Executive Attention Breadth and Rival Competitive Action: A Rivalrous View of Executive Attention

Abstract

Drawing on the attention-based view and the awareness-motivation-capability framework in competitive dynamics, this study provides a theoretical framework linking a focal firm’s public display of wide executive attention breadth to a rival’s subsequent volume of competitive actions. We argue that a wide executive attention breadth at the focal firm may motivate the rival into more aggressive attacks. We also argue that the focal firm’s level of managerial discretion will moderate the impact of its executive attention breadth on a rival’s competitive actions. Based on a unique sample of competitor dyads from duopoly industries composed of S&P 1,500 firms, we found a positive association between a focal firm’s executive attention breadth and a rival’s subsequent volume of competitive actions. We also found that when the focal firm had high media coverage, an indicator of reduced managerial discretion, the impact of its executive attention breadth on the rival’s action volume became stronger; whereas, when the focal firm had high market dominance, an indicator of increased managerial discretion, the impact of its executive attention breadth on the rival’s action volume became weaker.