primary challenge lies in the lack of adequate cooperation conditions between EU border institutions and EU countries. This impedes effective collaboration and results in higher costs. Furthermore, the diverse migration policies adopted by countries exacerbate the complexity of the problem. The paper aims to present the complexity of border security system in the EU, both its central and national part, and its impact on illegal migration flows, as well as to identify the most pressing issues that necessitate revision.

The paper addresses the issues of appropriateness and overall effectiveness of endeavours undertaken by selected countries (France and Russia) in the area of preventing, combating, and reducing illegal migration and criminality of foreign nationals. Analyses of the overall body of experience gained by those countries, often struggling with far more serious problems than ours, make it possible to highlight a variety of approaches to the issues under study, along with identifying new, frequently more effective ways of resolving them. In the section dealing with the French solutions, the author focused on those that are aimed specifically at preventing and combating illegal migration, mainly in the form of illegal residence in France. This is due to the fact that criminal offences committed by foreign nationals in France comprise primarily those related to illegal residence or illegal entry into the country. An in-depth review of the available instruments, mainly on the basis of specific regulations comprised in the Code of Entry and Residence of Foreign Nationals, in conjunction with the provisions regulating their right to claim political asylum, allowed to identify certain specific French solutions which might well be deemed good practices, with a view to having them considered for a prospective transposition into the Polish legal system, specifically into administrative and criminal law. When assessing the French regulations in terms of good practices, it appears prudent to consider their prospective transposition into Polish criminal or administrative law, especially with regard to the following areas. First of all, one would need to consider the option of imposing a lifetime ban on the entry into Poland for committing an offence related to illegal migration, but also with regard to other common offences. It is essential in terms of combating illegal migration, to have any individual conduct involving aiding or facilitating a third party’s illegal border crossing, contravening the law regulating the length of residence, or illegal residence in other countries of the Schengen Area, or in other EU Member States, duly criminalized, and not on the territory of Poland only. Another key solution at hand consists in the option to impose a ban on residence in France, also issued in the form of an administrative decision by the Minister of Internal Affairs, which might also apply to those individuals who are not currently residing in France, or those who have never held such residence do date, whereas might be deemed potential threat to public order. In the section dealing with Russia, the author aimed to address specific projects designed to combat illegal migration of foreign nationals and criminality at large (including organized crime) undertaken in that country. It was established that the Russian Federation was actively involved in combating both phenomena. In terms of preventing and reducing illegal immigration into the Russian Federation, several specific projects have been undertaken. In particular, The Concept of State Migration Policy for 2025 was developed, which sets out the objectives, principles, tasks, key directions, and specific constraints in the implementation of state migration policy across the country. It emphasises the need for the introduction of a number of modifications of legal, organizational and social nature, aimed specifically to radically restructure a number of areas within overall state migration policy. Several amendments were made to the Russian Penal Code of 1996, pertaining to illegal border crossings, organizing illegal migration, and others, as well as to the Code of Administrative Breaches of the Law of 2001 (i.e. a series of offences in breach of border security, visa procedures, etc.).

The Escape to Turkey. Ways and Methods of Illegal Border Crossings into Turkey from the perspective of SSI documents (1945-1948). Romania's first years after the communist regime took political power in Romania, concurrent with the onset of the Cold War, meant a reshuffle of the state institutions at first and later a dramatic impact on people's lives. The political and institutional purges were the first signal that soon repression and terror will follow, thus prompting numerous Romanian citizens to leave the country. Yet, due to the strict surveillance of the Secret Police Services which did not easily allow traveling to Western countries, the only way to escape was through illicit border crossings. One of the most common destinations was Turkey, with documents issued between 1945 and 1948 by the Secret police services revealing an impressive number of such cases. Rezumat: Evadarea în Turcia. Modalităţi şi metode de trecere ilegale a frontierei în Turcia din perspectiva documentelor SSI (1945-1948). Primii ani de după preluarea puterii politice de către regimul comunist din România, concomitent cu declanşarea Războiului Rece pe plan internaţional, au vizat mai întâi întregul aparat statal, ajungând să fie resimţit apoi inclusiv la nivelul vieţii cotidiene. Epurările politice şi instituţionale au fost semnalul că vor urma forme de represiune şi teroare, ceea ce a determinat mulţi cetăţeni români să părăsească ţara, doar că, sub atenta supraveghere a Serviciului Special de Informaţii care nu permitea plecarea spre Occident oricui, sigura modalitate de a fugi era în mod fraudulos, una dintre destinaţiile predilecte fiind Turcia iar documentele S.S.I. consemnează pentru perioada 1945-1848 un număr impresionant de astfel de cazuri. Cuvinte-cheie: Treceri frauduloase de frontieră, fugă, comunism, România, Turcia.

Europe experienced an unprecedented peak in asylum seekers in 2015. Over a million asylum seekers entered the European Union across the Mediterranean Sea and travelled by all means of transport, including by foot, from South to Central and Northern parts of the EU. This “migration crisis” became to define much of the political-territorial atmosphere in the continent with severe impacts on the European security but, significantly, also to the way countries communicated migration related threat images into desires for re-bordering. Towards the end of 2015 and early 2016, a bit strange episode happened up in the North, when asylum seekers travelled to Northern Norway and Finland through Russian Federation. Despite locating very far from the Mediterranean and Balkan routes to Europe, the Russian North appeared to become part of so-called Arctic route to the Schengen area with over 7000 African, Middle-Eastern and Asian asylum seekers. Due to the history of very strict border management and control, very few illegal border crossings and extremely distant location, the “Arctic route episode” to Norway and Finland became matters of security in many ways. After describing the overall character of this “Arctic route episode”, we will analyse different perspectives to migration related security. A particular attention will be paid to Finland, Finnish border management and foreign citizens who applied for asylum at one of the “Eastern” border crossing points (Salla or Raja-Jooseppi) in Northern Finland. The Finnish-Russian case illustrates well the networked - but still rather specific - migratory processes in Europe. The public discussion on the episode expresses well many of the international political fears and threats migration poses for those who actually are on the move.

Migration is a continued process that causes both positive and negative effects. This study investigates the EU’s resilience to migration challenges taking into consideration a comparative analysis of the European refugee crisis of 2015 and the influx of refugees from Ukraine due to the Russian invasion. On the one hand, the European refugee crisis of 2015 raised doubts about the EU’s ability to manage a humanitarian crisis, highlighting the necessity for enhancing its crisis management. However, the EU learned valuable lessons from that crisis, leading to a decrease in illegal border crossings and an improvement of its ability to anticipate future im migration patterns, and its resilience against migration challenges.

Securitisation is associated with a certain amount of visibility for migrants in public space. It is expressed in actions such as tightening rules on illegal border crossings, strengthening the number of forces and services at the borders, introducing a state of emergency, intensive use of surveillance technologies and control practices by uniformed services, attempts to push migrants out, and ultimately the erection of fences. The aim of the article is to present activities related to the crisis on the border of the EU with Belarus (2021-2022) in the context of the securitisation theory. The research hypothesis assumes that the militarisation and weaponisation of migration in public discourse are important factors deepening the securitisation of migration in the event of a crisis on the border of the European Union with Belarus. In addition to indicating the emergency measures used in the case of this crisis and its specific features, the article draws attention to the process of securitisation of migration in the European Union in the context of other crises that have affected the community in recent years and were significantly related to migration.

Migration is an integral part of the modern world. More and more people change their country of residence in search of better education, well paid jobs, higher living standards and for other reasons. This process requires significant material and psycho-emotional resources and it is accompanied by multiple difficulties (language, social, financial and so on) faced by migrants in the process of integration into the society of the host country. Migration has many positive (cultural exchange, international relations, etc.) and negative features (illegal border crossings, increased competition in the labour market, etc.). That makes the adaptation of foreigners in a new cultural and language environment one of the priority areas in the social sciences of our time.

Maritime security is of paramount importance for coastal nations, given the numerous challenges posed by illegal border crossings, smuggling activities, and environmental hazards. Traditional surveillance methods have limitations in effectively monitoring vast maritime borders in real time and predicting potential security breaches. Additionally, fishermen operating in these areas are often exposed to risks such as adverse weather conditions and maritime hazards due to limited access to timely information. Hence, there is a critical need for innovative technological solutions to enhance border surveillance, communication, and coordination among maritime authorities and stakeholders. In response to these challenges, the aim of the project is to develop a solution to address the shortcomings of traditional border surveillance systems This project introduces an integrated border alert system that combines weather monitoring, hazard alerts, and seamless integration with maritime authorities. Leveraging Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) neural networks, the FBAS aims to bolster surveillance and response capabilities. The Border Net Model, is going to develop with LSTM neural networks, enables predictive border classification, while the Alert System issues timely notifications to stakeholders. The Weather Data Provider API ensures access to up-to-date meteorological information, enhancing decision-making. Additionally, features such as alert systems for adverse weather conditions and maritime hazards ensure the safety of fishermen and other maritime activities. Through its innovative features and capabilities, the proposed system aims to bridge the gaps in traditional surveillance systems and provide comprehensive protection for maritime borders.