Abstract
Arrow's impossibility theorem [K.J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, Wiley, New York, NY, 1951] shows that the set of acyclic tournaments is not closed to non-dictatorial Boolean aggregation. In this paper we extend the notion of aggregation to general tournaments and we show that for tournaments with four vertices or more any proper symmetric (closed to vertex permutations) subset cannot be closed to non-dictatorial monotone aggregation and to non-neutral aggregation. We also demonstrate a proper subset of tournaments that is closed to parity aggregation for an arbitrarily large number of vertices. This proves a conjecture of Kalai [Social choice without rationality, Reviewed NAJ Economics 3(4)] for the non-neutral and the non-dictatorial and monotone cases and gives a counter example for the general case.
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