Abstract
Containing customer fraud has great economic relevance. This research proposes a fresh approach, derived from mental accounting theory and behavioral pricing research. Large-scale field data from more than 100,000 insurance customers and a follow-up experiment reveal that payment schemes influence customer fraud. Specifically, customers with annual payment schedules submit more rejected claims soon after their lump sum payments, and customers with monthly payment schedules exhibit greater customer fraud, in an effect that increases over time and decreases with greater category involvement. Customers who actively pay using money transfers submit about 40% more claims that get rejected than those who rely on more passive payment methods, such as autopay or direct debit. Marketing practitioners thus should reconsider frequent payment schedules and active payment options and monitor customer behavior after lump sum payments. For marketing research, this study opens a new research avenue, linking customer misbehavior and behavioral pricing research within a mental accounting framework.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
