EXPLORING PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS IN ROHINTON MISTRY'S CHARACTERS

In a 'Message … on Evolution' to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences in 1996 Pope John Paul II speaks of both a physical continuity and an ontological discontinuity or leap regarding the origin of human persons.1 Alan Porter considers an ontological leap to be contrary to the 'gradualism' of evolution.2 In this paper we first present Pope John Paul II's views on evolution, the origin of human persons, and original sin more fully. Next we examine Porter's view more fully, as well as that of Denis Lamoureux who takes a gradualist approach to both human origins and human sin. We then summarize the proposals of Germain Grisez, Benedict Ashley and Earl Muller with regard to how an 'ontological leap' might be reconciled with evolution. They also consider how original sin might be reconciled with evolution. These various views and proposals, as well as a proposal that I put forward, are then assessed in terms of what seems to be most consistent with science, human experience, philosophy and Christian theology. Concerning human origins, it seems that a gradualism involving many steps pertaining to our biological and psychological dimensions could have taken place, along with an ontological leap pertaining to our moral and spiritual dimensions. In line with this we can also understand original sin. The church's magisterium is directly concerned with the question of evolution for it involves the conception of man: Revelation teaches us that he was created in the image and likeness of God (cf. Gn. 1:27–29) . … [M]an is called to enter into a relationship of knowledge and love with God himself, a relationship which will find its complete fulfillment beyond time, in eternity . … It is by virtue of his spiritual soul that the whole person possesses such a dignity even in his body . … Consequently, theories of evolution which, in accordance with the philosophies inspiring them, consider the spirit as emerging from the forces of living matter or as a mere epiphenomenon of this matter are incompatible with the truth about man. Nor are they able to ground the dignity of the person. With man, then, we find ourselves in the presence of an ontological difference, an ontological leap, one could say. However, does not the posing of such ontological discontinuity run counter to that physical continuity which seems to be the main thread of research into evolution in the field of physics and chemistry? Consideration of the method used in the various branches of knowledge makes it possible to reconcile two points of view which would seem irreconcilable. The sciences of observation describe and measure the multiple manifestations of life with increasing precision and correlate them with the time line. The moment of transition to the spiritual is not the object of this kind of observation, which nevertheless can discover at the experimental level a series of very valuable signs indicating what is specific to the human being. But the experience of metaphysical knowledge, of self-reflection, of moral conscience, freedom, or again, of aesthetic and religious experience, falls within the competence of philosophical analysis and reflection, while theology brings out its ultimate meaning according to the Creator's plans.3 The account of the Fall in Genesis 3 uses figurative language, but affirms a primeval event, a deed that took place at the beginning of the history of man. … "Although set by God in a state of rectitude, man, enticed by the evil one, abused his freedom at the very start of history. He lifted himself up against God and sought to attain his goal apart from him" (GS 13, 1). By his sin Adam, as the first man, lost the original holiness and justice he had received from God, not only for himself but for all human beings. Adam and Eve transmitted to their descendants human nature wounded by their own first sin and hence deprived of original holiness and justice; this deprivation is called "original sin." As a result of original sin, human nature is weakened in its powers; subject to ignorance, suffering, and the domination of death; and inclined to sin. … "We therefore hold, with the Council of Trent, that original sin is transmitted with human nature, 'by propagation, not by imitation' and that it is … 'proper to each' " (Paul VI, CPG, n. 16). The victory that Christ won over sin has given us greater blessings than those which sin had taken from us: "where sin increased, grace abounded all the more" (Rom 5:20).4 It is especially in regard to original sin in this second meaning that modern culture raises such strong reservations. It cannot admit the idea of a hereditary sin connected with the decision of a progenitor and not with that of the person concerned. It holds that such a view runs counter to the personalistic vision of man and to the demands which derive from the full respect for his subjectivity. However, the Church's teaching on original sin can be extremely valuable also for modern man who having rejected the data of faith in this matter, can no longer understand the mysterious and distressing aspects of evil which he daily experiences and he ends up by wavering between a hasty and unjustified optimism and a radical pessimism bereft of hope.5 Moreover, man, who was created for freedom, bears within himself the wound of original sin, which constantly draws him towards evil and puts him in need of redemption. Not only is this doctrine an integral part of Christian revelation; it also has great hermeneutical value insofar as it helps one to understand human reality. Man tends towards good, but he is also capable of evil.6 The premise that evolution was gradual but ensoulment was discontinuous predicates the irrational conclusion that for one generation the parents were animals without souls and their children humans, made in the image of God, and with souls. Biological gradualism is incompatible with a sudden ensoulment dichotomy both in the evolutionary history of humans and for a maturing foetus, human or animal. At some point … there must have existed a strange family. The parents are hominid "animals" without souls, incapable of the knowledge of good and evil and of the experience of God after death and thus devoid of any of the theological interpretations of "imago Dei". John and Jenny their children by contrast, have been ensouled by an arbitrary gift of God and possess all the physical, cognitive, behavioural and spiritual attributes of a human. This implies a speciation event involving one generation only which is an evolutionary, anthropological and spiritual absurdity . …7 the Image of God and human sinfulness were gradually and mysteriously manifested through many generations of evolving ancestors. The origin of spiritual characteristics that define and distinguish humanity is not marked by a single punctiliar event in history. Rather, these metaphysical realities arose slowly and in a way that cannot be fully comprehended. Their manifestation during human evolution is similar to that in embryological development. Consequently, there never was an Adam/s or Eve/s. [Concerning the] … question of another conjectural opinion, namely polygenism, the children of the Church … cannot embrace that opinion which maintains that either after Adam there existed on this earth true men who did not take their origin through natural generation from him as from the first parent of all, or that Adam represents a certain number of first parents. Now it is in no way apparent how such an opinion can be reconciled with that which the sources of revealed truth and the documents of the Teaching Authority of the Church propose with regard to original sin, which proceeds from a sin actually committed by an individual Adam and which, through generation, is passed on to all and is in everyone as his own.11 … [T]heology must assume that the spiritual capacity for free choice was given initially by a special divine intervention, which completed hominization, to a group of individuals small and cohesive enough to function socially as a single body. In this way, solidarity in sin by the whole of humankind was possible at the beginning. God may then have hominized additional groups which 'emerged into an already-given existential situation, and so shared prior to any personal act in the moral condition of humankind. In this sense, they shared "by propagation not by imitation" … even if not all humans were lineal descendants of a single couple . …' Therefore, 'there is no obstacle to thinking the original human community had a single leader whose action was decisive for its action as such.'13 Grisez's view would be an example of what Lamoureux calls punctiliar polygenism. [E]volutionary theory as a purely physical theory … is necessarily incomplete. In order to complete it as a theory which is … fully consistent with the principle of causality, it is necessary to refer to some superphysical creativity … [which is required] to explain the origin of human intelligence (or, better say, intelligent human beings), because … intelligent, creative thinking cannot be reduced totally to a function of the brain. Consequently, the evolutionary origin of human beings, while it must have been entirely consistent with the natural processes of biological evolution, also was a unique, creative event . … [Another possibility is that] … the origin of that final genetic trait responsible to produce a human brain capable of functioning at the human level depended on the mutation of one dominant gene that occurred in the germ-cells of a primate ancestor, which was not itself human but which then bred with another primate of its own kind to produce a male and female child who were genotypically the first human beings having fully human brains, and who by interbreeding became the ancestors of the entire human race. Either this or the former explanation is consistent with the interpretation of Genesis which is not concerned with the exact way in which the human species came into existence and began as a single interbreeding and intercommunicating species to have a history determined by a primordial act of human choice [i.e., original sin].14 [T]here is a single human race . … [T]he sin that disrupted human solidarity must have truly been sin. This in itself requires a spiritual dimension of human reality that simply transcends all other forms of life: monkeys … do not sin. … Furthermore, disrupted spiritual solidarity … and the universality of that condition require a disruption "in the beginning" – that is (as the Council of TRENT insisted), transmitted by propagation rather than merely by imitation . … But sin is a moral action, and this requires moral individuals.16 Christians have tended to prefer monogenetic evolutionary accounts. In point of fact, all that is strictly required by Christian faith is the universal solidarity in sin that is traced back "to the beginning". … There has been an implicit tendency to identify the human race (which is to say, rationally ensouled simians) with Homo sapiens and, accordingly, for many Christians to want to that Homo sapiens with a single There is no necessary theological to do ensoulment could have taken place prior to the of the final physical of the human or even after this had been would in interbreeding with the present solidarity of the human race had been In any event, the of the these of with any In the of evolution, it seems to that not only the of moral and spiritual life would have an ontological The first of psychological would also have a kind of or or an ontological animals the of psychological life seems to from who only experience a experiences such as how one experiences the or to more animals such as and who seem to experience many or a whole of psychological The and of that an individual experiences seems to be very to the of and present functioning of its as well as the of its body its and it seems that first to experience during As the individual into its or brain it to experience more and more it experiences to certain of its for to a or an to a for its in the individual will no longer be able to experience certain that it if the individual has a brain that it it then no longer experiences any the brain enough to it to do psychological experiences seem to be to the kind of brain and body an the psychological dimension of reality may have first with a genetic mutation capable of that kind of brain in a single that mutation was this capacity would then also be present in that genetic over time could have more and more brains, and capable of more and more psychological As as we we are the only living species on earth that has not only biological and psychological but also moral and spiritual dimensions. we can a kind of freedom that makes us responsible for our and and we can have a personal involving knowledge and with God, who is and who transcends the physical Pope Benedict of us human beings, created in the image of God, as free with souls and of we are persons, of us is only able to our moral and spiritual in this life we have that us to be the human child and all the human nature, with moral and spiritual at we can not these a certain of brain and psychological development. Nor can we if we have a brain that us the if the brain enough to and a certain level of psychological the person may be able to his or moral and spiritual the present to moral and spiritual in this seems to be to a certain level of present brain and psychological no or has been in the human As a I with and teaching that the human is a of a physical body and spiritual I have this view in another on philosophical and theological I will not all of I with Pope John Paul Grisez, Ashley and Muller that our moral and spiritual our capacity of or would have an ontological leap during evolution, which God a spiritual soul for human person. even a human is a living human an of the human species with a human nature, it seems that the most time that God created spiritual soul was body began to at and might the first human persons, with spiritual souls, have in the of proposals have some proposals, and the other views in this are assessed in the it seems that the of the first human person or during evolution may not have required a specific genetic the as an Christ was fully with a human body and he was also fully divine according to Christian faith and With in human history there within life in this a dimension or reality. This the of the or the second person of the who was fully with his human nature, body and the began with human that his human body began to this would not have biological but a by God, his was a and the the full of the divine and it required that there were in existence human beings with a true human It does not that the required any specific genetic Rather, it occurred at the time in human history by intelligence and which is greater than it seems that the moral and spiritual dimensions of human require brain and psychological to be in this God would have these were present in a hominid at in many individuals during part of their to the first human person or This may not have any specific genetic but God it at the most time according to It seems that the of the first human person would have as most with God their spiritual at their conception or that their body began to as was to faith original sin having one human and transmitted by human generation, it seems that there are possible one person who or two or more persons, the possibility of a who The one or more and their children the and so could then have with other of their biological These other of their species would have been very similar to them and The of the moral and spiritual would have the psychological experiences of the individuals who It would also have to certain in the This would have all of the human species were and by original sin, as is the original sin the first human person or would have been in the state of grace or with who in his body and was free from sin, beginning with his human who never committed sin, the first human person or did against God or sin original having who would not have been without sin, and their and so to us more than one human person was in the state of grace sin, it is that one of these and the other did which could have to some of the human race by original sin, and not It thus seems that most there was only one human person who or only a couple who the were the both human would have been in this original sin, with its for this is possible from a metaphysical and theological for it is also possible that there was only one human person the first human sin. God, who is free and could have initially created either a human soul for one human or he could have initially created souls for more than one human he or or they and had In either this proposal seems to be in line with the of original sin which is to all human 'by propagation, not by imitation' II By our personal we have all with this original sin. the of one to this was the of who was without sin, and never by a special or grace of God, to as the of our It seems that such a as in this is in line with the of doctrine on original sin, as well as what Pope John Paul II about both physical continuity and an ontological the origin of human occurred along these this would have a kind of from a within a from a biological this proposal is also in line with human evolution. In this I first a points Grisez, Muller and I then to Porter and conclusion that Pope John Paul II's views are in line with a of the and a metaphysical and theological of human Grisez's views are that free choice and the spiritual reality of either are present or However, his proposal that God hominized a whole group of humans all at and more groups all at after sin, would human ensoulment place at various of human from the to This proposal does not with the view that the most time God the spiritual both and was the body of the individual began to that at or a in the of an place the body to makes sense, the human person is a of physical body and spiritual In contrast, the proposal of is for all the individuals who would have been ensouled some time after their began to In the spirit of the [which are given in his that it is possible to a in with a by the of various … how a single mutation could have a sudden and during evolution on the of and us some into how it could have occurred at the genetic and In any two both a single which was the such mutation that one or two human capable of a fully human brain. This one or two from the would have been or to a spiritual soul or souls created by proposal is not it seems that a of his proposal is his an a spiritual soul so with his or genetic a single mutation could have to the first human then a mutation after this event, in a human that the capacity to such a human to human would not have received a spiritual soul from God, and would not be a This would be from the of and which are not the of human and are not human beings. a of proposal is that it would the view that all human beings are in dignity and human of the of their and This could be used to rather than in the image of the one God and with souls, all men have the nature and the by the of all are called to in the divine all therefore an … in personal … must be and as incompatible with and who is also a to teaching on the origin of human and original sin with biological evolution. view seems to be to both the proposals of and and these have been the are to to the by ensoulment could have taken place prior to the of the final physical of the human or even after this had been would in interbreeding with the present solidarity of the human race had been to evolutionary humans similar to us in between they began to and the of the their was from forms of modern humans and of about of the of of it is that as modern humans the they with these of the became Concerning this in of the of the that from and other humans may to for example in how the but most of these are to have no The human of modern humans, must have been to this it seems that ensoulment most occurred in modern humans some of them and with and In this way all humans or not they any from and the human nature with souls – having moral and spiritual – and are by original sin. The other proposal by in this paper is to the proposal by but does not the of the first human spiritual which in the first human to a specific genetic This the which from that certain could this and result in one or more of our species not having received a spiritual this were the they would not be in dignity with the of second proposal as we in this would also initially have of a biological and this is not required by the proposal in this It seems that one which some may against proposal is that if God began human spiritual souls in one or more individuals at a certain point in time, without a genetic that this may seem arbitrary on to this is that this is not any more arbitrary than the of Christ beginning at a certain point in time by As in there is no to that the was with a specific genetic mutation As we in Porter that biological gradualism is incompatible with a sudden ensoulment because in his view this would have irrational conclusion that for one generation the parents were animals without souls and their children humans, made in the image of God, and with This view that humans have souls and animals do but it does not the view of or that animals have souls, souls, humans have or spiritual souls, a kind of souls humans not only to the biological and psychological but also moral and spiritual to his of a sudden ensoulment dichotomy during evolution, Porter speaks of a strange the parents were of any of the theological interpretations of "imago children by … possess all the physical, cognitive, behavioural and spiritual attributes of a human. This implies a speciation event involving one generation only which is an evolutionary, anthropological and spiritual absurdity . As we have also the proposals of Pope John Paul Grisez, and the of this while biological gradualism in evolution, also an ontological leap regarding the of the spiritual of these proposals, second involves a species from a biological the first human child with a spiritual soul would have had a moral and spiritual and his or parents would in the of the proposal put in this they would have been very similar and proposals, the more fully human brain to a spiritual soul may have also some psychological but the child would have up in the culture of its we humans in that we have and psychological it may not have strange at all at the time, if the first human child had some as to other of his or As an we can consider how many great with their who some similar psychological to The first fully human child would have been more similar to his or than a and a This that an 'ontological leap' may not have been as strange as Porter the parents and child this could have as they to other better over the as the child of human origins is very in and various points of view and I with him that the origin of human beings in the image of God would have a which we cannot fully does not that we cannot understand or any that to the reality of the nature of the human as a of a physical body and a spiritual and sin, original sin. I the view that an ontological leap occurred during evolution (cf. Grisez, the proposal put in this and John Paul is required by a metaphysical of the human spiritual intelligence and The view that there was such an ontological leap is not necessarily to a and Rather, we can with human experience It is not possible to explain the moral and spiritual dimensions of human without that we have spiritual souls, which according to Christian are and other this is in line with a interpretation of those pertaining to an state of the person in some between death and nature, as we experience is not only one of us also has – to love God, and It is not possible to explain all of human evil only by biological and psychological and the we ourselves actually As Pope John Paul II II the doctrine of original sin is not only an integral part of Christian revelation; it also great hermeneutical value insofar as it helps one to understand human there was an ontological leap, with the first human person having received a spiritual soul created directly by God at conception (as to that his or body began to as is then, that first person would have enough to be able to his or moral and spiritual he or would have been capable of and against Therefore, sin in the human race would not have been but rather with a moral action, a sin, committed by an individual human person. if there was more than one person the first sin, no one of them would have the other in time, even if only Concerning both Pope John Paul II and Muller II and some very good points to original sin. These need not be In proposal I have also to to this In terms of of Genesis are not forms of modern or fully of the nature of these Pope John Paul II in his of the certain which they who we are in relationship to God and I with as well as Lamoureux himself that is part of and of God to an that was by In the of the it seems that Pope John Paul II's view regarding evolution involving both a physical continuity and an ontological leap is the of teaching on original sin is in line with good Christian and human experience and nature It can also be with evolution and human origins There is a of as he we have and are about evolution and human origins, from the of the natural can be as to the of Christian and a theology. In this paper we have a number of views with regard to evolution, the origin of human persons, and original sin. Porter and Lamoureux take a gradualist approach to both biological evolution and the origin of human Lamoureux also takes a gradualist approach to original sin. Pope John Paul Grisez, and the of this all a gradualist approach to biological evolution. of us that human nature not only a physical but also a spiritual which can only be by a by God in the of human person. a spiritual soul is to explain our moral and spiritual These the biological and psychological of animals and human a human soul for the first human person or would have an 'ontological to the of Pope John Paul an ontological leap can also us to understand original sin Grisez, and I have a proposals with regard to how an ontological leap may have occurred during the of biological evolution. This paper has not all views and proposals with regard to evolution, the origin of human persons, and original sin. proposal as well as of the views and proposals in this paper while to a to the of some very is not as a

Spatial Literary Studies: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Space, Geography, and the Imagination

This volume explores the affective nature of human relationships with the environment, focusing on the concept of affectivating. It examines affective involvement and agentivity in social encounters through examples like rituals, music, and poetry. The book challenges cultural psychology to emphasize subjectivity and human experience. The second volume of Annals of Cultural Psychology is dedicated to the affective nature of human social relationships with the environment. The chapters here included explore the historical, theoretical and practical dimensions of the concept of affectivating originally introduced by one of us (Valsiner, 1999), as a potential tool of inquiry into the affective-sensitive dimension of psychological life within a cultural-psychological framework. The concept of affectivating involves two psychological dimensions often undervalued or even obliterated from contemporary cultural psychology, namely the affective involvement and the agentivity of people in their social encounters.Through several examples --‘feeling-at-home’, silence spaces and rituals, memorials, music and poetry, among others-- we show individual’s concrete actions in mundane everyday life aim to give an affective personal sense to the world around. This focuses on the primary affective nature of human meaning construction that guides the person in one’s continuing feeling-into-the-world.At a theoretical level the notion of affectivation challenges contemporary Cultural Psychology to rescue subjectivity, not only symbolism. Affectivation propounds a return to the long, but partially forgotten, organismic tradition, represented in the history by thinkers like Wilhelm Dilthey, Jakob von Uexküll and Kurt Goldstein. Cultural psychology has to bring semiosis back to the vital background of human experience.

This volume explores the affective nature of human relationships with the environment, focusing on the concept of affectivating. It examines affective involvement and agentivity in social encounters through examples like rituals, music, and poetry. The book challenges cultural psychology to emphasize subjectivity and human experience. The second volume of Annals of Cultural Psychology is dedicated to the affective nature of human social relationships with the environment. The chapters here included explore the historical, theoretical and practical dimensions of the concept of affectivating originally introduced by one of us (Valsiner, 1999), as a potential tool of inquiry into the affective-sensitive dimension of psychological life within a cultural-psychological framework. The concept of affectivating involves two psychological dimensions often undervalued or even obliterated from contemporary cultural psychology, namely the affective involvement and the agentivity of people in their social encounters.Through several examples --‘feeling-at-home’, silence spaces and rituals, memorials, music and poetry, among others-- we show individual’s concrete actions in mundane everyday life aim to give an affective personal sense to the world around. This focuses on the primary affective nature of human meaning construction that guides the person in one’s continuing feeling-into-the-world.At a theoretical level the notion of affectivation challenges contemporary Cultural Psychology to rescue subjectivity, not only symbolism. Affectivation propounds a return to the long, but partially forgotten, organismic tradition, represented in the history by thinkers like Wilhelm Dilthey, Jakob von Uexküll and Kurt Goldstein. Cultural psychology has to bring semiosis back to the vital background of human experience.

This volume explores the affective nature of human relationships with the environment, focusing on the concept of affectivating. It examines affective involvement and agentivity in social encounters through examples like rituals, music, and poetry. The book challenges cultural psychology to emphasize subjectivity and human experience. The second volume of Annals of Cultural Psychology is dedicated to the affective nature of human social relationships with the environment. The chapters here included explore the historical, theoretical and practical dimensions of the concept of affectivating originally introduced by one of us (Valsiner, 1999), as a potential tool of inquiry into the affective-sensitive dimension of psychological life within a cultural-psychological framework. The concept of affectivating involves two psychological dimensions often undervalued or even obliterated from contemporary cultural psychology, namely the affective involvement and the agentivity of people in their social encounters.Through several examples --‘feeling-at-home’, silence spaces and rituals, memorials, music and poetry, among others-- we show individual’s concrete actions in mundane everyday life aim to give an affective personal sense to the world around. This focuses on the primary affective nature of human meaning construction that guides the person in one’s continuing feeling-into-the-world.At a theoretical level the notion of affectivation challenges contemporary Cultural Psychology to rescue subjectivity, not only symbolism. Affectivation propounds a return to the long, but partially forgotten, organismic tradition, represented in the history by thinkers like Wilhelm Dilthey, Jakob von Uexküll and Kurt Goldstein. Cultural psychology has to bring semiosis back to the vital background of human experience.

This volume explores the affective nature of human relationships with the environment, focusing on the concept of affectivating. It examines affective involvement and agentivity in social encounters through examples like rituals, music, and poetry. The book challenges cultural psychology to emphasize subjectivity and human experience. The second volume of Annals of Cultural Psychology is dedicated to the affective nature of human social relationships with the environment. The chapters here included explore the historical, theoretical and practical dimensions of the concept of affectivating originally introduced by one of us (Valsiner, 1999), as a potential tool of inquiry into the affective-sensitive dimension of psychological life within a cultural-psychological framework. The concept of affectivating involves two psychological dimensions often undervalued or even obliterated from contemporary cultural psychology, namely the affective involvement and the agentivity of people in their social encounters.Through several examples --‘feeling-at-home’, silence spaces and rituals, memorials, music and poetry, among others-- we show individual’s concrete actions in mundane everyday life aim to give an affective personal sense to the world around. This focuses on the primary affective nature of human meaning construction that guides the person in one’s continuing feeling-into-the-world.At a theoretical level the notion of affectivation challenges contemporary Cultural Psychology to rescue subjectivity, not only symbolism. Affectivation propounds a return to the long, but partially forgotten, organismic tradition, represented in the history by thinkers like Wilhelm Dilthey, Jakob von Uexküll and Kurt Goldstein. Cultural psychology has to bring semiosis back to the vital background of human experience.

This volume explores the affective nature of human relationships with the environment, focusing on the concept of affectivating. It examines affective involvement and agentivity in social encounters through examples like rituals, music, and poetry. The book challenges cultural psychology to emphasize subjectivity and human experience. The second volume of Annals of Cultural Psychology is dedicated to the affective nature of human social relationships with the environment. The chapters here included explore the historical, theoretical and practical dimensions of the concept of affectivating originally introduced by one of us (Valsiner, 1999), as a potential tool of inquiry into the affective-sensitive dimension of psychological life within a cultural-psychological framework. The concept of affectivating involves two psychological dimensions often undervalued or even obliterated from contemporary cultural psychology, namely the affective involvement and the agentivity of people in their social encounters.Through several examples --‘feeling-at-home’, silence spaces and rituals, memorials, music and poetry, among others-- we show individual’s concrete actions in mundane everyday life aim to give an affective personal sense to the world around. This focuses on the primary affective nature of human meaning construction that guides the person in one’s continuing feeling-into-the-world.At a theoretical level the notion of affectivation challenges contemporary Cultural Psychology to rescue subjectivity, not only symbolism. Affectivation propounds a return to the long, but partially forgotten, organismic tradition, represented in the history by thinkers like Wilhelm Dilthey, Jakob von Uexküll and Kurt Goldstein. Cultural psychology has to bring semiosis back to the vital background of human experience.

This volume explores the affective nature of human relationships with the environment, focusing on the concept of affectivating. It examines affective involvement and agentivity in social encounters through examples like rituals, music, and poetry. The book challenges cultural psychology to emphasize subjectivity and human experience. The second volume of Annals of Cultural Psychology is dedicated to the affective nature of human social relationships with the environment. The chapters here included explore the historical, theoretical and practical dimensions of the concept of affectivating originally introduced by one of us (Valsiner, 1999), as a potential tool of inquiry into the affective-sensitive dimension of psychological life within a cultural-psychological framework. The concept of affectivating involves two psychological dimensions often undervalued or even obliterated from contemporary cultural psychology, namely the affective involvement and the agentivity of people in their social encounters.Through several examples --‘feeling-at-home’, silence spaces and rituals, memorials, music and poetry, among others-- we show individual’s concrete actions in mundane everyday life aim to give an affective personal sense to the world around. This focuses on the primary affective nature of human meaning construction that guides the person in one’s continuing feeling-into-the-world.At a theoretical level the notion of affectivation challenges contemporary Cultural Psychology to rescue subjectivity, not only symbolism. Affectivation propounds a return to the long, but partially forgotten, organismic tradition, represented in the history by thinkers like Wilhelm Dilthey, Jakob von Uexküll and Kurt Goldstein. Cultural psychology has to bring semiosis back to the vital background of human experience.

Reviewed by: Embodying Gender and Age in Speculative Fiction: A Biopsychosocial Approach by Derek J. Thiess Carter F. Hanson (bio) Derek J. Thiess. Embodying Gender and Age in Speculative Fiction: A Biopsychosocial Approach. New York and London: Routledge, 2016. Print. Derek Thiess names the methodology of his study explicitly in his subtitle—A Biopsychosocial Approach—and readers should take immediate note because this study is all about its critical approach. Thiess' main intent is to demonstrate the efficacy of the biopsychosocial model, a leading clinical model of treating patients in health and developmental psychology, for literary criticism. As its name implies, a biospsychosocial approach to treatment stresses holistic attention to a person's physical needs, individual psychology, and sociological environment (13). Taking up Sherryl Vint's call in Bodies of Tomorrow (2007) for an ethically "embodied subjectivity" that values "bodies that matter," Thiess takes issue with the "social constructivist" approach of [End Page 412] many feminist and youth studies critics, which ignores important elements of identity, especially biological age (4–11). In his introduction and first chapter, Thiess engagingly critiques how understanding markers of identity, such as gender, class, race and age, as constituted entirely within social structures and discourses leaves theorists such as Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, and Nancy Lesko no conceptual space for the "biological and psychological pain and pleasure [of] the individual body" (20). Bodies become abstracted and hence ageless, and this exclusion or abjection of the body does a particular disservice to those whose bodies are especially vulnerable: children and the elderly. Thiess seeks not to discard or reject social constructions of identity, but rather to include biological and psychological dimensions in the critical mix in order to ethically embody the subjects of literary texts. Thiess' first full application of his model looks at the character of Bella in Stephenie Meyer's Twilight as a 17-year-old girl in a "pederastic relationship" with a 108-year-old male vampire (43). Examining the sociological research that points to significant risk factors for teenage girls in relationships with older boys or men, Thiess argues that the Twilight series works to normalize such coercive relationships among female adolescents. Thiess posits that speculative fiction (sf)—or more often in his choice of texts, science fiction—is particularly well suited as a genre for his project because being less "constrained by physical reality, it allows us to consider topics such as gender in new ways" (5). Despite this potential, however, Thiess acknowledges that the history of sf is littered with novels, stories, and subgenres that mainly reinforce stereotypical patterns of white male power. To counteract this tendency, Thiess invokes Judith Fetterley's second-wave feminist concept of resistant reading, whereby the critic deliberately reads against the author's apparent intentions to uncover the text's blind spots, particularly with regard to assumptions about human experience. Thiess employs resistant reading to good effect in chapter 3 in his interesting analysis of age and care work (caregiving) in Octavia Butler's Parable of the Sower (1993) and Parable of the Talents (1998). Placing Butler in the context of social constructivist views of youth that tend to treat children as miniature adults—where the "precociousness of children is often assumed"—Thiess shows that Butler's novels extend this idea "to the point of negating biological age" (71). In the dystopian Parable novels, protagonist Lauren Olamina is already a community leader and founder of a new religion, Earthseed, as a teenager, and feels a strong social imperative to teach and care for her younger siblings and other community children. Thiess argues that by reducing age to a purely social construct, Butler's novels overlook the "physical and psychological limitations of age and the stress of care work on the body and mind" (82). As in all of his chapters, Thiess marshals an impressive array [End Page 413] of clinical, psychological, and sociological studies to draw attention to the individual embodied subject. Thiess is to be commended for mastering large bodies of research that few literary critics ever touch. Thiess' book is the latest volume in Routledge's Children's Literature and Culture series, and from a strictly literary perspective, the book is an uneven...

Climate change represents a global challenge that transcends geographic, political, and cultural boundaries, affecting not only environmental systems but also human behavior, social well-being, and the sustainability of life. This special issue of Perspectives on Climate Change and Human Behavior examines individual and community perceptions, attitudes, and responses to climate change, emphasizing decision-making at both personal and policy levels. The issue focuses on three interconnected themes: environmental education, mental health, and community action as strategic pathways toward resilience and sustainability. Contributions highlight the critical role of education and environmental awareness in fostering sustainable behavior. Studies explore best educational practices for promoting ecological consciousness, methodological innovations in assessing school–family collaboration, and the integration of territorial justice and social equity in local environmental programs. Psychological dimensions are addressed through research on social capital as a buffer against climate-related distress and the perspectives of vulnerable rural populations, particularly women. Additionally, the issue examines post-COVID challenges in education and sustainable development, addressing gaps in environmental literacy and the influence of cultural practices on adaptive governance of socio-ecosystems. Overall, the research underscores the urgency of interdisciplinary approaches that integrate knowledge, human experience, and cultural diversity, fostering critical participation and resilience. This special issue provides insights into the complex interplay between climate change and human behavior, offering evidence-based guidance for sustainable policy and practice.

This research paper explores the existential and psychological dimensions in the selected poetic works of Louise Gluck, focusing on the collections The Seven Ages and Averno. The study examines how Gluck’s poetry reflects the struggles of human existence, including themes of ageing, identity, isolation and the search for meaning. Through the poems “The seven ages” and “Fable”, the paper investigates the poet’s engagement with existential philosophy, particularly her reflections on mortality, transformation, and the human condition. Gluck’s use of allegory and myth reveals a profound awareness of the fragility of life and the complexities of selfhood. The paper also analyses the psychological aspects of Gluck’s writing by focusing on the poems “Averno” and “Persephone the Wanderer”. These works illustrate deep emotional trauma, inner conflict, and the lasting impact of personal and collective loss. The myth of Persephone is reimagined to reflect contemporary concerns about identity, memory and psychological endurance. The study highlights how Gluck’s poetry gives voice to internal suffering and healing through lyrical expression, demonstrating her distinctive blend of personal experience and mythic characters to explore the human psyche. Index Terms-Existential and Psychological aspects Objectives of the Study To analyse the existential themes present in Louise Gluck’s poetry, particularly in The Seven Ages and Averno. To explore the psychological dimensions in Gluck’s work, focusing on trauma, identity, and inner conflict. To examine how Gluck reinterprets mythological narratives such as the story of Persephone as vehicles for expressing contemporary psychological and existential concerns. To investigate the relationship between poetic language and her philosophical and emotional insights. To contextualise Gluck’s poetry within broader philosophical frameworks such as existentialism and psychoanalysis, and evaluate how these frameworks enhance the understanding of her work. Methodology of the Study: Close reading of selected poems from Gluck’s The Seven Ages and Averno and the application of existential philosophy and use of psychoanalytic theory.

For different reasons, some modern and postmodern psychologists are skeptical about the of psychological phenomena as irreducible, influential entities. Nonetheless, much psychological inquiry presumes precisely such a reality. We present a of reality approach to psychological that we believe can assuage some of the concerns of psychological skeptics. Our approach treats psychological as inseparably embedded in sociocultural, biological, and physical levels of reality, without being reducible to any of these other levels. We develop our of reality approach in relation to four different doctrines of realism, and elaborate its implications for understanding psychological phenomena. As we enter the twenty-first century, we psychologists are having trouble with reality. Some of us who hold more or less traditionally modern views with respect to psychological science want to treat psychological as if it were akin to physical (e.g., Matthews, 1998) and are therefore anxious to reduce psychological phenomena of interest to their presumed neurophysiological, chemical, and biological correlates. Some of us who hold postmodern and related views with respect to psychology as a human social construction are skeptical about psychological and physical alike (e.g., Gergen, 1994), especially when psychological is asserted to be natural or essential. To complicate matters, many of the reality-concerned of modern or postmodern persuasions appear to hold rather different conceptions of realism. In this article, we describe a of reality position that we believe might illuminate and possibly resolve some of the confusions and impasses in psychology's contemporary struggles. To set the stage for our presentation, we first offer three different, traditional doctrines of realism and consider a variety of brief examples of how these might play out with respect to various levels of physical and human phenomena. We then distinguish realism from related, but different, philosophical doctrines of naturalism, essentialism, foundationTh is d oc um en t i s c op yr ig ht ed b y th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia tio n or o ne o f i ts a lli ed p ub lis he rs . Th is a rti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r t he p er so na l u se o f t he in di vi du al u se r a nd is n ot to b e di ss em in at ed b ro ad ly . 178 Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psy. Vol. 19, No. 2, 1999 alism, and reductionism. We start this way because, on our reading of their works, many modernists, postmodernists, and others frequently conflate one or more of these doctrines or positions with realism or its opposite, and in so doing, contribute significantly to our woes. However, proceeding in this way also makes it apparent that traditional philosophical doctrines of realism may be inadequate with respect to ascertaining the ontological status of psychological phenomena per se. We therefore make one final preliminary move prior to presenting our of reality position and argument. This move consists of introducing a line of thought with respect to questions concerning that effectively rejects the entire debate between metaphysical realists and anti-realists as arising from a failure to understand human life and existence properly in the first place. This type of thinking takes human existence in the world as a basic, unitary that is not amenable to traditional metaphysical conjecture. It is available most originally in the work of Martin Heidegger (1962, 1982), especially as developed and extended by Charles Taylor (1985, 1995) and Charles Guignon (1991, Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999). Of particular relevance for our of reality position is the Heideggerian claim that meanings are as much a part of the world as are gravitation and mass. With these preliminaries in place, we turn directly to an explication of our of reality position and argument and conclude by considering some of its possible implications with respect to psychological inquiry. The point of all of this is to argue that psychological is neither as reducible as some modernists claim, nor as problematic as some postmodernists assert. Rather, psychological is irreducibly nested within physical, biological, and sociocultural levels of reality, all of which both enable and constrain it. Further, while psychological is not fixed, nor knowledge of it certain, it also is not so ephemeral and subjective as to escape psychologists' attempts to study it, so long as the conclusions from such studies are regarded as contingent, fallible, and subject to revision.

A fractal, a self-similar organic or geometric pattern that repeats at varying scales, is one of the most compelling characteristics found in nature. Previous studies on fractal patterns have demonstrated consistent trends in potential psychological benefits, such as stress reduction. However, we fall short of understanding one of the essential properties of fractals found in nature, i.e., the three-dimensionality of their appearance. In this study, we aimed at understanding the role of the three-dimensionalization of fractal patterns in spatial structures on human subjective perceptual experience. Two hundred seventy three-dimensional spatial prototype models were created for this study, spanning two dimensions: (1) the application of spatial depth (shallow; medium; deep) and (2) fractal complexity (low; medium; high). The participants rated each space on six psychological dimensions (bad–good; stressful–relaxing; ugly–beautiful; boring–interesting; leave–enter; ignore–explore). Significant effects of the application depth of fractals were observed primarily for “boring-interesting”, “ignore-explore”, and “leave-enter” dimensions and were primarily manifested within spaces with medium and high D-values. The results suggest that spatial depth plays a significant role in individuals’ experiences of fractal spaces, arguably by making the space more engaging and interesting.

Among literary greats, Shakespeare stands head and shoulders above the crowd. No writer has ever had the same lasting impact as Shakespeare. Homer, Dante, Leo Tolstoy, and Charles Dickens are just a few names that come to mind. Even though he wrote for a very limited theater audience in the late 16th and early 17th century, his plays continue to have a global appeal and are produced frequently. The renowned prognosis of Shakespeare's contemporaries, such as Ben Jonson, that his works would outlive their author, is still relevant today. While Shakespeare's genius remains elusive, his gifts as a writer are plain to see in his works, which evoke strong feelings and provoke thought. Thanks to his keen intellect, extraordinary lyrical talent, and keen perception, he was able to delve into universally relatable human emotions and conflicts. Using extraordinary wordplay and imagery, Shakespeare brought human experiences to life, in contrast to other authors who write about abstract ideas. Thanks to his talent for bringing his characters to life onstage, his works are both thought-provoking and approachable; they encourage audience participation and foster empathy. Beyond his literary contributions, Shakespeare had an impact on the evolution of the English language. His contributions to contemporary English are substantial, as he created numerous new terms and altered others. Looking at Shakespeare's sonnets, poems, and plays through the prism of reader-response theory, this study will investigate his unique writing style and the enduring influence he has had on literature.

Aim. This study focuses on the biblical layer found within the stories of Mitrush Kuteli. Through a multi-faceted approach, the study aims to shed light on the intricate layers of meaning embedded in Kuteli's narratives and their significance within the broader context of Albanian literature and cultural history. It also offers a detailed psychoanalytic interpretation of Kuteli's use of biblical elements, exploring their symbolic meanings and psychological implications. Methods. The research employs a combination of cultural, biographical, descriptive, and analytical methods to explore and understand the unique biblical dimension in Kuteli's work. Results. It classifies and analyses the different types of perceptions (sensory, fantastic, biblical, and universal) present in Kuteli's work. By investigating these aspects, the study provides a nuanced understanding of Mitrush Kuteli's literary contributions and the intricate layers of meaning within his work. Conclusion. Intertextuality serves as a valuable resource for writers to establish fresh interpretations and links among various texts, concepts, and cultures. The use of metaphorical language effectively expresses intricate emotions and ideas while also enhancing the overall atmosphere and tone of a story. The conflict between the tangible and the intangible is a core element of human experience, and literature often delves into this conflict to illuminate our perception of both ourselves and the surrounding world.