Explaining election violence: A meta-analysis

Cross-national research on African electoral politics has argued that competition increases the prospects for pre-election violence. However, there is a dearth of systematic research on the effect of political competition on pre-election violence at the subnational level. We theorize that in African democracies characterized by competition at the national level but low subnational competitiveness (polarization), violence is often a manifestation of turf war and a tool to maintain and disrupt political territorial control. Consequently, contrary to expectations derived from the cross-national literature, pre-election violence is more likely in uncompetitive than competitive constituencies. Locally dominant as well as locally weak parties have incentives to perpetrate violence in uncompetitive constituencies. For locally dominant parties, violence is a tool to shrink the democratic space in their strongholds and maintain territorial control. For locally weak parties, violence can disturb the dominance of the opponent and protect their presence in hostile territory. We hypothesize that pre-election violence will be particularly common in opposition strongholds. In such locations, ruling parties can leverage their superior repressive resources to defend their ability to campaign, while the opposition can use their local capacity to reinforce the politics of territoriality. We test our hypotheses with original constituency-level election violence data from the 2016 Zambian elections. Data come from expert surveys of domestic election observers and represent a novel way of measuring low-level variations in election violence. Our analysis shows patterns of pre-election violence consistent with our theory on pre-election violence as a territorial tool.

Highly contested elections are characterised by electoral violence and high levels of uncertainty that negatively impact on economic activities of the country. This is was a descriptive study. A case study design employed both qualitative and quantitative approaches to explore the impacts of electoral violence on economic development of Kenya by examining data during and after election periods. Quantitative data was derived from a desk review of economic monitor indicators from World Bank database and the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics for the period between 1990 and 2017. Qualitative data was from in-depth interviews which were conducted with five business individuals by use of a semi-structured interview guide. Comparative analysis of the data was done on an annual and monthly basis. Comparative analysis was also done for years of peaceful elections and years that experienced electoral violence. The findings suggested that electoral month was significantly affected by electoral violence in comparison to the electoral year. Economic activities remained stable and even increased during the years of peaceful elections in comparison to years of electoral violence. The findings revealed that significant economic development can be achieved with peaceful elections and therefore there is need to halt electoral violence through creation of awareness on the importance of embracing peaceful elections and its impact on the economy.

This article analyses over 19,000 articles from newspapers and parliamentary commission reports to reveal endemic electoral violence in England and Wales between 1832 and 1914. It offers a new understanding of the phenomenon in three main ways. First, the extent of election violence, which regularly featured major riots requiring police and military intervention, disturbances of the peace, and deaths, questions conventional understandings of Britain's comparatively peaceful political development through a century of gradual suffrage expansion, rising literacy and economic development. Second, the trajectory of the electoral violence, which peaked in the period after the Second Reform Act of 1867 rather than after the Great Reform Act of 1832, challenges the linearity of these accounts. Third, despite the recent historiographical emphasis on explaining electoral violence as a ritual expression of discontent, much violence resulted from elites strategizing to win elections. Electoral violence occurred disproportionately when and where it was most useful to candidates and parties, and often involved the previously overlooked figure of the ‘hired rough’: men employed to disrupt elections by force. We thus advance a political, rather than cultural, explanation for electoral violence.

Background:Research indicates that young people in Nigeria mistakenly think that participating in politics is a “do-or-die” situation. This tendency has resulted in varying political beliefs, attitudes, and behavior patterns that may be irrational. This has occasionally led to a rise in the rate of social disengagement, thuggery, and electoral violence among young people. As a result, there is a lack of psychologically based interventions addressing this issue, which puts young people’s welfare at risk. In light of these findings, the study examined the impact of rational emotive behavioral education (REBE) on electoral violence among students in federal universities in Southeast Nigeria.Methods:A pure experimental research design was used in the study. In all, 220 undergraduate students served as study participants. This sample was collected using a multiphase sampling technique. A modified version of the electoral violence attitude scale was used as an instrument for data collection. The mean, standard deviation, and analysis of covariance were used to analyze the data gathered.Results:The findings indicated that REBE effectively changed students’ perceptions of election violence. Compared with their male peers, female students experienced a greater decrease in electoral violence during the therapy period. Thus, when exposed to REBE, students’ electoral violence in federal universities in Southeast Nigeria was strongly influenced by their gender.Conclusion:The study concluded that the perception of students at federal universities in Southeast Nigeria about electoral violence can be effectively reduced by using REBE.

Election violence has the potential to threaten the peace and security of many nations and destabilize the social fabric. Scholars have argued that women and children bear the greatest burden in times of violence compared to men. The main purpose of this study was to assess the nature and aspects of gender integration during election violence in Kibera slum, Kenya. The study was guided by social integration theory by Emille Durkheim and employed the descriptive research design. Fischer formulae as suggested was used to arrive at the sample size of 384 respondents;
 S = X2 NP (1-P) / d2 (N-1) + X2 P (1-P). Data were collected by use of interviewee assisted questionnaires and unstructured interview schedules. Data were analyzed by use of the statistical packages for social scientists (SPSS version 17). Data were presented in form of frequency tables, bar graphs, pie charts and verbatims, Measures of data analysis used included the chi square, mean, R spearman’s rank order correlation. The study established that Kibera residents had a moderately cordial relationship with each other during election violence. Majority could seek help or be helped, buy property or land, marry or be married and employ or be employed by someone outside their ethnic, social class political and religious affiliations. Election violence had a negative relationship with ethnic affiliations, social class, political affiliation and religious affiliation aspects of gender integration, that is, an increase in election violence would lead to a decrease in gender integration. Generally, women were more integrated compared to men. The study recommends that NGOs, CBOs and FBOs enhance their non-partisan advocacy and carry out civic education to enlighten Kibera residents and Kenyans at large on the importance of gender integration especially during the elections.

ABSTRACTThis article focuses on a less visible and less studied type of political violence, namely violence that occurs within political parties. We use new, district-level data to compare the temporal and spatial dynamics of intra-party violence to those of general election violence across selected sub-Saharan African countries, including both democracies and autocracies, from 1998 to 2016. Relying on cross-national and sub-national analyses, we show that intra-party violence follows a unique pattern. First, unlike general election violence, intra-party violence peaks prior to election day as it is often sparked by individual parties’ candidate nomination processes. Second, low levels of competitiveness – typically theorized to reduce the risk of election violence – increase the risk of intra-party violence on the sub-national level. Thus, dominant party elections do not necessarily see less election-related violence than hotly contested elections. Rather, violence may be pushed from election day to intra-party competitions. If we neglect the study of violence within political parties, we thus risk underestimating the threat of election violence and misdiagnosing its causes.

Electoral violence remains a poignant issue in many societies, with Okene Local Government Area being no exception. This study examines the complexities of managing electoral violence within this region. It specifically investigates the underlying causes of electoral violence, the efforts and challenges faced by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in addressing this menace, and the broader implications for national security. The Marxian Political Economy approach provided the theoretical foundation for this research. A qualitative, descriptive research design was employed to gain in-depth insights into the subject matter. Data were gathered from both primary and secondary sources. Through purposive sampling, interviews were conducted with ten key informants and four IDI respondents. These interviews were guided by a structured qualitative interview, and the collected data were analysed using content analysis. The findings revealed that electoral violence in Okene is primarily driven by factors such as corruption, greed, exclusion from the political system, and economic deprivation, including unemployment and poverty. Additionally, the efforts of INEC in managing electoral violence are often hampered by limited resources, political interference, and challenges in coordination with security agencies. The study also highlighted significant security implications, including loss of lives and property, displacement, and erosion of public trust in governmental institutions. The study therefore recommends comprehensive strategies to address the root causes of electoral violence and enhance the capacity of electoral institutions like INEC. Recommendations include improved resource allocation, strengthened legal frameworks, and enhanced coordination between INEC and security agencies to mitigate the risks of electoral violence and safeguard national security.

<p>There is high temporal variability in the occurrence of the monsoon floods in Bangladesh during the South Asian summer monsoon. Detailed flood forecast information about flood timing and duration can play a vital role in flood preparedness decisions. The objective of this study is to understand different stakeholder perceptions about existing forecasting tools and data, and how these can support preparedness and response activities. Forecast users can be divided into three broad categories-national, sub-national and community level. The stakeholders working at national level are involved in policy making while the sub-national level involved in implementation of policies.  In order to identify the appropriate lead-time for better flood preparedness and the challenges in communicating probabilistic forecasts to users, semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders involved in various sectors of flood disaster management at national and sub-national level, community level household surveys, focus group discussions and a national consultation workshop were undertaken during the 2019 monsoon.</p><p>It was found all major stakeholders working at national and sub-national levels are aware of the availability of forecasts and receive flood forecasts from the Flood Forecasting and Warning Centre (FFWC). However, about 40% of the respondents at the community do not receive forecast information. Before the flood event, policy level stakeholders need to know the availability of resources and preparedness at the sub-national level for better response activities. On the other hand, sub-national level stakeholders of different government agencies act as a bridge between policy level and the local community. Existing short-range forecasts cannot provide information about the potential flood duration which is essential for resources assessment, mobilization and preparedness activities.</p><p>People living in the floodplain are aware about the flood seasons as it is an annual phenomenon. However, they can anticipate floods events only 2 to 3 days beforehand based on the available early warning and their risk knowledge. This short-range forecast can be used for some basic household level response activities such as protecting household equipment or moving their livestock to a safer place. It is essential to know the actual duration and flood extent for their agricultural decisions such as understanding when to transplant young crops into the field. The study found that all stakeholders need forecast information with a lead-time between 15 to 20 days for better flood preparedness decisions. People are likely to have seen deterministic forecasts so far and are not used to probabilistic forecasts with multiple scenarios for a same event. However, national forecast bulletins may include probability of flooding events based on a threshold known as flood danger level. Capacity development of the local community is necessary to improve understanding of the probabilistic forecast and overcome communication challenges.</p><p> </p><p> </p>

This study examines the effect of electoral violence and political apathy during the 2019 and 2023 gubernatorial election in Gombe state, Nigeria. The objective of the study is to analyze how electoral violence influenced voter turnout and political disengagement in both elections. The research adopts a survey research design, utilizing both quantitative and qualitative data collection methods. Data were gathered through the administration of questionnaires to 400 respondents in five local government areas and through key informant interviews with political stakeholders. Theoretical underpinning from is drawn from political culture theory. Findings reveal that electoral violence significantly contributed to political apathy in both 2019 and 2023, with voter intimidation, harassment, and destruction of electoral materials being prominent causes. The 2023 election experienced a reduction in violence and an increase in public trust in the electoral process, attributed to improved security measures and reforms implemented by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Despite this progress, political apathy persisted, especially among marginalized groups. The study concludes that electoral violence undermines democratic processes by deterring political participation and eroding public trust in elections. The study recommends strengthening law enforcement to prevent electoral violence, enhancing civic education to re-engage politically apathetic groups, and further reforming electoral practices to ensure free, fair, and credible elections in Nigeria.

What explains variation in incumbents’ choice of political violence perpetrators? Incumbents often sponsor violence in elections but do not typically engage in it themselves, instead delegating violence to security forces, armed groups, party wings, or regular citizens. Existing theory poorly explains such variation, which has privileged incumbents’ incentives to plausibly deny their involvement. This article develops a theory centred around variation in electoral violence perpetrators. Focusing on the subnational level, I argue that variation in rents helps explain why some incumbents recruit armed groups while others rely on ordinary citizens. Incumbents with access to large rents can afford to hire costly yet effective armed groups. In contrast, those with limited rents recruit cheaper but less capable alternatives such as ordinary citizens. I use over one hundred interviews conducted with politicians, journalists, voters, civil society members and citizens in four Nigerian states, Lagos, Rivers, Plateau and Nasarawa, to probe the plausibility of the argument. I triangulate interview findings with newspapers and observer reports. Findings show that in Lagos and Rivers, incumbents hire and maintain armed groups such as transport workers and cult groups due to high rents, while those in the low-rents state of Nasarawa hire citizens to perpetrate violence. The study contributes to the literature on decentralization, joint production of political violence, and the resource curse.

Meteorological variables play a significant role in the transmission of viruses such as influenza and the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19). Previous studies have identified the relationship between changes in meteorological variables, humidity, rainfall, and temperature, and the infection rate of COVID-19 at the national level in Pakistan. However, the current study applied the logistic regression analysis technique to determine such a relationship on a more detailed scale, that is, subnational levels in addition to the national level in Pakistan, using a long-term analysis of two years of COVID-19 data. At the subnational level, the logistic regression analysis technique was applied, with infection rate as the predictive variable. The results showed an increase in the infection rate of COVID-19 with increasing humidity levels. In contrast, an increase in temperature has slowed the spread of COVID-19 cases at both the national and subnational levels. The minimum temperature was statistically significant (p < 0.001) for provinces, KPK and Sindh. Also, two federal territories, AJK and Islamabad, showed statistically significant p-values. At the national level, both maximum temperature and humidity showed such values that is, p < 0.001. We believe that this is the first study conducted in Pakistan to explore the direct and indirect relationship between variables such as temperature (min and max), humidity, and rainfall as predictive parameters for COVID-19 infection rates at a detailed level. The pattern observed in this study can help us predict the future spread of COVID-19, subject to climatic parameters in Pakistan at both the national and subnational levels.

The impact of economic development of primary and secondary industries on national CO2 emissions: The case of Russian regions

Mortality rates are often disaggregated by different attributes, such as sex, state, education, religion, or ethnicity. Forecasting mortality rates at the national and sub-national levels plays an important role in making social policies associated with the national and sub-national levels. However, base forecasts at the sub-national levels may not add up to the forecasts at the national level. To address this issue, we consider the problem of reconciling mortality rate forecasts from the viewpoint of grouped time-series forecasting methods (Hyndman et al. in, Comput Stat Data Anal 55(9):2579–2589, 2011). A bottom-up method and an optimal combination method are applied to produce point forecasts of infant mortality rates that are aggregated appropriately across the different levels of a hierarchy. We extend these two methods by considering the reconciliation of interval forecasts through a bootstrap procedure. Using the regional infant mortality rates in Australia, we investigate the one-step-ahead to 20-step-ahead point and interval forecast accuracies among the independent and these two grouped time-series forecasting methods. The proposed methods are shown to be useful for reconciling point and interval forecasts of demographic rates at the national and sub-national levels, and would be beneficial for government policy decisions regarding the allocations of current and future resources at both the national and sub-national levels.

What makes some regions within a country more likely to experience electoral violence than others ? Based on this initial question, this Ph.D. thesis uncovers the mechanisms driving incumbent elites to use violence as an electoral tactic in non-democratic regimes. The local determinants of electoral coercion are investigated by means of a subnational and cross-national research design. The analyses are conducted using a newly collected dataset comprising events of electoral violence at the constituency-level for 71 elections held in 14 countries. Among the key findings of the thesis are that authoritarian regimes are most likely to perpetrate violence where the opposition has an intermediate level of electoral strength, where the populations are economically vulnerable, where there are no alternative means to manipulate the election and where the electoral support for the regime is declining.

The future of Africa remains a global concern, and leadership is intrinsically linked to the continent’s economic and social development. Most African nations are in need of dynamic change, which could be best brought about by inherently female leadership qualities, including participation, sharing information and motivation of followers. Women and the qualities they embody are recognized as change agents, and they symbolize unity and hope in many parts of the continent. However, women in Africa remain largely absent from political leadership. Given this absence, it is essential to examine the challenges that women face when accessing the political arena. All across Africa, the political arena is dominated by men. When women try to vie for political positions they face violence, some of which is sexual-based violence. This is used as a way of dissuading them from competing in what is considered a male domain. Generally, politics is perceived as ‘dirty’ and violent, and only those who have sufficient stamina can navigate the field. This chapter thus explores women’s vulnerability in electoral processes and the extent to which transitional justice in various African contexts ought to consider the inclusion of feminist frameworks in deciphering electoral violence situations. That is, theoretical frameworks which consider how electoral violence affects women uniquely. The chapter will highlight the role that women have played in politics, the challenges they have faced, especially electoral violence, and how they can be supported in continuing to play an effective role in politics. In particular, the chapter looks at how transitional justice can be employed to address some of the challenges women face when they attempt to access the political arena. Addressing past injustices is central to transitional justice, and this relates to this chapter as women have been discriminated against and blocked from accessing leadership positions due to their gender. This discrimination does not allow for democratic processes to take place. Using transitional justice, the challenge now is for women to find appropriate pathways that enable them to attain leadership positions. For this to happen, it is important to leave behind past injustices and restrictive modes of leadership.