Expertise and policy influence during international transition: Astri Suhrke confronts post-conflict peace and development in the 1990s

Against the background of NATO's war over Kosovo in 1999, this article deals with legal and legal-political aspects of humanitarian intervention without authorisation from the UN Security Council – an issue elucidating the foundations of international law and the role of state practice in its dynamic development. It is argued that unauthorised humanitarian intervention has no legal basis in current international law: It is incompatible with Article 2(4) of the Charter, the defence of a state of necessity is not applicable and no doctrine of unauthorised humanitarian intervention has been established under customary international law. From a legal-political perspective, the crucial question is whether to develop a doctrine of humanitarian intervention without the Security Council if necessary, or stick to the existing legal order, maintaining the Security Council as the sole authoritative organ for decision-making on humanitarian intervention, while working to make it more effective. The author favours the latter alternative. However, in the short term, an ad hoc ``emergency exit'' may be needed. The special circumstances precluding wrongfulness, such as state necessity, it is argued, are not a conceptually suitable framework for justifying humanitarian intervention. But unauthorised humanitarian intervention could be undertaken ad hoc, as a deviation from international law justified solely on moral grounds. This leaves open an option for intervention in extreme cases of human suffering, but at the same time avoids jeopardising the existing, hard-earned, international legal order and the central role of the Security Council. NATO's war over Kosovo, it is argued, was such a case of ad hoc intervention on moral grounds. The article assesses the legal-political consequences of this approach in the aftermath of NATO's bombing campaign.

The civil war in Syria has demonstrated the international community’s inability to act to protect civilians caught in mass atrocities during cases of U.N. Security Council deadlock, with permanent member vetoes presenting a significant legal obstacle to international humanitarian intervention. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) construct, created in response to the NATO intervention in Kosovo, was originally designed to overcome such Security Council paralysis by transforming the debate from the 'right' of states to intervene to the 'responsibility' of the entire international community to protect civilians, as well as opening the door to legitimate unilateral humanitarian intervention in cases of Security Council deadlock. However, despite the innovations of these 'hard R2P' principles, the R2P framework was weakened during U.N. adoption into a 'soft R2P' that is reflected in the current legal impasse over Security Council authorization for humanitarian intervention.This article examines a chemical and biological weapons (CBW) usage criterion as a condition legitimizing unilateral humanitarian intervention under R2P. A CBW usage criterion for R2P intervention can provide the international community with a framework for legitimate humanitarian intervention to end chemical and biological weapons attacks against civilians and deter such attacks in the future. Such a criterion would increase support for a principle of R2P intervention across realist, institutionalist and cosmopolitan perspectives, strengthening a norm of humanitarian intervention in cases of CBW attack and promoting the international community’s overall ability to protect civilians in war. To provide legitimacy to act against future such atrocities, the international community should thus begin efforts to incorporate into the U.N. framework an R2P principle authorizing intervention in cases of CBW use against civilians.

This chapter presents some prefatory reflexions on an old and extremely controversial concept, that of 'humanitarian intervention'. 'Intervention' has been used to indicate the use of force, but it can also be by other means, economic, political, or even legal. In addition to self-defence, the UN Charter provides for collective measures, which are coercive measures, including by military means. In the post cold-war euphoria, the Security Council adopted, since the beginning of the 1990s, an extensive interpretation of 'threats to peace', to cover humanitarian emergencies, opening the way to its taking 'collective measures' in such situations. In the wake of the Kosovo crisis, an Independent Commission was established and its report entitled 'The Responsibility to Protect', seeks to enlarge the scope of collective action through proper UN channels, by placing emphasis on prevention and peace-building, and on resorting to the General Assembly in case of paralysis of the Security Council. Keywords:cold war; collective action; General Assembly; humanitarian intervention; Kosovo crisis; responsibility to protect (R2P); Security Council; UN Charter

This article examines the coverage of NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia in March-June 1999 by the global television news organization, the Cable News Network (CNN). The article argues that NATO's precedent-setting action — the first conflict in which the world's most powerful military alliance intervened in the internal affairs of a sovereign state — was reported uncritically and presented by CNN as a humanitarian intervention. Television pictures tended to follow the news agenda set up by the US military. Few alternative views were aired and, most importantly, a fundamental change in the nature of NATO — from a defence alliance to an offensive peace-enforcing organization — was largely ignored. The article then goes on to analyse the international implications of such coverage, arguing that given the global reach and influence of a channel like CNN, this type of framing also shaped the wider view of the crisis in Kosovo.

The horrors of World War Two made it universally clear that the world cannot progress without general respect for human rights. Still, the need for humanitarian intervention arose several times before 1999, but international political and military organisations including the UN, were either late or hesitant to prevent genocides or other related human catastrophes worldwide. The NATO intervention in Kosovo, however, marked the beginning of the new era in international relations. The facet of this intervention in view of legality is the topic of this paper. The aim of this study, above all, is to analyze the Security Council actions, debates and resolutions concerning situation in Kosovo, and the level of impact that the military operation had in international law (in particular) and international relations (in general). The study uses many authentic documents issued by the United Nations Security Council itself and other material related to the theme in order to develop an argument on the points raised. Throughout, this research paper has attempted to answer numerous issues related to the topic and offer a balanced view on the all the themes examined. Several but distinct points raised focus on relevant core subjects, discuss the challenges and opportunities of the humanitarian intervention and offer recommendations regarding the future of such operation for the well being of the humanity.

The doctrine of humanitarian intervention ('new internationalism') prounced to justify NATO's intervention in the Kosovo conflict was internationalist, multilateralist and interventionist in outlook, encompassed a larger vision consistent with liberal norms and morality and required the satisfaction of extensive conditions before being implemented. However, on closer examination the doctrine does not emerge as something entirely new, legal or humanitarian. It will certainly not cause the demise of nationalism and the nation‐state and will probably strive without success to retain consistency in its application in other parts of the world. New internationalism has also contributed to the further erosion of Westphalian structures. Attempts to harmonize new internationalism with the regional security arrangements that are foreseen in the UN Charter would allow the doctrine's application to a more limited regional scope, actions thus only being pursued by regional states or organisations (e.g. NATO). As a result, it might become easier to avoid deadlock at the Security Council, garner international support for humanitarian interventions and avoid criticisms of neo‐imperialism or selective application.

Elections are the centerpiece of efforts to rehabilitate countries devastated by civil conflict, and they are held increasingly often and early. We argue that the inability of postconflict politicians to commit credibly to respect peace and democracy implies that elections will inflame tensions unless countries have previous democratic experience or elections are delayed to allow for institution building. We test this theoretical framework with a statistical model of economic recovery and conflict recurrence. We show that early elections, particularly in new democracies, hasten recurrence; delaying elections two years in new democracies or one year in more established democracies can help forestall renewed violence.

ACADEMIC AND POLICY CIRCLES have recently devoted much attention to agendas in civil wars. Their findings: the economic functions of violence contribute significantly to the duration of civil wars; they also pose serious obstacles to conflict resolution. This article takes another look at the impact of economic agendas on the attitudes of belligerents to conflict resolution. I argue that the economic activities of insurgents can become a source of political and military vulnerability and thus contribute to decisions to negotiate a peace settlement.After a brief methodological note on research into economic agendas in civil wars and a review of the main findings of the literature on the subject, I challenge the prevailing understanding of the impact of economic agendas on the course of civil wars and use the example of the Lebanese Forces, the main Christian militia in the Lebanese civil war (1975-90), to illustrate the connection between economic agendas, strength, and vulnerability.(f.1)DEFINITIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUESThe term 'economic agendas' refers to the belligerents' involvement in black-market activities, ranging from transactions carried out 'off the books,' which are not different in substance from regular economic transactions, to criminal endeavours, which, by their very nature, contravene the law. Underground economic activities differ from conventional economic transactions in three respects:(f.2) - Unregulated: Since they are kept secret from governments, they fall outside the purview of a multitude of laws regulating exchanges of commodities and labour. - Untaxed: They do not generate tax revenues for the state or contribute to social security programmes. - Unmeasured: They are reflected in no official statistics on the economy.The nature of the activities raises special methodological problems that account, in part, for the relative dearth of empirical studies. Connections to the criminal 'underworld' shroud war economies in a secrecy that hinders efforts to obtain tangible evidence of theoretical claims. The context of civil wars, with the attending disruption of normal life, makes data collection arduous and research in the field hazardous.Within these limitations, it is, nonetheless, possible to sketch the role of the black market in the decision-making of the Lebanese Forces.(f.3) Indeed, this is a particularly instructive case. When the structures of the state collapse, as they did in Lebanon during the civil war, belligerents are often able to secure control over territorial enclaves wrested away from the state. The underground economy becomes the main economic activity within these enclaves. This may not necessarily increase the transparency of specific transactions; it does, however, provide a better sense of the scope and nature of the belligerents' economic undertakings.ECONOMIC AGENDAS IN CIVIL WARSAlthough relatively new to academic analysis, the study of economic agendas in civil wars has already generated a significant body of literature, which can usefully be divided into two main streams. One emphasizes greed as a primary motivation of violence; the other situates the economic agendas of combatants within the framework of efforts to address grievances.(f.4)When the motive is greed, violence is aimed at circumventing the law. Its immediate functions are local rather than national in scope. When a state collapses, military capabilities give warlords the means to extract economic resources for private profit.(f.5) Violence becomes a continuation of economics by other means.(f.6) Therefore, there is more to war than winning; for bandits or warlords it is logical to perpetuate conflict as a means of pursing economic interests. The policy implications are stark. There can be little prospect for conflict resolution as long as economic benefits flow to combatants. Sanctions, such as economic embargoes, may be the only available means to force combatants to the negotiating table. …

The atrocities committed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against the civilian population in Kosovo are clearly contrary to international law. They constitute grave violations of human rights and amount to crimes against humanity. Attempts by the Yugoslav authorities to characterize the events there as internal affairs and to hide behind the concept of sovereignty lack legal foundation. These events are of deep concern to the international community. Does it follow that a group of States or a military alliance has the right to use force in reaction to this Situation? The prohibition of the use of force, as embodied in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, is one of the cornerstones of contemporary international law. The Charter provides for certain limited exceptions. One is the right to self-defence provided for in Article 51 of the Charter. But the application of Article 51 requires an attack . . . against a Member of the United Nations. Even the most generous interpretation of the right to collective self-defence cannot cover assistance to an ethnic minority that suffers repression at the hands of its government. Another exception to Article 2(4) of the Charter is enforcement action by the Security Council under Chapter VII, specifically Article 42. Before taking enforcement action, the Security Council has to determine the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression under Article 39 of the Charter. The Security Council has repeatedly characterized massive human rights violations or grave humanitarian situations as threats to the peace. With regard to Kosovo, the Security Council already stated in Resolution 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998 that it was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. In Resolution 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998 and in Resolution 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 it affirmed that the situation in Kosovo constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region. In this context, the Security Council imposed an embargo on military supplies in Resolution 1160 (1998) in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter. But it has not taken or authorized military enforcement action. A determination under Article 39 that the conditions for enforcement action exist does not authorize member States to use force to implement the Security Council's decision. The Council must take a separate decision under Article 42. The veto of one or several Permanent Members of the Security Council in a situation of this kind may well be in violation of article 55(c) of the Charter which enjoins the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights. But the casting of a veto or the mere prospect of a veto in the Security Council does not free other member States to do individually or collectively what only the Security Council can do. In 1950, the General Assembly of the United Nations, in response to the prospect of continuing paralysis of the Security Council, adopted the so-called Uniting for Peace Resolution, 377(V). It foresees recommendations for collective measures, including the use of armed force when necessary, if the Security Council fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. No such recommendation was passed by the General Assembly in the present case. It is doubtful whether an attempt to do so would have attracted the necessary majority. The Security Council, by emphasizing at the end of

Although conflict, war, violence, and terrorism affect tourism, research that identifies possible channels of these effects is scarce. We explore if the adverse effects are channelled through proximity to conflict areas. We use the conflict in Kosovo in 1999 and the country Croatia as a quasi-natural experiment and take advantage of the specific north-west to south-east orientation of Croatian Adriatic counties to identify the effect of NATO bombing in Kosovo on tourism outcomes as well as the potential proximity channel. Using data on the population of Croatian firms and the difference-in-differences identification strategy we find that tourism companies’ revenues decreased significantly due to NATO bombing, especially in accommodation services and in companies with 50 or more employees. However, using a synthetic control approach we find that the adverse effect is only transitory. Analysing heterogeneous effects with respect to the distance of the firm from Kosovo—using a linear and a more flexible model—we find compelling evidence that within-country proximity to conflict is not a significant channel through which the negative effect propagates.

The United States and its NATO allies have defended the air strikes against Yugoslavia on moral grounds (to stop atrocities) and security grounds (to prevent the conflict from spilling over to neighboring European countries), but curiously they have never articulated a legal justification for the intervention. The nearest the NATO countries have come to articulating a legal rationale has been to cite various resolutions of the Security Council, in which the Council has determined that the actions of Yugoslavia in Kosovo constitute a threat to peace and security in the region and, pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, demanded a halt to such actions. Notably, however, these resolutions do not employ the talismanic phrase, 'States may take all necessary means..' which would constitute an express Security Council authorization of the use of force.The failure of the NATO countries to articulate a legal basis for their humanitarian intervention in Kosovo is puzzling in that there are in fact several compelling legal arguments that could be made to justify the Kosovo intervention. The reason for this silence may be that each possible legal underpinning carries with it the specter of a practical consequence that the NATO countries traditionally hope to avoid. Unfortunately the policy of silence is a blunt and weak tool for navigating these concerns and, in the long term, frequently exacerbates the concerns and validates the objections to the legitimate use of force for humanitarian intervention.

While a number of publications show that natural resources are associated with internal armed conflict, surprisingly little research looks at how natural resources affect post-conflict peace. This article therefore investigates the relationship between natural resources and post-conflict peace by analyzing new data on natural resource conflicts. We argue that the effect of natural resources on peace depends on how a country’s natural resources can constitute a motive or opportunity for armed conflict. In particular, three mechanisms may link natural resources to conflict recurrence: disagreements over natural resource distribution may motivate rebellion; using natural resources as a funding source creates an opportunity for conflict; and natural resources may aggravate existing conflict, acting either as motivation or opportunity for rebellion, but through other mechanisms than distributional claims or funding. Our data code all internal armed conflicts between 1946 and 2006 according to the presence of these resource–conflict links. We claim such mechanisms increase the risk of conflict recurrence because access to natural resources is an especially valuable prize worth fighting for. We test our hypotheses using a piecewise exponential survival model and find that, bivariately, armed conflicts with any of these resource–conflict mechanisms are more likely to resume than non-resource conflicts. A multivariate analysis distinguishing between the three mechanisms reveals that this relationship is significant only for conflicts motivated by natural resource distribution issues. These findings are important for researchers and policymakers interested in overcoming the ‘curse’ associated with natural resources and suggest that the way forward lies in natural resource management policies carefully designed to address the specific resource–conflict links.

Background:In recent years, the concept of health security has received an international dimension. However, despite evident links between health and security the concept of health security is not used in either academic or political discourse in Serbia. It comes as no surprise then that even though the issue of security challenges is present in Serbian legislation, it has not been incorporated into the National Security Strategy, by which health threats would be recognized as one of contemporary security priorities.Methods:The method applied is descriptive and analytical, in keeping with social studies research methodology and the aims of this study.Results:The 20th and the 21st century in Serbia have both been marked by events indicating a clear link between health and security. The most telling example of this connection is the events of the 1990s, namely civil wars, sanctions and the NATO bombing. The results of our research show that poor health conditions, an increasing number of reemerging diseases and pandemics of new diseases can have serious implications for the functioning of the state and devastating consequences for its population. What is most at risk are people’s lives, capability for work, the entire economy and the capacities of the army and overall national security.Conclusion:The results of this study indicate an inextricable link between health and security and the necessity of viewing health through the lens of health security and incorporating it as such into the National Security Strategy.

The devastating Syrian civil war that began after the Arab Spring in 2011 has reminded the international community of the many consequences of civil war. However, this conflict is simply one of many ongoing conflicts around the globe. Civil war has a number of effects on individual lives, the country experiencing the conflict, as well as the international system more broadly. The humanitarian costs of civil war are steep. Individuals are negatively impacted by civil war in a myriad of ways. Three main areas of research are of interest: mortality, physical and mental trauma, and education. Several factors increase the number of deaths in a civil war, including a lack of democracy, economic downturns, and foreign assistance to combatants. Even if civilians survive conflict, they are likely to endure trauma that affects both mental and physical health. Strong evidence indicates that civil war spreads infectious diseases and severely diminishes life expectancy. Mental health is also likely to suffer in the face of conflict, as individuals often must overcome debilitating trauma. Finally, children are particularly susceptible in civil war settings. Children are often unable to continue their education as a consequence of civil war because combatants often target schools strategically or the state is unable to fund education as a result of funneling resources to the conflict. Civil wars also pose a number of threats to the state itself. First, a state that has experienced a civil war is much more likely to have another civil war in its future. Conflict recurrence has been explained through the type of settlement that concludes the initial civil war, institutions that may prevent recurrence like proportional representation, and the role of third parties in providing peace-ensuring security guarantees. Beyond recurrence of war, scholars have looked at the impact that civil wars have on state-level institutions, including democratization. While most state-level effects of civil war seem to be deleterious, there may also be positive effects, specifically in terms of female representation. Civil war in sub-Saharan Africa has been shown to increase the number of female representatives, perhaps providing an avenue for gender equality. Civil wars have ripple effects that impact neighboring countries and the international system more broadly. Proximate states are often challenged with an influx of refugees that may burden social programs or facilitate the spread of diseases and illicit arms. However, positive consequences of hosting refugees may include trading opportunities or economic growth from remittances. Moving beyond proximate states, civil wars have consequences for the entire globe. For example, civil wars have been demonstrated to spur international terrorism. The civil war literature has explored the various effects of conflict at the individual, state, and interstate level.

The NATO intervention in Kosovo (1999) is only the most recent of a series of illegal interventions for which plausible moral justifications can be given. Others include India's intervention in East Pakistan in response to Pakistan's massive human rights violations there (1971), Vietnam's war against Pol Pot's genocidal regime in Cambodia (1978), and Tanzania's overthrow of Idi Amin's murderous rule in Uganda (1979). Without commenting on what the dominant motives of the intervenors were, it is accurate to say that in each case military action was aimed at preventing or stopping massive human rights violations. All could qualify as instances of humanitarian intervention, which may be defined as follows: humanitarian intervention is the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.