Executive Compensation Schemes: Accelerants of Agency and Corporate Governance Problems in South Africa

Abstract

Executive remuneration has been less analysed and there is need for scrutiny on executive compensation structures and their implications on corporate governance. The study aimed to ascertain the role of executive compensation in accelerating agency and governance problems for FTSE/JSE Top-40 companies from 2008 - 2016. A Generalised Method of Moments was employed, and the results revealed that executive compensation structures can be accelerants of agency and corporate governance problems as the performance was found to negatively affect directors' remuneration. Also, governance had a negative impact on remuneration. Share option trading results confirm agency conflict as net trades and the number of directors that traded on their share options were found to deteriorate with improvement in remuneration. Therefore, it is recommended that the remuneration of executives must be aligned with performance and corporate governance. Moreover, executive directors must exercise their share options after the vesting period and in years they meet predetermined performance targets. Companies should adopt the proposed executive remuneration model in their policies to ensure that executive remuneration considers the governance of the companies they lead. The study's proposed model can be modified in future studies to incorporate other performance matrices such as the six capitals. Keywords: Remuneration Model, Executive Compensation, Governance, Share Options