EXPRESS: From Virtue to Flourishing: Mapping the Self and Social Pathways of Hospitality

NBAR the end of Nicomachean Ethics 6, Aristotle makes the surprising claim that the virtues do not exist independently of each other (1144b32–1145a2). A person with one moral virtue must possess all others. The reason is that practical wisdom (ϕρóνησις) is a necessary and sufficient condition for moral virtue: ‘it is impossible to be properly [κνρíως] good without practical wisdom, or to be practically wise without [also having) moral virtue’ (1144b30–2). In order to have any one moral virtue, a person needs the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom (because virtue is just a capacity to act with practical wisdom, or ‘right reason’— òρθòς λóγoς —1144b26-8), and anyone with practical wisdom will have all the virtues (1145a1–2).

The predominant view of moral virtue can be traced back to Aristotle. He believed that moral virtue must involve intellectual excellence. To have moral virtue one must have practical wisdom - the ability to deliberate well and to see what is morally relevant in a given context. Julia Driver challenges this classical theory of virtue, arguing that it fails to take into account virtues which do seem to involve ignorance or epistemic defect. Some 'virtues of ignorance' are counterexamples to accounts of virtue which hold that moral virtue must involve practical wisdom. Modesty, for example, is generally considered to be a virtue even though the modest person may be making an inaccurate assessment of his or her accomplishments. Driver argues that we should abandon the highly intellectualist view of virtue and instead adopt a consequentialist perspective which holds that virtue is simply a character trait which systematically produces good consequences.

PurposePractical wisdom involves making sound decisions in complex, uncertain situations by addressing emotions, moral virtues and context-rational knowledge. This issue is crucial for SMEs when there is a sudden increase in the dynamics of emotions or moral virtues, particularly in rural companies. Rural managers need practical wisdom (PW) to effectively integrate rational, emotional and spiritual knowledge in making decisions with a sense of purpose, adaptability and hope.Design/methodology/approachThis paper adopts concepts derived from the knowledge management (KM) field to shed light on two research questions: Is PW different from an individual’s point of view compared to a collective one? How can PW be achieved from a collective standpoint? Examples from the recent history of Gran Canaria are mentioned, and valuable lessons for rural companies are also derived from three companies.FindingsThis paper contributes to raising the managers’ awareness of practical wisdom by exploring how SMEs, particularly in rural contexts, can use knowledge that is deeply intertwined with values, emotions and community considerations, thus enriching the thermodynamics model of KM.Originality/valueNo previous studies have analysed the connection between knowledge and PW of rural companies. Therefore, this paper not only strengthens interpersonal relationships within the rural business community but also encourages the exchange of valuable experiences. By striking the right balance between emotional, ethical and rational capacities, rural businesses can more effectively leverage shared knowledge, creating a support network that fosters resilience and sustainable growth.

Objective: to understand the relationship between moral virtues and phronesis from volunteers of civil society organizations that work for the protection and assistance of pregnant women, known as pro-life. Theoretical framework: the perspective of virtue ethics is presented in the neo-Aristotelian approach as a theoretical framework, according to which human conduct is understood as based on the dispositions of character, the moral virtues, as well as through practical wisdom or phronesis, with the purpose (telos) of human flourishing. Method: the research strategy consists of a qualitative multiple case study approach in Brazilian (n = 2) and Spanish (n = 2) organizations, focusing on their volunteers (n = 17 participants). The field was accessed through participant observation, semi-structured face-to-face interview, and documentary research, thematically analyzing their content with the aid of NVivo software. Results: the results suggest how they act and learn virtues throughout their experience as volunteers - prudence (phronesis), temperance, courage, and hope - to know how to approach, advise, judge, or restrain judgment and help pregnant women establish priorities and perspectives for the future (foresight). Evidence supports the relationship of the phronesis-temperance and phronesis-hope relationship to balance current priorities and future expectations. Conclusion: different contexts may reveal similar virtues in volunteer practices. The results reinforce the assumption of the unity of virtues. Evidence, limitations, and research possibilities are discussed.

Practical wisdom (“phronēsis”) is an Aristotelian concept that has been incorporated into management research to a considerable extent in the last 20–30 years. This paper attempts to show how practical wisdom is necessary as a type of situational knowledge that is required for most management decisions to be sustainable. We start reviewing the types of knowledge necessary in decision-making, and we emphasize “practical wisdom” as the kind of knowledge that is particular and subjective, is acquired through practice, and is transmitted by example. We relate the concept of practical wisdom with the Hayek concept of knowledge of time and place, the Polanyi concept of tacit knowledge, and Nonaka’s knowledge management. We conclude that in most management decisions, phronēsis is required and, thus, is necessary to increase sustainability in terms of effectively sharing knowledge and acquiring virtues to improve managerial decision-making. Not considering phronēsis has bad implications for management as it can lead to unsustainable and poor decisions, for instance, in main areas of management control such as pricing policies, budgeting, balanced scorecards, transfer pricing, and goal setting. Along with the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom we conclude that moral virtues, specifically justice, should be the complement that guides organizational objectives.

We analyze the status of virtues in management by going in some depth into the two main virtues, justice and practical wisdom. We next study how ethics requires that all virtues should be present under the ideal concept of a ‘unity of virtues’ for a completely wise person and discuss the practical limitations of this concept. Then, we draw a framework for decision making depending on whether the decision maker possesses justice and practical wisdom or lacks one of them and then discuss which one is better to have. We conclude that justice is more important, as it is about setting objectives and prioritizing, whereas practical wisdom is about attaining these objectives, once listed, in a rationally wise and contextual way. Hence, we conclude that objectives (justice) must come first, because this makes it more likely that, in the end, practical wisdom is developed, and thus we end up having the two virtues.

PurposeThe aim of this paper is to present the necessity for practical wisdom in the managerial decision making process and its role in such a process. The paper seeks to contrast the position with two conventional approaches based on maximizing and satisficing behaviors respectively.Design/methodology/approachFollowing Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas it is argued that a correct decision should consider an “integral rationality” which includes not only “instrumental rationality” but also “practical rationality”. The latter permits the evaluation of both means and ends from the perspective of human good. Practical wisdom helps the decision maker to determine how a decision will contribute to the human good in each particular situation.FindingsMaximizing and satisficing behaviors are based on the facts‐values dichotomy, which separates business and ethics and presents a rationalistic and incomplete view of the reality. The alternative presented here sees the decision as a whole, and this is a more comprehensive understanding of the reality. Ethics is better integrated into the decision making process, since it is an intrinsic part of such a process, not an extrinsic addition.Practical implicationsEvery decision has an ethical dimension, which should be considered by managers for making good decisions. Practical wisdom is essential in perceiving such a dimension and in making sound moral judgments in the making of decisions. Managers do not need only skills for making correct decisions, but practical wisdom and moral virtues, too.Originality/valueThe approach presented in the paper defeats the conventional but narrow views of managerial decision making based on maximizing behavior or on satisficing behavior and introduces the categories of good and evil as the main driver for managerial decision making.

We analyze the status of virtues in management by going in some depth into the two main virtues, justice and practical wisdom. We next study how ethics requires that all virtues should be present under the ideal concept of a ‘unity of virtues’ for a completely wise person and discuss the practical limitations of this concept. Then, we draw a framework for decision making depending on whether the decision maker possesses both justice and practical wisdom or only one of these, and then discuss which one is better to have. We conclude that justice is more important, as it is about setting objectives and prioritizing, whereas practical wisdom is about attaining these objectives, once listed, in a rationally wise and contextual way. Hence, we conclude that objectives (justice) must come first, because this makes it more likely for practical wisdom to be developed in the end, thus leading to having both virtues.

<p><b>In the wake of Caesar’s assassination, Cicero was without the necessary magisterial and martial authority to direct affairs and his influence over the fractious Senate was fragile at best. So, too, did he face the challenge of physical distance. With influential statesmen scattered across the Roman world, the reliance on correspondence for political manoeuvring and the performance of self was more pronounced than ever before. Cicero’s letters, then, played an essential role in his self-fashioning of authority after the Ides of March.</b></p> <p>This thesis illuminates the nuanced, critical, and underappreciated role that Cicero’s correspondence played in his cultivation of fresh influence after Caesar’s death by assessing the post-Ides corpus through the lens of ethos. In particular, Aristotle’s conception of ethos as comprising phronesis (‘practical wisdom’ or ‘prudence’), eunoia (‘goodwill’ or ‘benevolence’), and aretē excellence’ or ‘moral virtue’) provides a valuable framework. When applied to the letters, three distinct instances of epistolary persona creation are revealed: Cicero as Nestor, Cicero as amicus, and Cicero as saviour. Each of these personae, it is demonstrated, are ultimately employed by the statesman to establish authority as the res publica’s helmsman.</p>

The previous chapter focused on the motivational side of the virtue of honesty. But moral virtues are normally understood to consist of more than just motivational states. Virtuous thoughts of various kinds, for instance, play a role, and honesty is no exception. Here is another common observation about moral virtues: they are connected in some way to practical wisdom. This has long been held by Aristotelian approaches in particular, and it is important to clarify what relationship, if any, practical wisdom bears to honesty. Hence the goal of this chapter is to explore the role of virtuous thoughts and practical wisdom with respect to the virtue of honesty.

<p><b>In the wake of Caesar’s assassination, Cicero was without the necessary magisterial and martial authority to direct affairs and his influence over the fractious Senate was fragile at best. So, too, did he face the challenge of physical distance. With influential statesmen scattered across the Roman world, the reliance on correspondence for political manoeuvring and the performance of self was more pronounced than ever before. Cicero’s letters, then, played an essential role in his self-fashioning of authority after the Ides of March.</b></p> <p>This thesis illuminates the nuanced, critical, and underappreciated role that Cicero’s correspondence played in his cultivation of fresh influence after Caesar’s death by assessing the post-Ides corpus through the lens of ethos. In particular, Aristotle’s conception of ethos as comprising phronesis (‘practical wisdom’ or ‘prudence’), eunoia (‘goodwill’ or ‘benevolence’), and aretē excellence’ or ‘moral virtue’) provides a valuable framework. When applied to the letters, three distinct instances of epistolary persona creation are revealed: Cicero as Nestor, Cicero as amicus, and Cicero as saviour. Each of these personae, it is demonstrated, are ultimately employed by the statesman to establish authority as the res publica’s helmsman.</p>

This study begins to unravel the multiple bidirectional relationships between service-learning pedagogy and civic and academic engagement attitudes and behaviors. A quasi-experimental, nonequivalent comparison group pre- and post-test design was used with a sample of 300 first-semester freshmen participating in either a service-learning-based learning community or a learning community without service-learning. Participants completed a pre-test at the beginning of the semester measuring high school civic and academic engagement behaviors and attitudes and a post-test at the end of the semester measuring the same variables based on their first semester in college. Students with higher civic engagement attitudes and behaviors prior to college were more likely to take a service-learning course than students with lower civic engagement attitudes and behaviors. Students in service-learning were more likely to participate in community activities than students not participating in service-learning. Finally, within the service-learning groups, students who were more academically engaged had higher academic and civic attitudinal engagement at the end of the course. Students who were more civically engaged were more likely to see lower costs of helping to themselves; they did not change in terms of their beliefs about the community’s needs. This study replicates and extends previous research to demonstrate that there are multiple bidirectional relationships among these variables that need to be taken into account in research and practice.

In this chapter, I should like to suggest that during the late thirteenth century, specifically between Aquinas and Scotus, there were some important developments in moral philosophy in which certain concepts were articulated which could be classified as more ‘modern’, and that these developments can be seen clearly in changing scholastic attitudes to the Aristotelian claim that there cannot be prudence (phronesis, also translated in this chapter as ‘practical wisdom’) without moral virtue. The first thing to be done here, of course, is to try to come to an understanding of what is ‘modern’ about modern ethics. However, the more one tries to understand what is distinctively ‘modern’, the more one becomes conscious of trying to impose a kind of artificial homogeneity upon a time period which consists of very different thinkers and ideas. The following description of modern ethics, then, is an attempt merely to identify certain prominent strands in a very complex pattern. One way to start thinking about how modern ethics should be characterised has been given to us in recent years by scholars working on virtue ethics. These scholars tend to identify the distinctiveness of modern ethics by contrasting it with ancient ethics. Modern ethics, they claim, is an

This article examines the complementary pathway initiatives that are burgeoning in Australia, which include community sponsorship, labour mobility, and — more recently — education pathways. Set against a review of Australia’s recent policy past, including an enduring deterrence-based asylum policy and politicised resettlement cap and ongoing challenges for refugee family reunification, we map the political and policy changes that have led to the opening of a policy window for a suite of complementary pathways to be conceived, designed, and delivered in Australia. We also trace the actions of Australian policy entrepreneurs who have worked to develop complementary pathways that creatively meet the ever-expanding need for durable solutions, as envisaged in the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees and strategically set out in UNHCR’s the Third Country Solutions for Refugees: 2030 Roadmap. With community, private sector, and civil society groups bringing underutilised resources to help Australia meet the need for more pathways to long-term safety for refugees, we argue that narratives around refugee resettlement, as well as Australia’s contribution to international protection, are at a crossroad. We will outline each complementary pathway initiative, with reference to comparative models overseas, before ending with discussion of the need for a coherent programme of complementary pathways, each with clear policy objectives and key principles and a strengthened commitment to retaining the integrity of Australia’s commitment to global resettlement efforts.

How might bioethics take account of cultural diversity? Can practical wisdom of an Aristotelian sort be applied across cultures? After showing that practical wisdom involves both intellectual cleverness and moral virtue, it is argued that both these components have universality. Hence practical wisdom must be universal as well. Hellenic ethical thought neither depended on outdated theoretical notions nor limited itself to the Greek world, but was in fact developed with constant awareness of cultural differences, so it arguably works as well in other times and places when formulated. Even the eudaemonistic setting for practical wisdom is unproblematic.