Explaining Self-Perceived Accountability of Regulatory Agencies in Comparative Perspective: How Do Formal Independence and De Facto Managerial Autonomy Interact?

Abstract

There is much scepticism about the accountability of regulatory agencies towards society. It is generally believed that their non-majoritarian nature and need for credible commitment, which motivate their formal independence, render the accountability of such agencies problematic (see Chapter 1 of this book). The need for upward accountability must be balanced with the strict principle of non-interference by politicians in the activities and decisions of such agencies. Agencification (or autonomization) of public sector organizations renders traditional forms of upward accountability towards political principals (ministers and parliaments) problematic, as autonomy and accountability have an uneasy relationship. Several authors point at alternative forms of accountability (see Chapter 1), including downward accountability towards stakeholders, peers and target groups, as ways to overcome deficiencies in upward accountability relations. However, it remains unclear to what extent such alternative accountability mechanisms are really effective (see, for instance, Schillemans 2008). In this chapter we look at the circumstances under which regulatory agencies have elaborated upward and downward accountability mechanisms, and to what extent their degree of formal independence, de facto managerial autonomy and political salience influence the use of such accountability mechanisms. Moreover, the chapter analyses to what extent and under what circumstances the use of upward and downward accountability mechanisms results in a high level of accountability towards society, as perceived by the senior management of regulatory agencies.