Extended Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS 1982: A Comprehensive Analysis of State Submissions

ABSTRACTThis article considers the legal and policy issues surrounding the establishment of continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles (nm) from sub-Antarctic islands. Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) a coastal state may establish a continental shelf that extends seawards beyond 200 nm where the continental shelf continues, normally to a total distance of no more than 350 nm. To establish such an extended continental shelf (ECS) a coastal state must file a submission of delineation data with the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), a technical body established by UNCLOS.The rights of coastal states present particular difficulties in the Antarctic Treaty area (ATA), due to the general non-recognition of the seven territorial claims and the provisions of article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. Accordingly, Antarctic claimant states are generally adopting a restrained approach to the issue of ECS as appertaining to claimed territories in Antarctica in their submissions to the CLCS. These states appear to recognise that they cannot secure the normal prerogatives of a coastal state from territorial sea baselines within the ATA, at least for the duration of the present Antarctic Treaty system (ATS). A different approach is being taken with respect of sub-Antarctic islands lying north of the ATA. Sovereignty over sub-Antarctic territory north of the ATA is, with the exception of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, not contested. Accordingly, rights in relation to any continental shelf attaching to sub-Antarctic islands may be realised, apparently without challenging the Antarcticmodus vivendi.However, the ECS of several sub-Antarctic islands penetrate the ATA. In 2008, the CLCS largely endorsed the 2004 Australian submission that included data on ECS from Australia's sub-Antarctic islands of Macquarie Island and the Heard and McDonald group. The ECS from both groups penetrates south of 60°S into the ATA, in the case of Heard and McDonald covering a huge area. Although the wider dispute regarding sovereignty between the United Kingdom and Argentina adds complexity to the case, the South Sandwich Islands are sufficiently close to the ATA that their continental shelf also penetrates the area. In the event that the CLCS were ever able to make a recommendation on a submission of data relating to the South Sandwich Islands (something that could only occur with the consent of Argentina and the United Kingdom) the result would be a situation similar to that pertaining to the Australian sub-Antarctic islands.The consequence of these developments is that rights to seabed areas within the ATA have been assigned to individual states. On the face of it, this appears to be in conflict with the norm of collective responsibility that was established by the Antarctic Treaty 50 years ago precisely to constrain sovereignty issues in the region. What is suggested by this practice is a difference in the attitude of Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) to rights generated from territorywithinthe ATA and rights generated fromexternalterritory. Nonetheless, there may be significant implications flowing from the latter for resource issues within the ATA. Minerals exploitation on sub-Antarctic extended continental shelf within the ATA is precluded in the near-term because of cost, the formal prohibition under article 7 of the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, and the fact that all sub-Antarctic coastal states are ATCPs. However the situation in regard to other resource activities is less clear. Bioprospecting could proceed subject to coastal state approval pursuant to the provisions of UNCLOS relating to marine scientific research, and there is no mandatory regulation under the ATS. The possibility that a coastal state may seek to realise rights on the ECS in relation to genetic resources may complicate collective ATS approaches and pose wider geopolitical challenges. In the longer term, the fact that some Antarctic states are presently seeking to secure rights that are essentially about ensuring their preclusive access to resources may have significant implications for strategic interests in the greater Antarctic region.

Canada ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 2003. With that ratification is an obligation to submit data and information to the U.N. pertaining to the limits of the country’s extended continental shelf (ECS); the portion of the juridical continental shelf that extends beyond 200 nautical miles. A team of Canadian scientists, managers, and legal experts that included representation from three Federal Departments (Natural Resources Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and Global Affairs Canada) with additional support from other departments, spent 13 years compiling and acquiring data to provide the scientific evidence to support delineation of Canada’s seaward most maritime limit. The submission has the potential to provide Canada with 2.4 million km2 of additional submarine landmass in the Atlantic and the Arctic oceans over which Canada exercises sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its natural resources. Specific information such as the tectonic framework of the continental margin, the geomorphology of the margin and in particular the continental slope, the geologic nature of adjoined ridges, rises, and plateaux, and sediment thickness within adjacent basins are examples of fundamental pieces of geoscientific information needed to substantiate Canada’s outermost maritime limits. This paper highlights a number of segments of Canada’s continental margins to showcase this scientific evidence and how it is applied in the UNCLOS context. In doing so, the paper demonstrates the geologic complexity of Canada’s margins as illustrated in scientific publications that have resulted from these new data collections, while at the same time presenting new scientific evidence and interpretations. This collection of data and information provides a wealth of new knowledge in Canada’s offshore regions. The massive data compilation in the Atlantic led to conception of continental margins, in a source-to-sink scenario, as having an equilibrium base level or graded form, comparable to river systems. Departures from this shape relate to the interplay of sedimentary processes and in particular to those processes that do not fit the source-to-sink paradigm. For example, a significant part of the Atlantic margin is shown to be heavily influenced by along-slope geostrophic currents that generated massive contourite drift deposits. These deposits reflect lateral transport of sediment that had a significant impact on the morphology of the margin. The role of mass transport processes in shaping continental margins is also highlighted, and in particular the collapses of entire segments of the margin were observed. The prominent role mass failure processes play in delivering sediment to the adjacent abyssal plain is also critical in the ECS context. These observations challenge the entrenched notion of a continental margin comprising a shelf, slope, and rise and in particular the concept of the “continental rise”. Prior to 2006, regions of the Arctic Ocean seaward of the Canadian landmass had fewer than 5000 km of seismic reflection data. The massive efforts of Arctic coastal States to map their margins for ECS purposes have led to a leap in technological advances to acquire data in ice-covered seas and have led to a wealth of new geoscientific knowledge. Perhaps foremost amongst this knowledge is demonstration that Canada Basin is indeed a fully developed ocean basin, albeit significantly infilled with sediment. Based on this knowledge and identification of related structures, new realistic tectonic scenarios for opening of the Amerasia Basin are proposed that include a significant component of transform or strike-slip motions. With seismic velocity and rock sample information, the continental nature of Alpha and Mendeleev ridges has been substantiated. Even bathymetric data were lacking in the Arctic and new editions of seafloor maps now support grids of 500 m spacing; although some regions remain sparse. Once thought to be relatively stagnant, sedimentary processes such as found in many ocean basins were discovered in the Arctic Ocean. Evidence of geostrophic currents, sediment mass failures, and deep-sea turbidity current channels were found to be ubiquitous, even in the deepest parts of the Arctic’s basins.

O presente estudo analisa a submissão do Brasil a uma plataforma continental estendida formulada à Comissão de Limites da Plataforma Continental (CLPC). Primeiramente, o trabalho apresenta a evolução dos limites marítimos brasileiros ao longo de sua formação histórica até o momento atual. Posteriormente, examina o conceito jurídico de plataforma continental elaborado pela Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre o Direito do Mar (CNUDM) e a atuação da CLPC na fixação dos limites exteriores desse espaço do mar. Na parte final, destaca as implicações das recomendações "definitivas e obrigatórias" dessa instituição internacional sobre os interesses brasileiros na plataforma continental estendida.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Article 76 and Annex II, Section 7, specify the procedures for the delineation of the continental shelf, requiring coastal states to submit scientific and technical data to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to demonstrate the extent of their continental shelf. In practice, some states have exercised authority over the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles without obtaining recommendations from the CLCS or have been rejected by the CLCS. These states argue that the recommendations of the CLCS are not decisive in delineation. Some of these states have even received support from international court judgments, sparking discussions on the effectiveness of CLCS recommendations and controversies over the validity of delineation beyond 200 nautical miles. This paper argues that since states have inherent rights to their territories, the absence of CLCS recommendations does not preclude them from claiming rights to these areas. In cases of litigation arising from delineation beyond 200 nautical miles, if a state can provide sufficient evidence to prove that its territory indeed extends beyond 200 nautical miles and that its delineation does not exceed the actual limits of its continental shelf, the international court will support the state. However, the court’s support does not equate to the validity of the delineation, valid delineation must still adhere to the procedures stipulated by UNCLOS.

The legal continental shelf is a maritime zone that typically goes out to 200 nautical miles from shore. It may, however, be extended beyond 200 nautical miles, based in part on the morphology of the continental margin. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea sets forth the requirements for how coastal countries can legally define such an extended continental shelf (ECS), within which they may manage the natural resources on and below the seabed. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), along with the U.S. Geological Survey and the U.S. Department of State, is working to map, analyze, and define the seaward extent of the U.S. ECS. New advances in maritime technologies, such as improved multibeam echosounders, and associated visualization and analysis software aid in this effort by enabling project scientists to better understand seafloor geomorphology and interpret local and regional geologic processes. Marine geophysical data collected during this project are publicly available, benefiting the broader scientific community and public through timely data access and long-term preservation. To date, NOAA has led more than 30 high-resolution surveys and mapped more than 2 million square kilometers of sea floor in support of the U.S. ECS effort. New discoveries have been made during these surveys, and the data have contributed to better understanding of the morphology and geology of the U.S. continental margins.

The question of the amount of seabed to which a coastal nation is entitled is addressed in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This treaty, ratified by 153 nations and in force since 1994, specifies national obligations, rights, and jurisdiction in the oceans, and it allows nations a continental shelf out to at least 200 nautical miles or to a maritime boundary. Article 76 (A76) of the convention enables coastal nations to establish their continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles and therefore to control, among other things, access for scientific research and the use of seabed resources that would otherwise be considered to lie beyond national jurisdiction.To date, seven submissions for extended continental shelves (ECS) have been filed under UNCLOS (Table 1). These submissions have begun to define the ambiguities in A76. How these ambiguities are resolved into final ECS boundaries will probably set important precedents guiding the future delimitation of the ECS by the United States, which has not ratified the convention, and other coastal nations. This report uses examples from the first three submissions—by the Russian Federation, Brazil, and Australia—to identify outstanding issues encountered in applying A76 to ECS delimitation.

Coastal States with a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (nm), also known as an extended continental shelf (ECS), have made significant efforts to delineate their respective ECS limits. This chapter provides an assessment of all of the areas beyond 200 nm that require one or more maritime boundaries and the States involved. It also examines whether geophysical characteristics, namely the morphology and geology of the seafloor, will likely play a role in delimiting maritime boundaries for these areas. The chapter postulates that geophysical characteristics will play a role in determining relatively few maritime boundaries beyond 200 nm. The analysis in the chapter is primarily based on information provided in the executive summaries of the 58 submissions, the 45 preliminary information documents (PIDs), and the notes verbale relating to these documents submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) as of 15 January 2012. Keywords:CLCS; extended continental shelf (ECS); maritime boundaries; nautical miles (NM); preliminary information documents (PIDs)

Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sets out the legal regime governing the novel ‘continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles’ or ‘the outer continental shelf’. As Article 76 contains a complex interface between law and science, its interpretation and application raises intricate issues, with which no international court or tribunal had dealt with substantively before 2012. The UNCLOS dispute settlement bodies were the first international tribunals to provide answers to long-standing questions surrounding the meaning and application of several important, but ambiguous or controversial, legal terms employed under Article 76. As such, the decisions rendered by the UNCLOS tribunals have been seen as playing an important role in elucidating the legal regime of the outer continental shelf. This article queries this assessment by critically examining whether and to what extent the relevant pronouncements made by UNCLOS tribunals have contributed to clarifying and developing the law governing the outer continental shelf regime under UNCLOS.

NLL and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)The Northern Limit Line (NLL) is a disputed maritime extralegal boundary in the Yellow (West) Sea, dividing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), commonly referred to as North Korea, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), commonly referred to as South Korea. Initially imposed in 1953 as a temporary measure in response to concerns about ROK President Syngman Rhee threatening the Armistice (AA),2 it was also a restraint on the DPRK. original purpose of the NLL remains: it is a mechanism to separate the two Koreas. was necessary because the Armistice Agreement, although granting military control of the islands to the commander-in-chief of the United Nations Command (UNC), did not give a clear position on the territorial waters surrounding the islands. Thus, the dispute includes both the legitimacy of the NLL itself and conflicting territorial claims to the waters surrounding the five islands. five islands are U-do, Sochong-do, Taechongdo, Paengnyong-do and Yeonpyeong-do.From a legal perspective, there are two major regimes that apply to the NLL dispute: the Armistice (AA) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). full text of Article 15 of the AA is as follows: This Armistice shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the water contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.3The DPRK is bound under the AA to respect waters contiguous to the islands as ROK waters, but the international norm of the time, 3 nautical miles, has since become 12 nautical miles. Regardless, the NLL reserves for the ROK waters that go beyond the definition of contiguous, using either the 3-or 12-nautical-mile norms.The right of the DPRK to dispute the NLL has been disputed. Roehrig argues that the DPRK did not lodge a formal protest until 1973, and cites the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea.4 Article 11 of the agreement stipulates: The South-North demarcation line and the areas for nonaggression shall be identical with the Military Demarcation Line provided in the Military Armistice of July 27, 1953, and the areas that each side has exercised jurisdiction over until the present time.5Article 11 of the 1991 North-South Joint Declaration does not necessarily mean that the DPRK has lost the legal right to dispute the NLL. DPRK could plausibly argue, due to the ambiguity of the Article 15 of the AA, that it has been prevented from exercising its full jurisdiction over its own territorial waters. From 1953 to 1973, however, the DPRK failed to take clear action where the NLL was concerned. may not have been from acquiescence to the state of affairs as they were so much as acknowledgment of its weaker position in the aftermath of the Korean War. renewed aggression in 1973 was instigated in the hope of achieving a peace agreement with the U.S.,6 encouraged by the withdrawal from Vietnam.7 objective may also have driven the 1999 and 2002 clashes, with the DPRK applying pressure while simultaneously proposing negotiations with the U.S.8 differing positions of the U.S. and ROK on the NLL render it a useful area that the DPRK can exploit in an attempt to weaken their diplomatic relations.9It has been customary for the ROK and supporters of the NLL to argue that its compliance with the median line principle, commonly used in settling disputed maritime areas, makes it legal. Experts in the law however, have written that the NLL breaches a number of UNCLOS articles. Van Dyke, Valencia and Garmendia, using case studies, demonstrate that the median line principle does not mean the NLL complies with UNCLOS. Most striking is Article 76, which proclaims that states can't use straight baselines to cut offthe territorial seas of other states. …

Solving the Potential Conflict: High Seas Marine Protected Areas and the Exercise of Sovereign Rights Over the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles

Significant oil and gas resources beneath the seabed of the Arctic Ocean and its adjacent seas are becoming increasingly accessible as the polar ice cap melts. There has been considerable media and academic interest in the issue of which states have the sovereign rights to exploit these resources. This article demonstrates that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides a suitable framework for amicable resolution of all of the outstanding maritime boundary issues in the Arctic region. Determining the extent of the maritime zones and boundaries of the Arctic states under UNCLOS will provide the legal certainty necessary for resource exploration and exploitation. The article first establishes that the provisions of UNCLOS and the norms that they reflect are applicable to all five Arctic states, and then considers the current status of the various maritime boundaries between these states. The situation within 200 nautical miles (nm) of the Arctic coastline is shown to be generally unproblematic with few boundaries remaining to be delimited. Beyond 200 nm the situation becomes more complex. The littoral states must establish the outer limits of their continental shelf in accordance with the complex provisions of Article 76 and on the basis of recommendations from the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Where this process reveals areas of overlap then the Arctic states will have to agree additional maritime boundaries under Article 83. Cooperation between the littoral states will be required if disputes are to be avoided.

Kevin Krajick provides a comprehensive description of issues related to the development of extended continental shelves by the five coastal states that surround the Arctic Ocean in his article “Race to plumb the frigid depths” (Special Section on Polar Science: News, 16 Mar., p. 1525). However, he addresses certain topics in a way that could foster wrong or misleading impressions, and it is important to set the record straight. Krajick suggests that the Russian Federation is seeking to extend sovereign rights beyond 200 nautical miles over an unjustifiably large sector of the central Arctic Ocean. Three points need to be noted here: 1) In the process of defining maritime boundaries, a well-established principle is that the extent of a coastal state's offshore jurisdiction is largely determined by the length and the configuration of its coastline ([1][1]). Since nearly half of the Arctic Ocean's coastline fringes Russia's northern territory, it does not seem unwarranted for that country, in accordance with the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Article 76, to pursue an extended continental shelf that encompasses a significant portion of the sea floor beyond 200 nautical miles. 2) Many observers and commentators appear to have missed the proviso (perhaps because it appears in Russian and in fine print at the bottom of a key document) that the proposed Russian outer limits are “subject to more precise determination through negotiations [with neighbouring States],” according to a translation posted on the Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea Web site ([2][2]). This indicates a readiness to seek accommodations with other coastal states in the region. 3) Independent studies have considered the continental shelf implications for all coastal states that border the Arctic Ocean ([3][3], [4][4]). Derived from data sets that differed from those used by Russian investigators, the outcomes of these studies have tended to mirror the outer limits that were proposed by Russia in its 2001 submission to UNCLOS. On a more personal level, the article contains statements attributed to me that appear to disparage the Russian continental shelf submission. I did not suggest that the Russian initiative lacked merit; in fact, recent studies have further substantiated the Russian case ([5][5]). I did not claim to speak for the Canadian Polar Commission, as implied by Krajick; the views expressed during the course of our exchanges were mine alone. 1. 1.[↵][6]United Nations, Handbook on the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries (United Nations, New York, 2000). 2. 2.[↵][7]United Nations, Website of the Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS), Legends to the attached maps, {[www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs\_new/submissions\_files/rus01/RUS\_page5\_Legend.pdf][8]} (2001). 3. 3.[↵][9]1. R. Macnab, 2. P. Neto, 3. R van de Poll , Cooperative preparations for determining the outer limit of the juridical continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean: a model for regional collaboration in other parts of the world ocean?, Proceedings of a Continental Shelf Workshop hosted by the Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI), Buenos Aires, 13 to 15 November 2000 (reprinted with permission in Boundary and Security Bulletin, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 86-96, International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham University, NC, Spring 2001). 4. 4.[↵][10]1. P. Neto, 2. R. van de Poll , Int. Hydrogr. Rev. 2((no. 1)), 37 (2001). [OpenUrl][11] 5. 5.[↵][12]1. V. D. Kaminsky, 2. V. A. Poselov, 3. V. Y. Glebovsky, 4. A. V. Zayonchek, 5. V. V. Butsenko , Eos Trans. AGU 86((no. 52)), (2005)Fall Meet. Suppl., Abstr. T12C-06. # {#article-title-2} In the article “Race to plumb the frigid depths” (Special Section on Polar Science: News, 16 Mar., p. 1525), Kevin Krajick gives a rather negative view on the work our Russian colleagues are doing on the topic of territorial claims to underwater rights in the Arctic Ocean. To understand the kind of work being done to fulfil the requirements of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, readers should be aware that the way data are being interpreted inevitably will be in the national interest of the country doing the interpretation, which will then be countered by the UN's Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). It is a legal process. There is no given line on the sea floor marking the “end of the natural prolongation of the land mass.” The problem about the process lies elsewhere: in the secrecy in dealings between a submitting nation and CLCS. In the article, I am quoted as agreeing with the statement (made by Arthur Grantz): “They're [the Russians] under great pressure. Their government gave them a lot of money, and it expects them to come up with a certain result.” However, I did not express agreement with this point of view when talking to Kevin Krajick. [1]: #ref-1 [2]: #ref-2 [3]: #ref-3 [4]: #ref-4 [5]: #ref-5 [6]: #xref-ref-1-1 View reference 1. in text [7]: #xref-ref-2-1 View reference 2. in text [8]: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/RUS_page5_Legend.pdf [9]: #xref-ref-3-1 View reference 3. in text [10]: #xref-ref-4-1 View reference 4. in text [11]: {openurl}?query=rft.jtitle%253DInt.%2BHydrogr.%2BRev.%26rft.volume%253D2%26rft.issue%253D%2528no.%2B1%2529%26rft.spage%253D37%26rft.atitle%253DINT%2BHYDROGR%2BREV%26rft.genre%253Darticle%26rft_val_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Ajournal%26ctx_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ctx_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Actx [12]: #xref-ref-5-1 View reference 5. in text

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is a globally recognized legal regime. UNCLOS has been widely regarded as a “constitution for the oceans” and enshrines the notion that “the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole”. In compliance with the concept of effective enforcement of international norms, standards and procedures, State Parties to UNCLOS have an obligation to preserve the marine environment. The purpose of this chapter is to consider the role of the law of the sea in marine spatial planning (MSP), bearing in mind that UNCLOS has also provided the framework for the further development of, inter alia, global ocean governance.

Sub-Saharan Africa's blue economy policies are informed by global instruments such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as global targets as set out under the Sustainable Development Goals. The 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy) is also key to the definition of national blue economy policies in sub-Saharan Africa. While many sub-Saharan African countries have signed up to UNCLOS, very few have taken the next step of domesticating the framework law into their national policies. Furthermore, few countries are making use of tools such as marine spatial planning (MSP) and ecosystem-based management (EBM) to inform their policymaking and to advance their blue economic activities. A number of island countries such as Mauritius and Seychelles have significantly extended their maritime boundaries based on some provisions of UNCLOS, while others such as South Africa have developed ambitious blue economy programmes through Operation Phakisa. The majority of sub-Saharan African countries are not engaged in the exploration or exploitation of resources in their exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and in the community heritage areas despite having enabling global policies and strategies such as UNCLOS and the 2050 AIM Strategy, as well as planning tools such as MSP and EBM at their disposal. It is possible to significantly grow sub-Saharan Africa's blue economy if countries fully embrace and domesticate the global laws and agreements that give them access to resources in the common heritage areas and in their EEZ.

This chapter talks about the delimitation of the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and the delineation of the continental shelves of the circumpolar Arctic States beyond 200 nautical miles, there are, no territorial claims equivalent to those relating to the Antarctic continent. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has brought about major changes to the traditional law of the sea which have also had an important impact on the legal regime governing the Arctic Ocean. The EEZ, an entirely new concept in international law, is certainly one of the most revolutionary features of UNCLOS. The provisions of UNCLOS relating to the high seas and other pertinent rules of international law continue to apply to the EEZ. Proposals to elaborate a new treaty for the Arctic, such as a regional framework instrument, complemented by protocols relating to specific issues or an implementing agreement under UNCLOS, have become redundant. Keywords:Antarctic continent; Arctic States; exclusive economic zones (EEZs); international law; UNCLOS