Abstract

The extended mind thesis holds that the mental is not restricted to what ­happens in the brain. Rather, one can think of the extended mind thesis as an outgrowth of broader, physicalist commitments. In particular, views of the mental that tie it very strongly to consciousness seem to be in a position to resist the extension of mind. One way of taking the origin and force of the extended mind thesis, then, is as a demand that philosophers be consistent in their broader commitments in the philosophy of mind. Acquaintance theories of self-knowledge require a directness and immediacy between a mental state and one's knowledge of it that seems especially foreign to an extended mind perspective. On the acquaintance approach, the justification for the introspective judgments under consideration is a function only of an agent's conscious states at a time.

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