Exploring the Evolution of Cotton Policy: Linking Politics and Policy in Agricultural Economics Education

In seeking to explain why poor countries tend to choose policies that tax agriculture relative to manufacturing while rich countries do the opposite, archetypical parameters for a poor agrarian economy and a rich industrial one are inserted in a computable general equilibrium model to simulate the medium-term effects on income distribution of policies that distort the relative prices of tradables. The model includes a non-tradables sector and intermediate inputs, realistic features that ensure even greater skewness in the distributional effects of protection than simpler models suggest. The magnitude of the results helps explain the tendency for countries to change gradually from taxing to subsidizing agriculture relative to manufacturing as their economies develop. The paper draws out the implications of the analysis for agricultural and trade policy reform in the 1990s.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomieVolume 68, Issue 2 p. 139-142 SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE Introduction to the special issue on COVID-19 and the Canadian agriculture and food sectors: Thoughts from the pandemic onset Alan P. Ker, Corresponding Author Alan P. Ker [email protected] Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, OAC Research Chair in Agricultural Risk and Policy, Guelph, Canada Institute for the Advanced Study of Food and Agricultural Policy, University of Guelph, Guelph, Canada Department of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Guelph, Guelph, Canada Correspondence Alan P. Ker, Department of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Guelph, Guelph, ON, N1K 1E7, Canada. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorRyan Cardwell, Ryan Cardwell Department of Agribusiness and Agricultural Economics, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, CanadaSearch for more papers by this author Alan P. Ker, Corresponding Author Alan P. Ker [email protected] Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, OAC Research Chair in Agricultural Risk and Policy, Guelph, Canada Institute for the Advanced Study of Food and Agricultural Policy, University of Guelph, Guelph, Canada Department of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Guelph, Guelph, Canada Correspondence Alan P. Ker, Department of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Guelph, Guelph, ON, N1K 1E7, Canada. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorRyan Cardwell, Ryan Cardwell Department of Agribusiness and Agricultural Economics, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, CanadaSearch for more papers by this author First published: 27 April 2020 https://doi.org/10.1111/cjag.12245Citations: 34Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume68, Issue22020 Special Issue: COVID‐19 and the Canadian agriculture and food sectors: Thoughts from the pandemic onsetJune 2020Pages 139-142 This article also appears in:COVID-19 and the Canadian Agriculture and Food Sectors: Thoughts from the Pandemic Onset RelatedInformation

List of Tables and Figures. Preface. List of Abbreviations. Prologue . Chapter 1: Introduction: The Problem of Agricultural Subsidies . Benin. Western Agricultural Subsidies. Organization of the Book. Chapter 2: The Economics of Government Intervention . Introduction. The Invisible Hand. Market Failures. Violation of the Basic Conditions: Imperfect Competition, Information and Risk. Public Goods and Externalities. Income Distribution, Poverty and Inequality. Conclusion. Appendix 2-1: The Theory of the Invisible Hand. Appendix 2-2: The Prisoners' Dilemma. Chapter 3: The Structure of the World Food System . Introduction. Historical Perspectives. The World Food System. Agribusiness, Government and Science. Conclusion. Appendix 3-1: Country and Commodity Classifications used in Statistical Tables. Chapter 4: Global Institutions and the World Trade Organization . Introduction. The World Trade Organization. Agriculture in the WTO. Trade and Development. Appendix 4-1: Comparative Advantage. Chapter 5: The Nature and Scope of Agricultural Subsidies in High-Income Countries . Introduction. Agricultural Policy Objectives and Tools. Agricultural Subsidies in OECD Countries. Effects of OECD Agricultural Subsidies. Conclusion. Chapter 6: U.S. Agricultural Policy: How Not to Save the Family Farm. Introduction. Historical Overview of U.S. Farm Policy. The Impacts of U.S. Farm Subsidies. The Politics of U.S. Agricultural Policy. Appendix 6-1: ERS Farm Typology. Chapter 7: Agricultural Policy in the European Union: Europe's Sacred Cows . Introduction. Agricultural Policy in the European Union. The Impact of the Common Agricultural Policy. Appendix 7-1: Green Currencies and the Re-Nationalization of the CAP. Chapter 8: Agricultural Policy on the Pacific Rim: Non-Trade Concerns Versus Comparative Advantage. Introduction. Japan and Korea. Australia and New Zealand. Conclusion. Chapter 9: Agricultural Policy in Developing Countries: Cheap Food . Introduction. The Developing World. Agricultural Policy in Developing Countries. The Impacts of Agricultural and Trade Policy Reforms. Conclusion. Appendix 9-1: Country Lists. Chapter 10: Conclusion: Whither Agricultural Policy? . References. Index

This article analyzes the implications of World Trade Organization (WTO) accession for Russian agricultural policy. Using Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data on producer support from 2010, we identify two major characteristics of Russian agricultural and trade policy (a) reliance on sizeable differences between world and domestic prices to generate two-thirds of agricultural producer support and (b) highly distortionary budget support. We then consider whether the disciplines introduced by WTO accession will constrain or even roll back these distortionary policies, thereby substantially changing the nature of agricultural policies in Russia. Using data from OECD-FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) and Russian Ministry of Agriculture projections, we conclude that the structure of OECD-type producer support in 2020 will be very similar to its current state. Market price support will continue to dominate the Producer Support Estimate, and the projected Current Total Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) will approach the WTO Bound Total AMS (the ceiling on production-distorting support) only in 2018. For the reasons above, we conclude that although WTO accession provides opportunities for important changes in Russian sanitary, phytosanitary, food safety, trade, and tariff policies, membership is not a guarantee of systemic change. In fact, a serious look at Russian WTO commitments makes a minimum-change scenario quite possible and even likely.

Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomieVolume 69, Issue 2 p. 155-159 SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE Introduction to the special issue on COVID-19 and the Canadian agriculture and food sectors: Thoughts one year into the pandemic Alan P. Ker, Corresponding Author Alan P. Ker [email protected] Department of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economics, and Institute for the Advanced Study of Food and Agricultural Policy, University of Guelph, Ontario, Canada Correspondence Alan P. Ker, Department of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economics, Institute for the Advanced Study of Food and Agricultural Policy, University of Guelph, Ontario, Canada. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorRyan Cardwell, Ryan Cardwell Department of Agribusiness and Agricultural Economics, University of Manitoba, Manitoba, CanadaSearch for more papers by this author Alan P. Ker, Corresponding Author Alan P. Ker [email protected] Department of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economics, and Institute for the Advanced Study of Food and Agricultural Policy, University of Guelph, Ontario, Canada Correspondence Alan P. Ker, Department of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economics, Institute for the Advanced Study of Food and Agricultural Policy, University of Guelph, Ontario, Canada. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorRyan Cardwell, Ryan Cardwell Department of Agribusiness and Agricultural Economics, University of Manitoba, Manitoba, CanadaSearch for more papers by this author First published: 28 April 2021 https://doi.org/10.1111/cjag.12289Citations: 2 Financial support to cover both page charges and technical editing was provided by the following: (i) Canadian Agricultural Economics Society; (ii) Masters of Food and Resource Economics (MFRE) Program, The University of British Columbia; (iii) Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Saskatchewan; (iv) Sol Sinclair Institute of Farm Management, University of Manitoba; (v) Department of Agribusiness and Agricultural Economics, University of Manitoba; (vi) Department of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Guelph; (vii) McCain Family Chair in Food Security, University of Guelph; (viii) Institute for the Advanced Study of Food and Agricultural Policy, University of Guelph; (ix) OAC Research Chair in Agricultural Risk and Policy, University of Guelph; (x) Ridgetown Campus, University of Guelph; and (xi) Département d’économie agroalimentaire et sciences de la consommation, Universite Laval Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume69, Issue2June 2021Pages 155-159 RelatedInformation

Acting on complaints by Brazil, the World Trade Organization (WTO) adopted in Spring 2005 two dispute settlement reports that not only require changes to U.S. and European agricultural but alter the balance of concessions reached in the 1994 Agreement on Agriculture, further complicating the task of tightening agricultural disciplines underway in the Doha Development Round. The Cotton report reclassifies from the green box (permitted subsidies) to the amber box (subject to reduction commitments) two U.S. programs whose payments are based on historical acreage and yields and thus were thought by most observers to be decoupled both from price and production, the archetypal exemption from reduction commitments for non-trade distorting subsidies. The panel concluded that the so-called fruit and vegetable exception, which results in reduced payments if the grower plants certain crops, was sufficient to link payments to production, despite evidence that virtually all cotton recipients would in any event have continued to plant cotton on their base acreage. The panel went on to find that subsidies to cotton producers exceeded the U.S. reduction commitment in the Agreement on Agriculture and caused world cotton prices to be significantly suppressed, an actionable form of injury to Brazil's cotton exporters under the WTO Subsidies Agreement. We conclude that it is difficult to argue with the Panel's finding that price support programs tied to world prices have market insulating effects on farmers and a negative impact on world cotton prices. However, even in the absence of U.S. cotton policy, world cotton prices may be distorted from widespread use of subsidies by other cotton-producing nations. As a result, the Panel's statements concerning price suppression in the absence of U.S. cotton policy should be interpreted with caution, because price suppression can exist even in the absence of the U.S. cotton policy. Even more importantly, the Panel's failure to quantify either the magnitude of the subsidies or the nature of the price effects leaves governments without a road map to conform their agricultural support programs to these strict-liability interpretations of WTO mandates. The EC regime establishes production quotas for two categories of sugar, labeled sugar and These are the maximum amounts of that may be sold within the EC in a given year. Producers must any surplus amounts, designated Domestic prices for and are supported by an array of government measures and also receive subsidies. EC producers receive no additional funds from the EC if they a large amount or no sugar. The Sugar panel found that or are part of the same line of production and thus to the extent that the fixed costs of A, or are largely paid for by the profits made on sales of and sugar, the EC regime provides the advantage which allows EC producers to produce and at below total cost of production. The Sugar panel's finding that below-cost exports of an agricultural product may, even in the absence of direct represent proof of subsidization if there is close linkage between these exports and domestic support programs makes the U.S. rice, corn, soybeans, and other commodities programs vulnerable to dispute challenge. The finding also substantially complicates the EC's task of bringing its regime into compliance with its reduction commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture. If the 4 million tons of sugar exports benefit from prohibited export subsidies, either these exports must be eliminated or their subsidization must be ended. The former approach will put the EU in breach of its agreements with ACP countries and with India. The latter will be difficult, if possible at all, without elimination of domestic support for A and B quota sugar, because the Sugar opinions leave the EC with little guidance as what level of domestic support would end C cross-subsidization. As in the Cotton case, the lack of quantification has left the losing WTO Member in a position of not knowing how to bring its subsidy program into compliance. Using both subsidies law and trade economics, we argue that these decisions markedly change the starting positions in the Doha Round by blurring distinctions between the boxes that were clear to agriculture negotiators during the Uruguay Round, as well as distinctions between domestic and subsidies crucial to the balances struck in the Agreements on Subsidies and on Agriculture. No matter how destructive of efficient markets large subsidies may be, these cases should not be seen as proof that developing countries can bring to justice rich nations that abuse their financial power to cause injury. The cases simply demonstrate that an agricultural superpower can take advantage of technical traps caused by imprecise drafting and an increasingly literal WTO dispute settlement system with a built-in bias against deference to national agencies to penetrate its most desirable markets.

Agricultural trade policies in the new millennium

Following the World Trade Organization (WTO) ruling favoring Brazil over U.S. cotton growers, the debate continues over the impact of U.S. farm policy. For U.S. cotton policy, the price impact depends on several factors, including the extent to which it is decoupled from production. The impact on world cotton prices under decoupling (the loan rate is used in supply response analysis) is much less than under coupling (the target price is used in producer production decisions). Also, the welfare impacts are very different. Using cotton as an example, the welfare cost of U.S. cotton policy is much less under a decoupled program.

A contention in this Comment is that agricultural economists have had more influence than Bates and Edwards (2016) seem to admit. Also, it seems reasonable to take a broader view of adjustment than just adjustment policy as there have been many changes in Australian agriculture, analysed and debated by agricultural economists, that have impacted on the ways in which adjustment has occurred. However, as Edwards and Bates note, structural change in the farm sector is subject to many forces other than agricultural policy change and there are other major economic forces including human capital development, technological change and relative price shifts that bring about changes in the structure of agriculture. A brief search of some parliamentary documents relating to agricultural adjustment and a scan of the references clearly reflect the fact that many Australian agricultural economists have been involved and have contributed to the ideas relating to agricultural adjustment (e.g. Harris et al. 1974; Wilkinson 1999). Further, it does not take long to find agricultural economists who have led and contributed to major reviews of many industry policies that have had adjustment consequences, for example the McColl (1988) Royal Commission into Grain Storage, Handling and Transport, reviews of the wool industry, reviews of the dairy industry (Drane and Edwards 1961) and many others even more recently. Of course, the impact on agricultural adjustment is difficult to assess, but the input efforts have been significant. Also, general deregulation in agriculture has had impacts on farm size and farm numbers in addition to the direct changes in agricultural adjustment policies. Many agricultural economists, far too numerous to list, from academia, government and the private sector including farmer groups, have contributed to deregulation. Another major impact of agricultural economists has been through ABARES and the former Bureau of Agricultural Economics, and the Productivity Commission and its predecessors. The impact in both cases is direct through ministerial briefings and other advice provided to government organisations and the information provided to the public more generally. Many agricultural economists have been involved in these organisations. A number of high-profile agricultural economists with great influence over agricultural policy at various points in their careers have impacted agricultural adjustment policies – Sir John Crawford and his role in the formation of the Industries Assistance Commission (Parker 1987), the considerable number of directors of the BAE, ABARE and ABARES, John Kerin as Minister for Primary Industries, Geoff Miller as Secretary of the Department of Primary Industries (and Energy) and the many agricultural economists in leadership roles in State Departments of Agriculture. Difficult to measure and hard to draw a direct connection to agricultural adjustment is the contribution of academics in agricultural economics. Training in applied analysis has provided the human resources and technical support for many of the analyses, reviews and policy developments that have occurred in relation to agricultural adjustment. This is a somewhat hidden contribution but provides a background that has strengthened the rational analysis of many policies. Then, there is the role of those publishing in the Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics and the related journal, the Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics, where there has been a significant number of contributions, many referred to by Bates and Edwards. It is thus reasonable to conclude that agricultural economists have played a significant role in the area of agricultural adjustment when measured against the counterfactual position of not having agricultural economists contributing to the area.

Part 1 The setting: the economic setting for US food and agriculture, Daryll E. Ray and Roy Frederick world food and agricultural economy, Bruce L. Gardner and Abner W. Womack evolution of US food and agricultural policy - 1970s to 1990s, Robert G.F. Spitze and Barry L. Flinchbaugh structure of food and agricultural sector, Milton C. Hallberg and Dennis R. Henderson. Part 2 The issues - environment: water, agriculture and public policy, Norman K. Whittlesey and Roy R. Carriker land-use issues, Michael R. Dicks and C. Tim Osborn sustainable agriculture, Glenn A. Helmers and Dana L. Hoag. Part 3 The issues - food and food aid: domestic food-aid programmes, Jean D. Kinsey and David M. Smallwood overseas food-aid programmes, Mark E. Smith and David R. Lee food quality - safety, nutrition and labelling, Carol S. Kramer and Julie A. Caswell. Part 4 The issues - international agriculture: international trade agreements, C. Parr Rosson III et al US agricultural trade policy, Ronald G. Trostle et al. Part 5 The issues - commodity-policy issues: farm prices, income, stability and distribution, Harold D. Guither et al agricultural-supply control, Fred C. White et al commodity policy, Ronald D. Knutson and Edward G. Smith. Part 6 The issues - marketing and risk management: federal marketing orders, Walter J. Armbruster and Robert A. Cropp commodity-promotion programmes, Olan D. Forker and John P. Nichols policy alternatives to protect against crop failure in US agriculture, Jerry R. Skees and Daniel B. Smith. Part 7 The issues - rural programmes and education: rural development and human-resource adjustment, Brady J. Deaton et al rural credit programmes, John R. Brake and David A. Lins issues in research and education, Robert L. Christensen and Ronald C. Wimberley.

Policy evolution can be a chain of events linked through reactions and counter-reactions. Each reform event in the sequence is facilitated by previous reform events. Though events in the sequence may seem insignificant when they happen, they may, over time, amount to substantial policy change. The analysis of the sequence of agricultural policy reforms in theEuropean Union (EU) from 1992 to 2008 demonstrates the utility of this approach to sequencing. The 1992 MacSharry reform triggered a sequence of reforms enabling EU agricultural policy makers to respond to subsequent challenges within the World Trade Organization (WTO) and over almost two decades substantially reshape the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in a manner which would have been politically unrealistic in the past. The internal dynamics of the CAP evolution made certain responses to these pressures more likely than others. By analysing internal reform dynamics within the CAP and how these intersect with development in the WTO, the chapter contributes to a more sophisticated understanding of how the CAP responds to pressures originating from farm trade negotiations within the WTO.

The biblical David vs. Goliath paradigm plays out very frequently in international trade disputes. In 2003, a tiny island state, Antigua and Barbuda (hereafter Antigua) took on the United States (hereafter U.S.) in a WTO (World Trade Organization) dispute, alleging that the U.S. violated the General Agreement on Trade in Services (hereafter GATS) obligations by effectively foreclosing its borders to overseas internet gambling services. It won at both the panel and the appellate levels. However, to this date, it has been unable to secure compliance by the U.S.This paper considers “cross retaliation" by suspending intellectual property rights under the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (hereafter TRIPS) as a viable remedy for developing countries such as Antigua that often find themselves at the receiving end of WTO inconsistent measures maintained by countries that are economically more powerful.Towards this end, it proposes a “Tiered IP suspension model," where certain kinds of Intellectual Property (hereafter IP) are targeted first for suspension before others, depending on the ease of objectively ascertaining the harm caused by the unauthorized use of such IP and/or the potential to induce compliance by the defaulting state. Illustratively, copyrights over sound recordings that have established rates for public performance are targeted first. If working with this tier of IP subject matter does not yield desired results, then the complaining state moves on to other IP where it is relatively more difficult to compute the loss caused to the IP owner (such as pharmaceutical patents) but which may be a more powerful tool to induce compliance. Such a model could be useful for a large number of developing countries, such as India and Brazil, that often find that, despite WTO victories, scofflaw states such as the U.S. and EU fail to comply. Towards this end, this paper offers a very concrete “development" oriented international trade law remedy.

Turning TRIPS on It's Head: An IP 'Cross Retaliation' Model For Developing Countries

The current trend in international trade is growing rapidly, along with these developments, the problems occurring in trade transactions are also increasing on the other hand the disputes arising in international trade are also increasing, under such conditions it is necessary to have greater legal role to overcome international trade issues. Several international trade dispute settlement institutions have been established but have not been well known and maximized in resolving international trade disputes whereas dispute settlement institutions play a huge role in the effort to create economic stability and world trade. Dispute resolution agencies that need special attention are Dispute Settlement Body and International Arbitration. In this article author using the goodfaith theory as the importand principle in the dispute dispute of international business. The author would like to disclose some international trade dispute settlement which becomes the choice for disputing countries so that the writer can formulate the following problem of Settlement of international trade disputes through the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and international trade disputes through international arbitration bodies.
 Keywords: international trade dispute, dispute settlement, Arbitration

Climate Change and Agriculture Policies: Managing Potential Risks to Agriculture Trade Liberalization